Introduction

Leon Trotsky

Editor’s note:

Leon Trotsky completed this introduction to the Polish edition of Lenin’s ‘Left-Wing’ Communism: An Infantile Disorder on 6 October 1932, from his exile on Prinkipo island, Turkey. The present English translation is based on the Russian original text.

In this introduction Trotsky examines the resurgence of ‘Left-Wing’ communist, or rather, ultra-left ideas in the form of ‘Third Period’ Stalinism. The Stalinised Comintern, however, differed from the original ‘Left-Wing’ communist trends that Lenin considered affected by an ‘infantile disorder’, which he was striving to correct when he wrote the book in 1920.

As Trotsky explains, it is an entirely different phenomenon. Stalin only stole the phraseology and method from the ‘Left-Wing’ communists to give political flesh and bones to pursue the interests of the bureaucratic centrist faction in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and in the Comintern. In 1932, the Soviet bureaucracy and Stalin were still in the process of consolidating their grip over power, which would lead to the final showdown of the Stalinist Purges a few years later.

* * *

This work by Lenin, now presented to the Polish readers, was originally written between April and May 1920. At the time, the international communist movement had yet to emerge from its infancy. Its illnesses were truly of an infantile kind.

While condemning formal ‘leftism’ – the radicalism of gesture and phrase – Lenin was no less passionate in defending the real revolutionary intransigence of class politics. In doing this – alas! – he could not fully insure himself against misuse on the part of opportunists of all kinds, who in the twelve years since the publication of this book have referred to it hundreds and thousands of times in defence of unprincipled conciliationism.

Now, in the context of the global crisis, the left wing in many countries is separating from the Social Democratic parties. Caught in the yawning gap between communism and reformism, these groups usually declare as their special historical task the creation of a ‘united front’, or, even more broadly, the ‘unity of the workers’ movement’. Such conciliationist slogans are nothing more than the same facade taken up by the Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany, led by Seydewitz, K Rosenfeld, the old Ledebour and others.[1] As far as I can judge from here, the Polish political grouping to which Dr. Joseph Kruk and others belong is, apparently, not much different from the Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany. The theoreticians of such formations very readily refer, on occasion, to Lenin’s ‘Left-Wing’ Communism. They only forget to explain why they always considered Lenin to be an incorrigible splitter.

The essence of Lenin’s policy of the united front is to enable the proletariat – in the presence of struggling and irreconcilable programmes and organisations – to make at least a small practical step forward, in closed ranks; but through these practical steps of the masses, Lenin does not seek to obscure and soften the political contradictions between Marxism and reformism, but rather to uncover them, make them known to the masses and thereby strengthen the revolutionary wing.

The problems of a united front are problems of tactics. And we know that tactics are subordinate to strategy. From the perspective of Marxism, the line of our strategy is determined by the historical interests of the proletariat. By this we do not want to minimise the importance of tactical questions. Strategy without corresponding tactics is condemned to remain a lifeless abstraction. But it is no less hopeless to turn a particular tactical method, however important at a given moment, into a panacea, a universal recipe, a religious creed. The first condition for the revolutionary application of the united-front policy is an irreconcilable break with unprincipled conciliationism.

Lenin’s book seemed to deal a fatal blow to false radicalism. The third and fourth Congresses of the Comintern almost unanimously adopted the conclusions of this book into their resolutions. But in the following period, beginning with Lenin’s illness and death, we observed a quite shocking phenomenon: ultra-leftism once again rising to the surface, becoming stronger, provoking a series of defeats, then disappearing from the stage, only to re-emerge in a more acute and malignant form.

Formalistic and shallow protests against any agreements with the reformists, against a united front with Social-Democracy, against the unity of the trade union movement, superficial arguments for the creation of their own ‘pure’ trade unions (as Lenin puts it) – all these ultra-left ideas have become neither more serious nor more intelligent because they are now expressed in a bureaucratic bass voice instead of a childish falsetto. Where does this startling relapse come from?

We know that political tendencies are not suspended in mid-air. If deviations and errors are persistent and long-lasting, they must have a class basis. To talk about ‘ultra-leftism’ without defining its social roots means to replace Marxist analysis with wordplay. Meanwhile, the right wing, that is the opportunist critics of Stalinism, such as the Brandlerites, even now reduce all the mistakes of the Comintern to a simple ideological misunderstanding. Ultra-leftism is treated as a supra-social, supra-historical, a kind of mystical factor, like an evil spirit tempting pious Christians.

This is not the case. Events have shown with exhaustive clarity that those mistakes which were once expressed by individuals and groups and were really only the manifestation of an immature political age, are now raised into a system, and have become a conscious weapon in the struggle for dominance by an entire political tendency: bureaucratic centrism. It is all the less a case of the inconsistent spirit of ultra-leftism, since the same political clique that now leads the Comintern alternates crass opportunism with ultra-left errors. Sometimes, the Stalinist faction does not even intersperse radicalism with opportunism at different moments, but applies them simultaneously, depending on the needs of its factional struggle.

Thus at present we are observing, on the one hand, a fundamental rejection on principle of any agreements with the German Social Democrats; on the other hand, we witness the convening of an anti-war congress for which they came to agreements with bourgeois and petty bourgeois pacifists, French Radicals, Freemasons, or with pretentious individuals like Barbusse, who consider themselves called upon to unite the Third and Second Internationals.[2]

The simple and, as always, exhaustive arguments that Lenin gives in favour of ‘agreements’, ‘compromises’, inevitable concessions, etc., also serve to show the line beyond which these methods must not cross, lest they turn into their opposite.

The tactic of a united front is not a universal principle. It is subordinated to a higher criterion: does it facilitate the unification of the proletarian vanguard on the basis of uncompromising Marxist policies? The art of leadership lies in determining, each time, on the basis of a concrete class relationship, with whom, for what purpose and within what limits a united front is permissible, and at what moment it must be broken.

* * *

If we were to look for an exhaustive example of how not to conduct a united front policy, we would find nothing better – or rather, nothing worse – than the Amsterdam Congress of ‘all classes and all parties’ against war. This example deserves to be examined point by point.

  1. The Communist Party must at all times act openly under its own banner, no matter whether the agreement is temporary or long term. But at Amsterdam, parties were forbidden from attending, as if the struggle against war is not a political task and therefore a non-partisan task. As if this struggle does not need the most clear and precise ideas. As if there could be organisations other than parties that can bring forth the most clear, comprehensive resolution to the antiwar struggle. Yet, at the same time, it was precisely the Comintern who is the organiser of this Congress that excluded all parties!
  2. The united front that the Communist Party must build is not a union with individual lawyers and journalists, not with nice acquaintances, but with mass workers’ organisations, which in the first place is Social Democracy. But now, a united front with Social Democracy was ruled out beforehand. Even an appeal to Social Democracy for a united front, which is a public test of the power of pressure of the social democratic masses upon their leaders – have all been forbidden.
  3. Precisely because a united front tactic carries the danger of opportunism, the Communist Party must reject all forms of ambiguous mediation and diplomacy behind the backs of the masses. Meanwhile, the Comintern has seen fit to put forward as a formal leader, behind-the-scenes mediator and standard-bearer, the French writer Barbusse, who relies on the worst dregs of reformism and communism. Without the knowledge of the masses, but clearly at the behest of the praesidium of the Comintern, Barbusse entered into negotiations on a congress, with Friedrich Adler.[3] But a united front from above is inadmissible, is it not? Through the mediation of Barbusse, it turns out, it is permissible. Needless to say, the cronies of the Second International in the field of political manoeuvring are well ahead of Barbusse. The behind-the-scenes diplomacy of Barbusse ensured that the Second International could evade participation in the Congress under the most plausible pretexts.
  4. The Communist Party has a right and even a responsibility to attract wavering allies to support the cause, if they are genuine allies, but not at the cost of alienating the working masses, who are its main ‘ally’. Yet, individual bourgeois Radicals, which are members of the ruling party in imperialist France, attended the Congress. This cannot but alienate the socialist workers in France from communism. Nor is it easy to explain to the German workers why it is possible to go hand in hand with the Vice-President of the party, Herriot,[4] or with the pacifist General Schoenaich,[5] and why it is unacceptable to offer joint actions against the war to reformist workers’ organisations.
  5. The biggest danger in a united front policy is to deal with false estimates, to pass off fake allies as real ones and thereby deceive the workers. Yet this is precisely the crime that has been and is being committed by the organisers of the Amsterdam Congress.

    The French bourgeoisie of today is completely ‘pacifist’. This is not hard to understand: every victor strives to prevent the defeated from launching a war of revenge. The French bourgeoisie is looking everywhere for guarantees of peace, that is, guarantees of the inviolability of their loot. The left wing of petty-bourgeois pacifism is even prepared to seek these guarantees in their occasional agreement with the Comintern. But on the first day of war, these pacifists will stand on the side of their own governments. They will tell the French workers: “We have done everything to secure peace. We even attended the Amsterdam Congress. But war has been forced on us. We need to defend the fatherland.” The participation of French pacifists in the congress, which practically does not oblige anyone to anything, will entirely benefit French imperialism at the time of war. On the other hand, it can be said without a doubt that in the event of a war for ‘equality’ in the field of world robbery, General Schoenaich and his like will be entirely on the side of their German fatherland and use their fresh Amsterdam credibility in its interests.

    The reason for Indian bourgeois nationalist Patel’s attendance of the congress is the same as Chang Kai-shek’s ‘consultative’ participation in the Comintern.[6] This participation will necessarily raise the authority of ‘national leaders’ in the eyes of the popular masses. To any Indian communist who calls Patel and his friends traitors at a meeting, Patel will answer: “If I were really a traitor, then I would not be an ally of the Bolsheviks in Amsterdam.” The Stalinists are arming the Indian bourgeoisie against the Indian workers.

  6. An agreement for a practical purpose must never be achieved by concessions of principle, by the silencing of essential differences, and by ambiguous language that allows each participant to put his own interpretation into it. Yet, the manifesto of the Amsterdam Congress is built on tricks and ambiguities, on wordplay, on disguising contradictions, on proud vows without substance, on solemn oaths that do not bind to anything. Members of bourgeois parties and Freemasonic lodges ‘condemn’ capitalism! Pacifists ‘condemn’… pacifism! The day after the Congress, General Schoenaich, in an article printed in W Münzenberg’s magazine, calls himself a pacifist.[7] Having condemned capitalism, the petty and not-so-petty French bourgeois return to their capitalist parties and give a vote of confidence to Herriot. Is this not a despicable masquerade, shameful charlatanism?

Marxist intransigence, which is obligatory when adopting the united front policy in general, becomes twice and three times more obligatory when it comes to such an acute question as war. During the war, the defiant voice of Liebknecht alone was incomparably more important for the development of the German revolution than the sentimental half-protests of the pacifist Independent Social Democrats. In France there was no Liebknecht. One of the reasons is precisely that in France, Freemason, Radical, socialist, or syndicalist brands of pacifism form an atmosphere saturated with lies and hypocrisy. Lenin demanded that at all kinds of congresses ‘against war’ one should not look for unifying commonplaces, but on the contrary, pose the question so clearly, accurately and sharply as to make the pacifists burn their fingers and retreat, and thereby teach a lesson to the workers. Thus, Lenin wrote the following instructions to the Soviet delegation to the Hague Anti-war Congress in 1922:

I think that if we have several people at The Hague Conference who are capable of delivering speeches against war in various languages, the most important thing would be to refute the opinion that the delegates at the Conference are opponents of war, that they understand how war may and will come upon them at the most unexpected moment, that they to any extent understand what methods should be adopted to combat war, that they are to any extent in a position to adopt reasonable and effective measures to combat war.[8]

Imagine for one moment Lenin voting in Amsterdam for a pompous yet empty manifesto hand in hand with the French Radical G Bergery, with the German general Schoenaich and the Hindu nationalist-liberal Patel. Such an unnatural and grotesque picture best measures the depth of the fall of Lenin’s epigones!

* * *

There is nothing in this book by Lenin that needs to be refuted by us today. But this was written twelve years ago. Lenin’s policies suffered endless distortions, and Lenin’s words have been abused. On this basis, the tendency of bureaucratic centrism was formed, a faction that did not exist when Lenin wrote this work.

The Stalinist faction is not an evanescent ghost, it has its own social base: a multimillion-strong bureaucracy that grew out of a victorious but isolated proletarian revolution in a backward country. The bureaucracy’s specific caste interests develop opportunistic and nationalistic tendencies within it. But nevertheless, this is the bureaucracy of a worker’s state surrounded by a bourgeois world. Every step it takes is clashing with the Social Democratic bureaucrats in capitalist countries. In determining the direction of the Comintern, the Soviet bureaucracy will imprint on it the contradictory position they find themselves in. The whole policy of the epigone leadership swings between opportunism and adventurism.

‘Ultra-leftism’ is no longer an infantile disorder, it has become a self-preservation measure of this faction that is increasingly hindering the development of the world proletarian vanguard. Now, the struggle against bureaucratic centrism is the primary responsibility of every Marxist. Were there no other reasons, for this alone we warmly welcome the Polish publication of this outstanding work by Lenin.

Endnotes

[1] The Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany (SAPD) was a left-wing split from Social Democracy in the autumn of 1931 with about 20,000 members. The party was banned by the Nazis in 1933.

[2] Henri Barbusse was a French journalist, novelist and a member of the French Communist Party. He became a supporter of Stalin in 1928 and wrote his biography, which was published in 1935.

[3] Friedrich Adler was a leading Austrian Social Democrat, known for assassinating Minister-President Karl von Stürgkh in 1916, in opposition to the First World War. After the war Adler became a prominent figure within Social Democracy.

[4] Édouard Herriot was a leader of the French Radical Party and three times Prime Minister.

[5] Paul von Schoenaich was a German general who resigned from the Reichswehr in 1920 and became a leading pacifist.

[6] Vallabhbhai Patel was President of the Indian National Congress in 1931. A bourgeois nationalist and a barrister, he served as the first Deputy Prime Minister of India after independence.

[7] Willi Münzenberg was a German Communist leader. He served as the chairman of the Young Communist International from 1919 to 1920, before he became disillusioned with the Soviet Union after witnessing the first Stalinist Great Purge.

[8] Lenin, ‘Notes On The Tasks Of Our Delegation At The Hague’, LCW, Vol. 33, pp. 447-51.