16. Chávez’ Death, and the Election of Maduro¶
Core Argument¶
The chapter chronicles the terminal phase of Hugo Chávez’s illness and the immediate aftermath of his death, arguing that the Bolivarian Revolution’s fatal weakness was its dependence on a single charismatic leader, unaccompanied by a democratic, revolutionary party capable of disciplining the state apparatus and advancing socialist measures. Chávez’s cancer, revealed in June 2011, exposed the vacuum at the revolution’s core. The chapter contends that while the masses saw Chávez as the sole honest revolutionary figure, the layer of managers, governors, and ministers around him was inept, corrupt, and often openly counter-revolutionary. The PSUV, supposedly founded to democratise the movement, was systematically emptied of democratic content: local leadership positions were made appointive rather than elective, and party tops like Diosdado Cabello and Tarek El Aissami—figures with records of sabotaging workers’ control and internal democracy—tightened their grip.
The chapter uses the 2012 presidential election to illustrate the opposition’s strategy of economic sabotage and media manipulation, and the government’s failure to respond effectively. Crime was made a central issue, but the chapter argues that the real solution—workers’ control and popular militias—was never pursued. Chávez won with 55.1 per cent, but the opposition’s 44.3 per cent was its highest ever, and the bourgeoisie played a long game, betting on Chávez’s death. The subsequent gubernatorial elections saw PSUV candidates win twenty of twenty-three states, not because of grassroots enthusiasm but because the opposition’s record in office—closing social missions—made them a worse option.
The chapter’s most sustained polemic is directed at the PSUV leadership and the state’s economic management. The devaluation of the bolivar in February 2013 is analysed as a gift to the bourgeoisie: the state handed dollars to capitalists at the official rate, who then sold them on the black market for profits exceeding 1,000 per cent. The chapter cites Pasqualina Curio’s research to argue that medicine shortages were not due to reduced imports but to hoarding by pharmaceutical importers whose sales and profits remained steady. The solution—centralisation of foreign trade and a single state importation centre—was never implemented, because it would threaten the corrupt networks that enriched the tops.
Chávez’s death on 5 March 2013 is presented as the moment the revolution’s central contradiction became fatal. The chapter praises his role in mobilising millions and delivering real gains, but insists that his most important mistakes—above all, the failure to build a democratic revolutionary party—left the movement leaderless. Nicolás Maduro’s narrow election victory in April 2013 (50.6 per cent against 49.1 per cent) is described as a product of this weakness. The chapter notes that Maduro immediately signalled a rightward shift: offering special economic zones, easing exchange controls, removing radical broadcasters from state media, and appealing to businessmen. The opposition’s refusal to accept the result, its accusations of fraud, and its street violence are detailed, but the chapter’s real target is the Bolivarian leadership’s own timidity. The municipal elections of December 2013 were won only after a campaign against hoarding rekindled popular expectations, but Maduro’s victory speech, the chapter concludes, contained no concrete measures to sustain the offensive. The revolution was being managed, not advanced.