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The Revolutions of 1917. Selected Writings: 2

Core Argument

Lenin’s The Revolutions of 1917. Selected Writings: 2 assembles his key interventions from February to October 1917 to demonstrate that the Russian Revolution was not a spontaneous accident but the logical outcome of the contradictions inherent in monopoly capitalism, intensified by the imperialist world war. The central thesis is that the capitalist mode of production had reached such an advanced stage of decay that the productive forces — factories, banks, railways, and syndicates — were already organised on a socialised basis, requiring only the transfer of political power to the proletariat to complete the transition to socialism. Lenin insists that the war economy had created state-monopoly capitalism, which he describes as the highest stage of preparation for socialism, and that the only missing element was the revolutionary seizure of power by the working class.

The book argues that the February Revolution established a fundamentally unstable ‘dual power’ — the bourgeois Provisional Government coexisting with the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies — and that this equilibrium could not last. Lenin’s writings trace the successive crises of April, June, and July 1917 to show how the conciliatory policy of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders, who repeatedly propped up the bourgeois government, led inexorably to counter-revolutionary violence and the closure of any peaceful path to working-class power. The core political claim is that the Bolsheviks, by applying a dialectical Marxist method to a rapidly shifting concrete situation, correctly identified each turning point — from the April Theses through the Kornilov revolt to the final insurrection — and that their victory in October was the product of patient explanatory work among the masses, not a minority coup. Lenin polemicises relentlessly against both the reformist wing of the Second International and the right wing of his own party, insisting that the revolutionary party must treat insurrection as an art, not a conspiracy, and that the objective conditions for socialist revolution had matured beyond any possibility of compromise.

Overview

The book opens with a theoretical chapter on production that establishes the economic foundation for the entire revolutionary project. Lenin argues that the imperialist war has driven the concentration and centralisation of capital to such an extreme that the productive apparatus is ripe for immediate social ownership. This chapter grounds the subsequent political analysis in Marx’s law of the tendency toward concentration, updated with concrete data on trusts, cartels, and state regulation. The polemical target is the reformist wing of the Second International, which argued that the war economy could be humanised, and the anarchist currents that rejected any form of centralised state control. Lenin insists that the workers’ state must seize the entire apparatus of production and distribution, not smash it.

The introduction and the first ‘Letter from Afar’ provide the political framework for the entire volume. Lenin dissects the class forces that produced the February Revolution, identifying the merger of Anglo-French imperialist intrigue with the spontaneous mass movement of workers and soldiers. He identifies three political forces — the defunct tsarist monarchy, the bourgeois Provisional Government, and the Soviets as the embryo of a workers’ government — and argues that the revolution must transition from its first stage to a second. The proletariat must not support the Provisional Government but instead arm itself, strengthen the Soviets, and organise a universal people’s militia that merges military, police, and state functions under popular control. Lenin insists that such measures constitute not socialism but the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry.

The April Theses and the Letters on Tactics mark the decisive break with the previous party line. Lenin argues that the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia is completed because state power has passed to the bourgeoisie, and that the old slogan of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry is now antiquated. The new task is to effect a split within the Soviets between proletarian elements and petty-bourgeois defencists. Lenin safeguards against accusations of Blanquism by citing the Paris Commune and insisting that the Bolsheviks must win a majority through patient explanatory work, not seize power as a minority. The party should be renamed Communist, not Social-Democrat, because Marx and Engels rejected ‘Social-Democracy’ as scientifically incorrect and because most ‘Social-Democratic’ leaders had betrayed socialism.

The middle chapters trace the successive political crises of 1917. The ‘Crisis of Power’ chapter analyses the April crisis as symptomatic of the unstable equilibrium produced by dual power, arguing that only the transfer of all power to the Soviets can end the war and economic catastrophe. The chapter ‘A Mote in the Eye’ dissects the formation of the coalition government on 6 May, characterising it not as a withdrawal of the bourgeoisie from government but as a withdrawal of the Menshevik and Narodnik leaders from the revolution. Lenin argues that the coalition government makes near-socialist ministers harmless appendages who shield the bourgeois government while using socialist phrases to influence the Soviets. The 18 June demonstration reveals that the vanguard of workers and soldiers overwhelmingly supports Bolshevik slogans, but the petty-bourgeois masses still vacillate.

The chapter ‘All Power to the Soviets!’ marks a decisive theoretical and political turning point. Lenin argues that after the July Days, the slogan ‘All Power to the Soviets’ ceased to be correct because the Soviets themselves, dominated by Menshevik and SR leaders, had become impotent accomplices of the bourgeoisie. Real state power has passed to a counter-revolutionary military clique, and the window for peaceful development has closed. The task now is to prepare for armed insurrection while maintaining all possible legal work and forming illegal organisations. The polemic against Kamenev over the Stockholm Conference and the chapter ‘On Compromises’ extend this logic, showing Lenin’s insistence on principled tactical flexibility without compromising revolutionary internationalism.

The final chapters build to the insurrection itself. ‘Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?’ is an urgent polemic arguing that the objective situation — peasant revolt, army disintegration, economic collapse, and the imminent surrender of Petrograd — has made armed uprising the only viable course. Lenin invokes Marx’s rules of insurrection, insisting that the revolutionary party must act with the greatest determination and always on the offensive. He accuses Zinoviev and Kamenev of strikebreaking for publishing their opposition in the non-Party press and demands their expulsion. The timeline and glossary provide the chronological and biographical apparatus necessary for understanding the compressed, overlapping dynamics of 1917–1918. The book’s place in the Marxist tradition is clear: it represents the practical application of the theory of the state developed in The State and Revolution and the analysis of imperialism to the concrete conditions of revolutionary Russia, arguing that the Bolshevik victory validated the Marxist conception of the state as an instrument of class rule and the necessity of smashing it rather than reforming it.

Chapter Guide

  1. Production — The capitalist mode of production has reached a stage of decay where state-monopoly capitalism has created the material conditions for socialism, requiring only the transfer of political power to the proletariat.
  2. Note on Dates — The thirteen-day gap between the Julian and Gregorian calendars carries substantive implications for understanding the tempo and sequence of revolutionary events.
  3. Introduction — The October Revolution demonstrated that society could be organised without bankers or capitalists, with Lenin’s writings tracing how the Bolsheviks prepared the working class for the conquest of power.
  4. The First Stage of the First Revolution (First ‘Letter from Afar’) — The February Revolution was the product of Anglo-French imperialist conspiracy merging with the spontaneous mass movement of workers and soldiers, creating dual power that must be resolved by a second revolution.
  5. Lenin’s Speech in the Finland Station Square to Workers, Soldiers and Sailors — The April Theses demand no support for the Provisional Government, transfer of all state power to the Soviets, and a change of the Party’s name to Communist.
  6. The ‘Crisis of Power’ — The April crisis reveals the unstable equilibrium of dual power, with only the transfer of all power to the Soviets able to end the war and economic catastrophe.
  7. A Mote in the Eye — The coalition government of 6 May represents a withdrawal of the Menshevik and Narodnik leaders from the revolution, making them harmless appendages of the bourgeois government.
  8. All Power to the Soviets! — After the July Days, the slogan ‘All Power to the Soviets’ is withdrawn because the Soviets have become impotent accomplices of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.
  9. Kamenev’s Speech in the CEC on the Stockholm Conference — Kamenev’s advocacy of participation in the Stockholm Conference is a breach of party discipline and a betrayal of revolutionary internationalism.
  10. On Compromises — By September 1917, with Bolshevik majorities in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets, the party must seize state power without delay or face the ruin of the revolution.
  11. Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power? (Extract) — Armed insurrection is the only viable course given peasant revolt, army disintegration, economic collapse, and the imminent surrender of Petrograd.
  12. Timeline — A chronological framework tracing the relentless radicalisation of the Russian working class and soldiery against the vacillation of the Provisional Government.
  13. Glossary — Biographical sketches and definitions of political factions, newspapers, and concepts referenced in the main text.
  14. Further Reading — A short bibliography recommending key texts for deeper study of the 1917 Russian Revolutions.

Key Concepts

  • Dual power — The unstable equilibrium between the bourgeois Provisional Government and the Soviets, which cannot last and must be resolved by the transfer of all power to one or the other.
  • State-monopoly capitalism — The highest stage of preparation for socialism, where the war economy has concentrated and organised the productive apparatus to the point where only the transfer of political power to the proletariat is required.
  • Revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry — The form of state power represented by the Soviets, which is not yet socialism but the necessary transitional form.
  • Defencism — The policy of supporting the bourgeois government in the imperialist war, which Lenin identifies as a betrayal of socialism and a product of petty-bourgeois deception.
  • Bonapartism — A form of state power that manoeuvres between two balanced hostile classes, leaning on the military clique, exemplified by Kerensky’s government after the July Days.
  • Insurrection as an art — The Marxist conception, derived from Marx, that insurrection must rely on the advanced class, a revolutionary upsurge of the people, and a turning-point when enemy vacillations are strongest.
  • Social-chauvinism — The policy of socialists who support their own bourgeoisie in the imperialist war, which Lenin identifies as the main obstacle to building a revolutionary International.

Chapters

14 chapters