Politics of the capitalist class¶
Core Argument¶
The chapter analyses the political strategy and internal contradictions of the British capitalist class in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, focusing on the period of the 1945 general election and the early Labour government. Its core argument is that the bourgeoisie, despite its overwhelming structural power, was temporarily paralysed by a deep-seated lack of confidence in the future and by the radicalisation of the working class. The ruling class therefore adopted a tactical, rather than strategic, posture: it chose to rely on the Labour Party to administer the burdens of British imperialism, postponing any direct confrontation until the inevitable economic slump.
The chapter presents the 1945 election result as a contradictory phenomenon. While the Labour Party’s landslide majority in parliamentary seats was a product of the peculiar electoral system, the 12 million votes it received are taken as evidence of a genuine and deep radicalisation. The Tories’ attempt to exploit Churchill’s prestige and to raise the spectre of a Gestapo-like Labour dictatorship failed because the psychological shift among workers and even the petty bourgeoisie was too profound. Nevertheless, the chapter notes that capitalism still possessed heavy reserves among backward sections of the population, as the combined Tory and Liberal vote equalled that of the working-class parties.
The analysis draws a sharp distinction between the immediate post-war conjuncture and the crisis of 1929-31. The Labour government of 1929-31 was a crisis government from the start, presiding over a world slump, which allowed the bourgeoisie to manipulate the situation, precipitate its downfall, and install the National Government in the panic election of 1931. The economic situation after 1945 was entirely different: the bourgeoisie did not wish to disturb the existing relationship of class forces and thereby provoke an anti-capitalist movement. The Labour leaders were therefore entrusted with doing the “dirty work of capitalism,” both at home and abroad, because the masses would tolerate present standards under a Labour government but not under the Tories.
The chapter polemicises against the notion that the bourgeoisie had already turned to fascist methods. At this stage, it argues, the ruling class had no need for fascist bands, nor could they immediately succeed in forming them. However, it warns that moods within the Tory right wing indicate the possibility of a later swing towards royalist-dictatorial or fascist movements. The liberal section of the capitalist class, a dwindling force, leans towards the Labour government and its semi-reforms, but faces only a perspective of further decline. In a serious crisis, all bourgeois forces would gather together, including a majority of Labour MPs who are petty bourgeois or bourgeois in origin, to form a new version of a national government.
The chapter’s central polemic is directed against any complacent view of capitalist stability. It insists that the bourgeoisie is merely waiting for the inevitable slump to use the crisis against Labour and the working class. However, it argues that a Tory victory in such a crisis would have entirely different consequences from 1931. Far from tranquilising class relations, it would precipitate open class battles. The collapse of the traditional capitalist parties would be accelerated, and the Conservatives would suffer the fate of the Liberals. This is the perspective of the future, but it is one the bourgeoisie dreads as much as it desires.