Reject the government reshuffle, the revolutionary people must take power¶
Core Argument¶
Here, Jorge Martín argues that the Tunisian government reshuffle of January 2011 was a cynical manoeuvre by the ruling class, designed to preserve the old regime’s essential structures while appearing to concede to the revolutionary movement. The core narrative thrust is that the masses must reject this cosmetic change and seize power themselves, because the bourgeoisie—backed by US and French imperialism—cannot be trusted to deliver genuine democracy or social transformation.
Martín’s key claim is that the new cabinet, though stripped of most ministers from Ben Ali’s last government, leaves the hated Ghannouchi as Prime Minister and retains three of Ben Ali’s ministers, including a Defence Minister who served under the dictator in the early 2000s. The government is stacked with “technocratic” figures and “independent businessmen,” a transparent attempt to clear the streets and send workers back to work. Ghannouchi’s appeal for Tunisians “to go back to work” and the bosses’ organisation UTICA’s full support are cited as evidence of the government’s real purpose: to demobilise the revolution.
Martín draws heavily on the immediate historical context of the Tunisian uprising, referencing the two weeks of mass strikes and demonstrations that followed Ben Ali’s overthrow. He highlights the role of the UGTT trade union, whose Central Committee voted 72-11 to accept the new government, despite opposition from four Executive Bureau members and representatives of key sectors like teachers and health workers. The author argues that the union bureaucracy, long loyal to Ben Ali, was pressured by EU and US delegations into selling the reshuffle to its ranks. This is presented as a betrayal, and Martín predicts growing calls to purge the UGTT of pro-RCD elements.
The chapter’s polemic is sharp and multi-directional. It attacks the “so-called opposition parties” like PDP and Ettajdid (the former Communist Party), which are accused of betraying the martyrs by joining Ghannouchi’s government. It also critiques the January 14 Front, whose call for a National Conference is welcomed as a step forward but criticised for retaining illusions in “independent personalities” and petty-bourgeois elements. Martín insists that the Conference should be composed of elected delegates from revolutionary committees and trade unions, not middle-class liberals who played little role in the revolution. He further argues that the Front’s focus on democratic tasks postpones the social tasks of the revolution; the goal must be not just a “civil, democratic and modern” Tunisia, but a socialist one free from exploitation.
The chapter concludes with a report of the state’s violent crackdown on the sit-in outside the Prime Minister’s office—army withdrawal, anti-riot police using batons and tear gas—and an appeal for the working class and poor neighbourhoods of Tunis to come to the aid of the revolutionary youth. The only solution, Martín insists, is for the revolutionary people to take power into their own hands and completely uproot the old regime and all its institutions.