The gathering storm¶
Core Argument¶
The Gathering Storm
The chapter opens with a stark portrait of Egypt’s economic deterioration by the late 2000s, a crisis that forms the material backdrop for the political convulsions to come. The minimum wage had been frozen at 35 Egyptian pounds per month since 1984, while inflation peaked at 11.8 percent in 2008. A 2009 study revealed that the minimum wage had collapsed from nearly 60 percent of per capita GNP in 1984 to just 13 percent in 2007—among the lowest globally. The global food crisis of 2007 and the 2008 recession compounded the damage: Suez Canal receipts declined, remittances fell, foreign direct investment dropped from $9.5 billion to $6.7 billion, and exports fell by 11.8 percent in 2009. Official unemployment rose from 8.7 to 9.4 percent, with the real figure believed to be in double digits. The regime sought to stave off food riots through trade agreements with Mercosur and planned deals with Russia and South Africa.
Against this economic decay, a wave of strikes and factory occupations erupted in December 2006, when 27,000 Mahalla textile workers struck, led by 3,000 low-paid female workers. This sparked further actions by cement workers, railway workers, Cairo Metro workers, and bus drivers. In February 2007, 21,000 textile workers struck in the Nile Delta, and 12,000 workers at Kafr al-Dawa occupied their factory. In April 2007, 5,000 workers at three flour mills in Cairo and Giza occupied their factories and continued production under workers’ control. In September 2007, the Mahalla workers again occupied their factory, with 10,000 to 15,000 sleeping on the premises. The regime made concessions, postponing privatisation in May 2008 and announcing a minimum wage increase, though no start date was specified, and delaying implementation of the Property Tax Law in early 2010.
The chapter argues that the boycott campaign, while supported, is insufficient alone; it must be linked to concrete action and an alternative. In Egypt, lacking other organs of mass struggle, the democratic programme should be tied to the demand for a revolutionary constituent assembly when the time is ripe, alongside organising action committees in neighbourhoods, factories, and schools. ElBaradei’s significance lies in providing a national point of reference for militant workers, youth, and the poor, overcoming the previous limit of isolated struggles. The campaign’s success depends on factors including the regional situation, the regime’s ability to split the movement, and the development of mass leaders. If it becomes a true mass movement, ElBaradei will be a minimal, accidental catalyst, carried forward by the masses towards the 2012 presidential elections and revolutionary confrontation. Democratic demands are supported but must be connected to fighting the capitalist class, state bureaucracy, army, and imperialism. Winning democratic demands would boost working-class confidence and organisation, leading to demands for price controls, wage increases, re-nationalisation, workers’ control, and socialism. The regime is already splitting; neither repression nor concessions will save it. The overthrow of dictatorship will not solve all issues; only abolishing capitalism can. The period up to the presidential elections will prepare for revolutionary events that will shake the entire region.