Anglo-Soviet Relations 1921-1923¶
Core Argument¶
In the early 1920s, the Soviet leadership confronted a world in which the promised international revolution had been delayed, forcing a strategic reckoning with the capitalist powers. Trotsky, analysing the period from late 1920 to late 1922, observed that the British bourgeoisie, led by Lloyd George, had reluctantly accepted the durability of Soviet power after the regime survived the catastrophic famine of 1921. This recognition, Trotsky argued, drove Britain toward economic relations rather than continued intervention, even as French elements still pressed for military action. The refusal of famine relief in March 1922 was interpreted as a tactical concession to anti-Soviet opinion ahead of the Genoa Conference, not a serious expectation of collapse. By October 1922, Trotsky concluded that European bourgeois governments were incapable of long-term policy due to economic instability and inter-imperialist rivalry. He dismissed Leslie Urquhart’s ninety-nine-year concession bid as a speculative bet on capitalism’s survival, noting that Britain’s hostile policy—particularly over the Straits and Turkey—offered no basis for normal relations. At the Fourth Comintern Congress in November 1922, he explained that genuine economic collaboration with Russia remained scarce because capitalism’s instability prevented the long-range planning such cooperation required.
The conservative wing of British capital, triumphant after the war, pursued openly hostile policies toward the Soviet Union. Lord Curzon’s May 1923 ultimatum demanded concessions on fishing rights, propaganda in the East, compensation for two British spies, and the recall of Soviet representatives from Afghanistan and Persia. The Soviet reply combined tactical concessions—withdrawing a letter, paying 100,000 roubles, and accepting fishing limits—with firm refusals on recalling representatives. The ten-day ultimatum stretched into forty-one days of negotiation, ending in compromise. British policy was characterised as the most treacherous in the world, historically setting states against each other while staying aside. The ultimatum’s real target was Soviet national policy in the East, which threatened colonial rule. The Conservative right wing, facing likely replacement by a Labour government, may have attempted to provoke a fascist war against the USSR. Curzon hoped to offend British public opinion, but the Soviet reply outmanoeuvred him. The affair concluded with the Soviet Union paying compensation for two British agents and sacrificing what bourgeois diplomacy terms ‘prestige’—though the Soviet concept of prestige differed sharply from Lord Curzon’s. The outcome demonstrated that the Soviet Union emerged stronger, a fact sharply emphasised by its simultaneous preliminary negotiations with Japan, a major imperialist power linked to Britain and the Entente.