14. Decline and Fall: Demoralisation¶
Core Argument¶
In Spain between 1978 and 1980, the working class suffered a catastrophic collapse in morale, directly proportional to the immense hopes of the preceding period. The leadership’s policy of endless pacts and compromises with the Suárez regime produced bewilderment and despondency among activists, who felt the leaders had applied the brakes on the movement. The old state apparatus, bureaucracy, Church, and Civil Guard remained intact behind a false democratic façade. The PCE and PSOE leaders limited their objective to a formal democracy, betraying socialist aspirations and refusing to use the mass movement to fight for genuine democracy. Mass unemployment deepened the depression, replacing class struggle with a struggle for survival. A new layer of middle-class intellectuals, loyal to the leadership’s line, displaced class-conscious proletarian militants, and an entire generation of underground fighters was cast aside. The PCE, which grew from 15,000 to 240,000 members after legalisation, saw its influence collapse by the early 1980s, with membership and paper sales plummeting. The situation reached a deadlock: workers’ struggles were semi-paralysed, the bourgeoisie could not establish order, and the army conspired, exemplified by the 1978 Operation Galaxia coup plot, which received lenient sentences.
The text draws a historical parallel between the Spanish monarchy and the Russian Tsar, arguing that personal relations play a non-negligible role in history. Nicholas II of Russia was a weak monarch dominated by his strong-willed wife, Alexandra, who introduced Rasputin into the court, helping to undermine the monarchy. Queen Sofia of Spain is presented as having reactionary views rooted in her Greek royal family background, which was linked to fascist tendencies. During the 1981 coup attempt, the king’s secretary caught the royal couple drinking a champagne toast, the purpose of which could not have been toasting democracy. The Zarzuela Palace was a hotbed of counter-revolutionary conspiracy, with General Armada as the king’s close adviser. The king demanded Suárez transfer Armada to Madrid, which Suárez refused. Suárez resigned in early 1981, hated and despised by millions.
On 29 January 1981, Adolfo Suárez resigned as president. The resignation followed a lunch at the Zarzuela Palace where the king left the table, allowing conspirator generals to demand Suárez’s resignation. The king’s secretary reviewed Suárez’s resignation speech and suggested he thank the king. Suárez added the phrase “I leave without anyone asking me to do so,” which was untrue; the king had told him to resign to allow a government headed by General Armada, averting a coup. Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo replaced him, but the UCD continued to fragment. Inflation reached fifteen per cent, unemployment exceeded two million, and the National Employment Agreement cut living standards. The business community grew impatient with Calvo-Sotelo’s continuation of Suárez’s policies. Calvo-Sotelo’s brief government was entirely reactionary on democratic rights, passing the LOAPA to limit regional powers and forcing Spain into NATO against majority public protest. On 5 February 1981, Defence Minister Rodríguez Sahagún appointed General Armada as second-in-command of the general staff, positioning him to head a government of national concentration. The king immediately congratulated Armada. On Friday 20 February, Calvo-Sotelo presented himself as the new presidential candidate but failed to reach the quorum needed for inauguration. A second vote was set for Monday 23 February. That day proved fateful.