Part II¶
Core Argument¶
The Democratic Conference, convened by Tsereteli in late September, was an artificial body designed to give coalitionist parties a preponderance, but it ended in fiasco. Kerensky refused ministerial responsibility, leaving the government answerable to the Cadets and Allied embassies. Though the Conference voted against coalition with the Cadets, Tsereteli argued that no other bourgeois parties existed, and negotiations with the rejected Cadets continued behind closed doors. A Provisional ‘Parliament’ was elected, but the new ministry maintained formal independence from it. This amounted to a capitulation by the lower middle-class democrats to the liberal bourgeoisie who had supported Kornilov. The masses saw the coalitionist parties as bailiffs for the bourgeoisie.
The war dragged on without perspective. Riga had been surrendered to the Germans to terrorise public opinion; Rodzianko openly stated that surrendering Petrograd would be no great misfortune, as the Germans would discipline it and crush the Revolution. The soldiers’ section of the Petrograd Soviet demanded peace or the government’s removal. At the front, conditions deteriorated and army committees were detested. Delegates asked the Soviet what to do. The Petrograd Soviet demanded Soviet power, land transfer, workers’ control, and peace negotiations. In the villages, peasants began seizing land, and the government repressed them. The Bolsheviks argued that only Soviet power could help.
During the Democratic Conference, Trotsky proposed a demonstrative exit and boycott of the Democratic Council to show the masses that the coalitionists had brought the Revolution to an impasse. He argued that authority must be wrested from those incapable of governing, and that a Soviet government could only be achieved through revolutionary methods—mobilising forces around the Soviets, the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets, and a rising. Lenin supported this in a letter. The party was hesitant after the July Days, but experience on the Council strengthened the Left Wing. By the time the Council became a ‘Provisional Parliament’, the party was ready to break away.
The Military Revolutionary Committee was formed as a Soviet staff counter to Kerensky’s. It appointed commissioners to all garrison sections and arms stores, effectively controlling arms distribution. Regiments recognised only Soviet-appointed commissioners. The Petrograd Soviet held a successful review of its forces on 4th November, with huge crowds attending meetings across the city. The garrison meeting reaffirmed loyalty to the Military Revolutionary Committee, while the military staff’s attempt to summon unit delegates failed when regiments refused to move without Soviet permission. On 6th November, the Military Revolutionary Committee began seizing administrative offices, placing guards at the Telephone Exchange, Telegraph Office, Post Office, and State Bank. The Smolny Institute was fortified. During the night of 6th-7th November, key points in the city passed into Soviet hands without resistance. On 7th November, the government’s closure of Bolshevik and Soviet newspapers was countermanded. Troops surrounded the Winter Palace. At the Petrograd Soviet, Trotsky announced the government no longer existed. The Winter Palace was taken, Kerensky fled, and the other ministers were arrested.
The Right Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, numbering about sixty delegates (one-tenth of the Congress), walked out in protest, throwing “the whole responsibility” for subsequent events onto the Bolsheviks and Left Socialist Revolutionaries. The Left SRs, reflecting the radicalism of the poorest peasantry, gravitated toward the proletariat but feared cutting ties with the old party. After hesitation, they concentrated their forces on the same side of the barricade as the Bolsheviks.