15. The 23 February Coup¶
Core Argument¶
Chapter 15: The 23 February Coup¶
The conventional narrative of the 1981 coup attempt, which presents King Juan Carlos as democracy’s saviour, is a carefully constructed myth. In reality, the monarch was the operation’s chief organiser, a Bonapartist figure who waited to see which side would prevail before committing. The coup is widely misidentified with Colonel Antonio Tejero, but he was merely a useful idiot. The true organisers were General Alfonso Armada, the king’s former private secretary, and General Jaime Milans del Bosch. Armada planned a government headed by himself, with the king’s involvement. Tejero’s role was to storm parliament and detain deputies, but he refused to allow Armada into the chamber, aborting the plan. King Juan Carlos delayed seven hours before publicly opposing the coup, only acting once its failure was certain. The coup’s ultimate aim—removing Prime Minister Suárez—was achieved regardless.
Sabino Fernández Campo, the king’s loyal secretary and a Francoist monarchist, gave a deathbed interview that contradicted the official narrative. On the afternoon of 23 February, he found the king and queen calm, listening to the radio. The king spoke on the phone with Armada, saying shots were “not in the plan” and telling him to stay at his post. When Tejero claimed to act “in the name of the king,” Sabino insisted the king publicly deny this and address the nation. He later found the king toasting champagne, and rebuked him for endangering the monarchy. The king, trembling, pleaded: “Sabino, please save me! Save me, save the Monarchy.” He admitted he “knew what was going to happen.” Sabino then arranged the king’s calls to the Captains General. The masses took to the streets spontaneously, and the ruling class feared working-class resistance.
Declassified German Foreign Ministry documents reveal a conversation between West German Ambassador Lothar Lahn and King Juan Carlos on 26 March 1981. The king showed no antipathy towards the plotters, displaying “much more understanding, if not sympathy,” stating they “only wanted what we are all striving for, namely, the re-establishment of discipline, order, security and calm.” He said 23F “should be forgotten as soon as possible” and planned to intercede so “nothing too serious happens to them,” blaming Adolfo Suárez for failing to take the military’s “justified wishes seriously.” The trial of the coup leaders was a sham; only Armada, Milans and Tejero received significant sentences, and none served their full terms. All references to the monarch had disappeared from the ruling. Further coup plots followed, aborted only by the bourgeoisie’s fear of a revolutionary working-class response.