The Revolutionary Crisis in Germany¶
Core Argument¶
This chapter comprises two reports delivered by Trotsky in October 1923, at the height of revolutionary ferment in Germany. The core argument is that the German revolution, while dependent on internal class forces, will also be determined by the capacity of capitalist powers to intervene—and that this capacity is fundamentally limited. Trotsky’s central strategic claim is that Britain is now impotent on the European continent, a fact of epochal significance for revolutionary strategy.
The argument proceeds through a historical analysis of British foreign policy. Britain’s traditional role, Trotsky contends, was to maintain a European balance of power by supporting the weaker of two contending land powers against the stronger—first Spain against France, then France against Germany, and so on. This allowed Britain to exert enormous influence at little cost. The First World War broke this pattern: Germany had grown too strong for Britain to balance by proxy, forcing direct military intervention. But the consequence was that France emerged as the undisputed hegemon of bourgeois Europe, with Germany prostrate at her feet. From that moment, Britain lost her continental leverage.
Trotsky offers two concrete examples. When France occupied the Ruhr over British objections, Curzon’s protests were ignored and Britain resigned herself. When Turkey defied Britain, the latter could only counterpose the Greeks, who were smashed; Britain then abandoned Constantinople. These episodes demonstrate that Britain, however formidable at sea and in finance, cannot project decisive land power. Her role in any intervention against a German revolution would be limited to that of quartermaster and pirate—supplying money, blockading ports, and provisioning French, Belgian, Polish, and Czechoslovak forces.
The polemical thrust is directed against those who overestimate British power and thus counsel caution or retreat. Trotsky insists that understanding British impotence is essential for international policy: the more clearly revolutionaries grasp and proclaim it, the less Britain will brandish threats. The decisive question reduces to France’s conduct, not Britain’s. A note appended to the text explains the historical context: on 12 October 1923, the German Communist Party entered coalition governments in Saxony and Thuringia to access state arsenals; by 21 October, social-democratic vacillation at Chemnitz defeated plans for a general strike; on 24 October, Reichswehr troops deposed the Saxon government. The chapter thus captures the precise moment when revolutionary opportunity collided with political indecisiveness, and Trotsky’s analysis of the international balance of forces was intended to steel the Comintern for the struggle ahead.