The ‘Crisis of Power’¶
Core Argument¶
In the chapter ‘The Crisis of Power’, the author dissects the volatile period of 19–21 April 1917, when civil war nearly erupted in Petrograd. The Provisional Government’s attempt to pacify the situation with a reassuring missive failed; within days, War Minister Guchkov resigned and the entire government threatened to collapse. These events are not accidental but symptomatic of a deep-rooted inner crisis generated by the dual power—the unstable equilibrium produced by the agreement between the Soviet and the capitalist Provisional Government. The Soviet, representing workers and soldiers opposed to the predatory war and capitalist profits, nonetheless continues to trust the Provisional Government. This overlapping of authority inevitably produces fresh complications. Three possible resolutions are offered: maintaining the status quo, forming a coalition cabinet, or transferring all power to the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. Only the third can end the war and economic catastrophe.
The dual power remains unresolved: the capitalist government retains real control, while the Soviets represent the majority. The Donets coal owners have deliberately disorganised production since March, and conciliatory meetings have achieved nothing. The capitalists, who profited enormously from the war, will inevitably fight for supreme power. The working majority, aware of its numerical strength, cannot accept rule by the capitalist minority or mere ‘agreements’ between them. The Narodnik and Menshevik leaders bear sole responsibility for the crisis, as they lead the Soviets yet pursue conciliation with the capitalists rather than allowing the majority to act against them. This wavering is a petty-bourgeois phenomenon. The only way out is for the worker and peasant majority to decide to act against the capitalist minority.
On the Kronstadt incident, the local revolution has advanced further than in Petrograd. The principle at stake is whether central authority may endorse locally elected officials. Engels is quoted demanding complete self-government through elected officers and abolition of all state-appointed local authorities. Tsereteli and Skobelev, by endorsing the Provisional Government’s right to approve elected officials, have betrayed democracy. Regarding economic disorganisation, Avilov’s resolution correctly indicts capitalist predation but then appeals to the ‘state’ to act against capitalists, forgetting that the state is an organ of class rule. A Marxist must distinguish capitalist, petty-bourgeois and proletarian revolutionary democracy.
After the February-to-May 1917 experience, invoking a unified ‘revolutionary democracy’ is a deception. The class fusion against tsarism ended with the first agreement between the Duma’s Provisional Committee and the Soviet, and class struggle began. The April and May crises produced a definite class cleavage within Russian revolutionary democracy; ignoring this is petty-bourgeois helplessness. Appealing to the current ‘state’ and ‘revolutionary democracy’ against predatory capitalism drags the working class backward and preaches stopping the revolution. The state after April and May is one of ‘predator’ capitalists, who, through figures like Chernov and Tsereteli, have tamed a large portion of petty-bourgeois ‘revolutionary democracy’. This state hinders the revolution in all domestic and foreign policy. Entrusting it with fighting capitalist predators is futile.