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On Compromises

Core Argument

In “On Compromises,” Lenin argues that the Bolsheviks, having secured majorities in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets by September 1917, must seize state power without delay. He insists that a Bolshevik government would immediately propose a democratic peace, distribute land to the peasants, and restore democratic liberties, creating a government no one could overthrow. The majority of the people are already on their side, as proved by events from May to September. The Democratic Conference, Lenin contends, represents only the compromising petty-bourgeois upper strata, not the revolutionary people. Power must be taken now because the impending surrender of Petrograd by Kerensky would make Bolshevik chances far worse, and Kerensky could also frustrate the Constituent Assembly. A separate peace between British and German imperialists must be prevented by quick action.

Lenin contrasts the situation in July, when taking power would have been premature, with the present moment. By September, after the Kornilov revolt, the Bolsheviks had a majority in both Soviets, the people were desperate, and the Menshevik-SR bloc was vacillating. The compromise offered to that bloc had been rejected. All objective conditions for a successful insurrection now exist. Lenin insists the Party must treat insurrection as an art, as Marx taught: it must rely on the advanced class, a revolutionary upsurge of the people, and a turning-point when enemy vacillations are strongest. To wait for a formal majority is naive; history will not forgive the Bolsheviks if they fail to act.

Lenin excoriates the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks for resorting to fraud, violating their pledge to call a new Congress, and rigging the Democratic Conference. He reveals Kerensky as a Bonapartist and Kornilovite, allied with the Right wing of the socialist parties, making secret pacts with the Kornilov gang and imperialist ‘Allies’. The Bolsheviks erred by participating in this farce; they should have walked out in protest and sent their delegation to the factories and barracks to expose the fraud to the masses. The correct tactic, Lenin argues, is to boycott the Pre-parliament, as the Bolsheviks correctly boycotted the Bulygin Duma in 1905 when the revolution was maturing, but incorrectly participated in the Third Duma when the revolution was in decline.

Only a Soviet government, Lenin concludes, can end the capitalists’ seizure of printing presses and newspapers, suppress bourgeois counter-revolutionary papers, and make advertising a state monopoly. If the Soviets take full state power now, they will gain support from nine-tenths of the population. No class will dare resist if the Soviets do not waver. By seizing power now, the Soviets can still ensure peaceful development of the revolution; if this opportunity is missed, bitter civil war is inevitable, costing tens of thousands of lives. In a dramatic postscript, Lenin resigns from the Central Committee, accusing it of censoring his articles and refusing to address his demands, reserving the right to campaign among the party rank-and-file.