2. On the Brink of the Abyss¶
Core Argument¶
2. On the Brink of the Abyss
This chapter decisively repudiates the notion that the outbreak of the First World War can be attributed to individual psychology or the vagaries of free will, a position it identifies with postmodernist historiography. Such explanations, which dwell on Kaiser Wilhelm II’s withered arm or difficult childhood, are dismissed as superficial. While individual character is not irrelevant, it only becomes historically significant insofar as it corresponds to the objective demands of a given situation. The real causes of the war are material and systemic: Germany’s belated entry into the colonial partition, its explosive industrial and military ascent, the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine, the accelerating naval arms race with Britain, and the crystallisation of rival military blocs.
The contrasting temperaments of the impulsive Kaiser and the aloof British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey are shown to be faithful reflections of their respective empires’ structural positions. Germany was an upstart industrial power hemmed in by rivals; Britain was an established empire content with its accumulated plunder. Grey’s apparent vacillations were not personal indecision but a precise expression of British imperial interests. London wanted war but sought to avoid a costly continental land campaign, preferring instead to let France and Russia bleed Germany dry before intervening decisively. Trotsky is cited to demonstrate that British diplomacy deliberately raised hopes in Berlin of British neutrality while simultaneously assuring Paris and Petrograd of intervention, thereby provoking Germany into war. The Schlieffen Plan’s violation of Belgian neutrality threatened British naval hegemony, providing the casus belli.
Bethmann-Hollweg played a double game, publicly urging mediation while privately pressing Austria to attack Serbia quickly and present a fait accompli. Austria declared war on 28 July and bombarded Belgrade the following day. The chapter concludes that the war’s origins lie in objective imperialist contradictions, not the neuroses of individuals. Diplomacy, as illustrated by Aesop’s fable of the wolf and the lamb, served only to make the other side appear responsible for one’s own aggression. Despite public talk of peace, all major powers were arming.