16. The Aftermath¶
Core Argument¶
Chapter 16: The Aftermath
This chapter dissects the legacy of Spain’s Democratic Transition, arguing that it was a farce which preserved the old regime’s power structures while crushing working-class aspirations. The ruling class benefited enormously from a pact engineered by the leaders of the PCE and PSOE. The Communist Party, despite its working-class roots, never pursued socialism or full democracy. Instead, under Santiago Carrillo, it sought a historic compromise that ceded everything to conservatives. After the 1977 elections, the PCE halted street and trade union mobilisations, demoralising its activists. By drifting rightwards to compete with the PSOE, it lost its identity and suffered splits, its vote share collapsing from nearly ten per cent in 1977 to 3.7 per cent in 1982. Carrillo was expelled from the party in 1985, his followers later joining the PSOE; the liberal press praised him after his death for saving the system.
The PSOE won a landslide in 1982 on a platform of change, yet in government it implemented privatisations, liberalisation, and industrial restructuring that destroyed jobs. Right-wingers controlled the economic ministries. González’s U-turn on NATO—campaigning for membership after opposing it—and the state-sponsored GAL death squads, which killed twenty-seven people in a dirty war against ETA, marked the party’s betrayal of its base. Former interior minister José Barrionuevo was jailed; González denied authorisation and was never charged. General strikes in 1985 and 1988 paralysed the country. In the 1991 Gulf War, González backed US imperialism. After leaving office, he accumulated wealth through directorships and defended ‘democracy’ in Latin America, supporting the Venezuelan opposition and the 2002 coup against Hugo Chávez. Spain was the only country after the US to recognise the Carmona junta, motivated by Spanish business interests threatened by nationalisations.
The monarchy, too, was exposed. In 2003, Juan Carlos involved Spain in the Iraq war against popular will. His reputation collapsed after a luxurious elephant-hunting trip to Botswana during a severe economic crisis, paid for by taxpayers. He was forced to abdicate in 2014, replaced by his son Felipe VI without a referendum, despite mass demonstrations and polls showing over sixty per cent of Spaniards wanted one. He left behind twenty-six per cent unemployment and over three million in severe poverty.
The chapter concludes that corruption is endemic from the Franco era. The PP operated an illegal kickback system, exemplified by the Palma Arena overspend, the unused Castellón airport, the Bankia ‘black cards’ scandal, and the Cifuentes master’s degree forgery. In Operación Púnica, a judge found a “criminal organisation” of PP politicians and businessmen engaged in embezzlement, fraud, and tax evasion. The party was convicted of corruption for the first time in Spain, judges finding “a real and effective system of institutional corruption” in public contracting. The PP government finally collapsed in 2018, replaced by a minority PSOE government, but the text argues that Spain requires a root-and-branch change of the entire system.