3. The Venezuelan Revolution in danger¶
Core Argument¶
This chapter presents a stark assessment of the Venezuelan process in the wake of the failed April 2002 coup. The correspondent describes a pre-revolutionary situation: the working class and people possess immense potential but lack the decisive element of a revolutionary leadership capable of overthrowing capitalism. Since April 13, organs of popular power—Bolivarian circles, land committees, and popular assemblies—have proliferated, yet they remain marked by inexperience, organisational weakness, and a critical absence of coordination. The messianic leadership of Chávez, while enjoying mass support, is no substitute for a revolutionary party. The mass movement must therefore create a popular action front and begin the urgent work of party construction. The organised workers’ movement has not yet assumed its vanguard role; the hub of mobilisation remains the popular organisations in poor areas. The counterrevolution, though weakened and lacking the strength for a military coup, retains a social base among the middle class and backward layers disenchanted by economic stagnation. The strike that followed the coup affected only 16 percent of the labour force, though conspirators caused significant disruption in the oil industry.
Alan Woods argues that the forces of revolution remain intact and the counterrevolution has failed, creating an extraordinarily favourable situation. The generalisation of popular committees is the most important factor; linking them on local, regional, and national scales is crucial. A democratically convened conference should decide a programme of action, where Marxists will propose socialism and workers’ power. The organised working class lagging behind is a weakness, but Marxists should base themselves on the most advanced elements, especially youth in committees, while also struggling inside unions to purge corrupt leaders. The key question is the party and leadership; the revolution remains in danger until the working people take power.
The chapter insists that the movement must now destroy the counterrevolution’s social and economic base through expropriation of land, banks, big businesses, and the property of counterrevolutionaries and US imperialists. Concessions to Washington would be fatal; weakness invites aggression. The revolution must pass from defence to an offensive programme of expropriation, as the bourgeoisie is implacable. The armed forces are decisive; reactionary elements in the officer corps must be purged. A serious mass offensive will tilt the balance toward revolutionary soldiers. The working class must establish elected Committees for the Defence of the Revolution in every workplace, neighbourhood, and barracks, and take power. The masses must be armed and a people’s militia formed under committee control. Workers should take over factories, land should be nationalised, and peasants should take over estates. An emergency decree should nationalise main enterprises, land, and banks. Such steps would cut the ground from under counterrevolution, cause shock waves across Latin America, and make US direct intervention unlikely. The alternative is defeat. A single Marxist party is needed to carry the revolution through to the end.