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Part IV The Abolition of Universal Suffrage in 1850

Core Argument

Following the revolutionary wave of 1848, the resurgence of industrial and commercial prosperity in 1849-50 effectively paralysed any further revolutionary upsurge. In France, industry flourished, exports rose, and the Bank of France resumed specie payment in August 1850, with its note circulation and metallic reserves reaching unprecedented levels. This demonstrated that the finance aristocracy had been strengthened, not overthrown, by the revolution. Despite this general prosperity, the mass of peasants suffered depression and remained incapable of revolutionary initiative. The text argues that a genuine revolution is impossible during periods of general prosperity; it can only occur when productive forces and bourgeois forms of production come into fundamental opposition. A new revolution, therefore, is the consequence of a new crisis.

The petty-bourgeois Montagne, emboldened by electoral victories in March and April 1850, believed it could achieve power legally through universal suffrage in the 1852 elections. The party of Order responded by abolishing universal suffrage via an election law passed on 31 May 1850. A subsequent press law, requiring signatures on articles and raising caution money, effectively killed the revolutionary press, reducing newspapers to collections of paid individual writers. With these election and press laws, the revolutionary and democratic party exited the official stage. The party of Order, composed of rival royalist factions, remained united only in defending the bourgeois republic against each other’s restorationist ambitions and against Bonaparte, whose request for a civil list increase was grudgingly granted.

The Assembly adjourned from 11 August to 11 November 1850, with Bonaparte seeking to operate unhindered and the party of Order pursuing factional intrigues and reactionary gains in the provinces. The death of Louis Philippe removed pretexts for fusing the Orléanist and Legitimist factions, revealing that divided class interests, not dynastic zeal, kept them apart. During the adjournment, most departmental councils declared for a monarchist restoration but confessed incompetence to achieve it. The constitutional solution—Bonaparte’s retirement in May 1852, a new presidential election, and constitutional revision—was inadmissible for the ruling class, as it would bring all hostile parties to a violent decision and jeopardise the entire political and economic status quo. The only possible bourgeois solution was postponement through violation of the constitution and prolongation of presidential power. Bonaparte’s struggle with Changarnier, the party of Order’s designated successor, continued. After the Satory review, where troops cried Vive l’Empereur!, Bonaparte removed War Minister Hautpoul and transferred General Neumayer. The majority of the party of Order would be compelled to prolong Bonaparte’s power, postponing the solution until economic relations produce a new explosion.