17. The Opposition Offensive and Electoral Gains¶
Core Argument¶
Chapter 17: The Opposition Offensive and Electoral Gains¶
Following the 2013 elections, President Maduro’s conciliatory overtures toward the national bourgeoisie—including expanded dollar credit—were interpreted not as goodwill but as weakness. The opposition immediately escalated its economic warfare, and on 23 January 2014, Leopoldo López and María Corina Machado launched the La Salida street campaign. This unleashed a guarimba strategy of public disorder, roadblocks, and firebomb attacks on state institutions, concentrated in Caracas’s wealthier districts. While Capriles Radonski and the mainstream opposition preferred to consolidate regional power and await electoral victory, the Bolivarian leadership’s response oscillated dangerously. On 19 February, pro-revolution workers clearing barricades in Puerto Ordaz were shot at by fascist elements, wounding nine. Maduro appealed for united workers’ militias, yet the government’s concrete action was to offer the ruling class greater foreign exchange access and remove the anti-sabotage official Samán. This pattern—concessions met with intensified assault—deepened disillusion among the Bolivarian masses and emboldened the opposition.
The bureaucracy acted as a brake on workers’ struggles. At the occupied ABC Formas y Sistemas factory, the Ministry of Labour took no action for a year. At Industrias Diana, a successful worker-run food plant, the Minister of Food imposed a new manager without consultation; workers resisted, faced detention and interrogation by intelligence services, and eventually won, but such victories were rare. Discontent grew over bureaucratic control of the PSUV, with 40% of its congress delegates being state officials. Left-wing Bolivarian journalists were removed from state media without explanation. On 10 April, a ‘Dialogue for Peace’ saw the government meet opposition representatives, many of whom had participated in the 2002 coup without facing trial. The opposition demanded fiscal discipline, free markets, labour ‘flexibilisation’, liberalised foreign exchange, an end to talk of socialism, immunity for guarimba participants, and disarmament of colectivos. The Bolivarian leadership repeatedly extended forgiveness, while the bourgeoisie used all means to overthrow it.
The MUD won 112 seats—a two-thirds majority—and announced plans to rescind progressive laws, privatise state enterprises, and return expropriated land. The TSJ annulled the Amazonas election due to MUD vote-buying, removing three deputies and the supermajority. The National Assembly refused the ruling, swore in the deputies, and was declared in contempt. Government was paralysed. Maduro introduced an Economic Emergency Decree; the Assembly rejected it and moved to remove him. Street protests turned violent, with over thirty killed, mostly Chavistas. Maduro made further concessions to capitalists: preferential dollars, devaluation, price rises, foreign debt prioritisation, Special Economic Zones exempt from labour laws and taxes, and mining concessions to multinationals and the military. PDVSA bonds were sold to Goldman Sachs at a giveaway price. Workers who took over factories faced bureaucratic obstacles or repression. The bureaucracy feared the masses more than the bourgeoisie, and the opposition won because reformist leaders avoided expropriating capital.