For a national general strike against the Ghannouchi government!¶
Core Argument¶
This chapter, written in the immediate aftermath of Ben Ali’s flight, analyses the volatile balance of forces in Tunisia in late January 2011. Its core argument is that the revolutionary movement of workers and youth had the power to overthrow the Ghannouchi “national unity” government—a direct continuation of the RCD regime—but was being held back by the absence of a clear revolutionary leadership and a coherent programme for replacing the state.
The text documents a series of concrete events to demonstrate the government’s paralysis. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Rachid Ammar, was forced to plead with demonstrators camped at the Kasbah to disperse, and when they refused, he could do nothing. The council of ministers met through a back door and promised an “imminent government reshuffle” that never materialised. Counter-revolutionary attempts were feeble: a pro-government rally in Tunis gathered only 200 people and was quickly broken up. The real power lay in the streets.
The chapter draws heavily on the regional general strikes called by the UGTT in Sfax, Sidi Bouzid, and other towns. These were explicitly political strikes aimed at bringing down the government, not economic stoppages. The Sfax UGTT’s statement is quoted at length: it called for the overthrow of the government and the dissolution of the RCD, while simultaneously deciding which vital sectors (hospitals, water, electricity, bakeries) would continue working under union authority. The author presents this as a practical demonstration of workers’ power and control, directly refuting bourgeois accusations of “chaos” and “disruption.”
The historical context is the Tunisian revolution’s first fortnight. The theoretical framework is Marxist: the situation is described as one of “dual power,” where embryonic revolutionary committees and trade union structures already exercised authority at a local level, but had not yet been linked nationally into a system of soviets. The author polemicises sharply against the UGTT’s national leadership, which conducted “frantic negotiations” with liberal figures to propose a new government to the interim president—dismissed as “parliamentary cretinism of the worst sort.” The former Communist Party (Ettijdad) is ridiculed for staying in the government after its own conditions were violated.
The chapter also takes aim at the January 14 Front, a coalition of left-wing groups including the PCOT. While praising its call for popular committees to take over public affairs, the author argues it fails to demand a complete break with capitalism, instead hoping for a “nicer” capitalism. The demand for expropriation of the Trabelsi clan and renationalisation of privatised industries is endorsed, but the author insists this must be extended to all imperialist property, which would amount to abolishing capitalism in Tunisia.
The conclusion is a call for a national general strike, workplace occupations, and the convening of a national assembly of delegates from revolutionary committees and trade unions to elect a provisional revolutionary government. The final slogans—“For a revolutionary socialist Tunisia! For a Socialist Federation of the Arab World”—make clear the strategic perspective. The chapter is a polemical intervention in a revolutionary conjuncture, arguing that the movement’s weakness is not objective but political and organisational.