The new government of el Sebsi forced to make concessions¶
Core Argument¶
Jorge Martín’s analysis of Tunisia’s post-revolutionary conjuncture, written in March 2011, argues that the formation of Béji Caïd el Sebsi’s government represents a ruling-class manoeuvre to contain a still-ascendant revolutionary movement. The core narrative thrust is that the Tunisian masses, having forced successive concessions—the removal of old-regime ministers, the dissolution of the RCD, the expulsion of regional governors and company managers, and finally the resignation of Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi—now face an attempt by capital and imperialism to restore bourgeois normality under a more palatable figurehead. El Sebsi, a Bourguiba-era minister presented as untainted by Ben Ali, is the chosen instrument.
Martín details the immediate context: Ghannouchi’s fall followed mass demonstrations on 25–27 February, during which police killed at least five protesters attempting to enter the Interior Ministry. The resignations of Ahmed Ibrahim and Ahmed Néjib Chebbi—figures from the legal opposition who had provided left cover for the “unity” government—are cited as evidence that the masses despise those who collaborated with Ben Ali until the last moment. The new government’s composition is scrutinised: key portfolios (defence, interior, justice, foreign affairs) remain unchanged, while economic ministers include Abdelhamid Triki, a former Ben Ali official and alternate director at the World Bank. The employers’ organisation UTICA’s welcome of the government is presented as damning confirmation of its class character.
Martín acknowledges the concessions wrested—dissolution of the political police and state security directorate, and the promise of elections to a Constituent Assembly on 24 July—but insists these are tactical. El Sebsi’s own language is quoted to expose his priorities: “re-establish security” and restore “work conditions, productivity, efficiency and the continuity of the state.” This is read as a demand to end strikes, sit-ins, and revolutionary committee rule, i.e., to restore capitalist order.
The polemic is directed against two targets. First, the left organisations in Tunisia, which Martín accuses of issuing statements without action and of failing to convene a national assembly of delegates from the revolutionary committees—the only body with genuine revolutionary legitimacy. Second, the Islamist party Ennahda, which is included in the Council for the Protection of the Revolution despite having played no role in the uprising. The theoretical context is classical Trotskyist: the analysis hinges on the balance of forces favouring the workers, the absence of a revolutionary leadership, and the necessity of a programme of socialist transformation to fulfil the masses’ demands for bread, jobs, and dignity—demands that bourgeois democracy cannot satisfy.