Demagogues and dictators what is Bonapartism

Marxist Theory · 2026-05-13

Core Argument¶

The central thesis is that the concept of "Bonapartism" — as developed by Marx in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte — provides a rigorous analytical framework for understanding contemporary political regimes, but that it is being misapplied by bourgeois commentators and sections of the left. The article argues that genuine Bonapartism arises only under specific conditions: a deadlock in the class struggle where the contending classes are exhausted and unable to rule directly, allowing the executive state apparatus to raise itself above society with a "strongman" at its head.

The article's key claim is that most regimes commonly labelled "authoritarian" or "strongman" — Trump, Johnson, Bolsonaro — are not Bonapartist at all. They emerged not from class equilibrium but from periods of intensifying class struggle, and their state apparatuses remained firmly under ruling-class control. By contrast, Putin's Russia is identified as a genuinely Bonapartist regime, arising from the mutual exhaustion of the Russian bourgeoisie and working class after the catastrophes of capitalist restoration in the 1990s. The article warns against conflating these distinct phenomena, arguing that such sloppiness leads to political paralysis and a failure to identify the real terrain of struggle.

Theoretical Grounding¶

The analysis is firmly rooted in the classical Marxist theory of the state as developed by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky. It draws on three interconnected theoretical traditions:

First, the materialist conception of the state as an instrument of class rule, not a neutral arbiter. The article cites Engels' formulation from The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State that the state arises precisely because society is "cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms" and must appear to stand above them while actually serving the ruling class. Lenin's observation from The State and Revolution that the democratic republic is "the best possible political shell for capitalism" is deployed to explain why bourgeois democracy is the preferred form of rule under normal conditions.

Second, the concept of Bonapartism itself, drawn from Marx's analysis of Louis Bonaparte's coup in 1851. The article distinguishes between the archetype (Napoleon I, arising from the exhaustion of the French Revolution) and the analogy (subsequent regimes exhibiting similar features under different historical conditions). Trotsky's definition is adopted: a "bureaucratic-police government raised over society" that maintains itself on "the relative equilibrium between the two opposing camps."

Third, the article situates itself within the Trotskyist tradition's analysis of the state under conditions of capitalist crisis and revolutionary opportunity. It references Trotsky's analysis of the Doumergue government in 1930s France as a Bonapartist regime based on the anticipation of revolution rather than exhaustion, and draws on the Bolshevik experience of 1917 — particularly Lenin's characterisation of Kerensky's government as "taking the first steps towards Bonapartism" — to illustrate the correct political response.

Conjunctural Relevance¶

The article is explicitly positioned as an intervention in contemporary debates about the "rise of authoritarianism" and "democratic recession." It directly challenges Gideon Rachman's The Age of the Strongman and the broader liberal narrative that lumps together Putin, Trump, Modi, Xi, Bolsonaro, and others as variants of the same phenomenon.

The article provides specific conjunctural analysis:

Russia: Putin's regime is identified as Bonapartist, arising from the specific conditions of the 1990s — the restoration of capitalism, the weakening of the working class after the failure of the strike wave of 1996-98, and the bourgeoisie's need for a "neutral man" to protect property while distancing the state from the most corrupt elements of the Yeltsin era. The article notes that Putin's popularity has been so shaken by economic crisis since 2015 that the regime stopped publishing approval polls, and that the war in Ukraine represents an attempt to rally support around a weakening base.

USA, UK, Brazil: Trump, Johnson, and Bolsonaro are explicitly distinguished from Bonapartist regimes. The article points to the Black Lives Matter movement (over 7,750 demonstrations in 2020) and the Brazilian general strike of June 2019 (millions of workers in 380 cities) as evidence that the class struggle was intensifying, not deadlocked. The failure of Trump's and Bolsonaro's attempted coups — their reliance on unarmed mobs rather than state forces — is presented as proof that the state apparatus remained under ruling-class control.

Iran: The regime is identified as Bonapartist but unstable, with the mass movement sparked by Mahsa Amini's murder in 2022 described as "the latest tremor in a volley of earthquakes" since 2018.

Global perspective: The article cites IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva's October 2022 speech about a "fundamental shift in the global economy" toward fragility, and Martin Wolf's data on the rise of "anocracies" from 21 in 1984 to 49 in 2016, to argue that instability — not stable Bonapartism — is the defining feature of the current conjuncture.

Where the Argument Continues¶

The article opens several lines of analysis that are developed elsewhere in the IDOM corpus and broader Marxist tradition:

The question of fascism versus Bonapartism is raised but not fully elaborated. The article distinguishes Bonapartism from fascism only implicitly, noting that Bonapartist regimes "balance between the classes" rather than mobilising a mass counter-revolutionary movement. A fuller treatment of this distinction can be found in Trotsky's The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany and in IDOM articles on the rise of the far right.

The relationship between Bonapartism and war is touched on in the discussion of Putin and Ukraine but not systematically developed. The article notes that Napoleon's regime relied on "military adventures and plundering abroad" and that Putin has used the Ukraine war to rally support, but does not explore the general tendency of Bonapartist regimes toward external aggression as a means of managing internal contradictions.

The prognosis for Bonapartism in the advanced capitalist countries is left open. The article argues that stable Bonapartist regimes are unlikely due to the numerical strength of the working class and the absence of a peasant base, but warns that "all kinds of phenomena can emerge" under conditions of extreme crisis combined with the absence of revolutionary leadership. This is a question that will be tested by events and is likely to be revisited in future IDOM analysis.

The Sudan reference (footnote 16) points to a separate IDOM article analysing the conflict there as a warning about the dangers of class collaborationist politics in the face of Bonapartist or counter-revolutionary forces.

Connections¶

This article should be read alongside:

Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte — the foundational text, which the article explicitly draws on and recommends
Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State — for the theory of the state
Lenin, The State and Revolution — for the analysis of the democratic republic as the "best political shell" for capitalism
Trotsky, The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany — for the application of Bonapartism to inter-war Europe, particularly the analysis of the Doumergue government
Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed — for analysis of the Stalinist state, which some Marxists have analysed as a variant of Bonapartism (though this article does not take up that question)
IDOM articles on Russia, Iran, and the global conjuncture — for ongoing conjunctural analysis applying these categories
Gideon Rachman, The Age of the Strongman — the bourgeois analysis the article is critiquing

Key Quotes¶

"The political regimes that will define the history of the period we are living through now are neither the products of media-savvy spin-doctors, nor presidents who bribed the right people. They can only be understood as the product of a particular stage in the class struggle."
"To characterise a regime as Bonapartist is to deem it a dictatorship, within varying degrees of severity. This clearly does not apply to the Trump, Bolsonaro, or Johnson regimes. Nor was there any possibility of their being able to establish such a regime when they were in power. The reason for this is precisely the thing which Rachman fails to notice, or deliberately ignores: the class balance of forces in those countries."
"Bonapartism cannot attain stability so long as the camp of revolution and the camp of counter-revolution have not measured their forces in battle." (quoting Trotsky)
"In every country the main obstacle in the way of revolution is not the awesome power of 'strongmen', but the weak and cowardly leadership of the working class."
"The Marxist approach, when the class struggle is in a convulsive state of fragile equilibrium, is to push for the resolution of that equilibrium in favour of the working class. By breaking the state of equilibrium, we prevent a Bonapartist from being able to balance between the classes and raise himself above the class struggle using the power of the sword."
"This independent proletarian policy is the axis upon which a revolutionary party is built. It is the highest responsibility of Marxists to develop such a policy and build a vehicle, in the form of a revolutionary party, to take it into the workers' movement."