The Goldilocks World
Core Argument¶
The central thesis is that the "Goldilocks economy" — a prolonged US-led boom characterised by low inflation, steady growth, and rising asset prices — is not a new paradigm of crisis-free capitalism but a speculative bubble built on unsustainable foundations. Roberts argues that the boom is being driven not by genuine productivity gains feeding through into rising profits, but by a self-referential cycle of stock market speculation, rising household and corporate debt, and fictitious wealth creation. The underlying profitability of US productive capital is already deteriorating, and the boom will end in a slump that will spread rapidly across the globalised world economy. The article is both a mea culpa for an earlier, prematurely pessimistic forecast and a refinement of the analytical tools needed to read the conjuncture correctly.
Theoretical Grounding¶
The analysis is rooted in the Marxist theory of crisis, specifically the understanding that capitalist booms contain within themselves the seeds of their own destruction through overaccumulation and the falling rate of profit. Roberts draws on the distinction between the real economy of production and the sphere of fictitious capital — the paper wealth generated by rising share prices that is not backed by commensurate increases in surplus value. The article deploys a classical Marxist critique of the "new economy" ideology, arguing that technological revolutions under capitalism lead to overinvestment, falling profit margins, and intensified competition, not permanent prosperity. The reference to the 1929 crash and the 1930s depression situates the argument within the tradition that sees financial crises as expressions of underlying contradictions in production, not mere market psychology. The analysis also implicitly draws on Marx's treatment of credit and speculation in Volume III of Capital, where the development of the credit system both accelerates accumulation and makes the system more fragile.
Conjunctural Relevance¶
The article was written in July 2000, at the peak of the dot-com bubble. Roberts identifies several concrete features of the conjuncture: US household consumption running ahead of real disposable incomes, financed by stock market wealth and rising debt; corporate capital spending rising at 10% annually, driven by competitive pressure to invest in internet-related technology; merger mania reaching nearly 20% of US GDP, financed increasingly by share exchanges rather than cash; and US manufacturing sector profits falling 7% over the preceding two years. He notes that when "inventory" gains from share price rises are stripped out, US company profits from actual production fell in the second half of 1999. The Federal Reserve had begun raising interest rates, increasing the cost of servicing record corporate debt. The article correctly identifies the fragility of the boom and the imminence of its collapse — the NASDAQ peaked in March 2000 and the US economy entered recession in 2001. The argument about global contagion through deregulated capital flows also anticipated the speed with which the dot-com crash and subsequent recession spread internationally.
Where the Argument Continues¶
The article is an early example of Roberts's long-running analysis of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and its expression in periodic crises. It connects forward to his later work on the 2008 global financial crisis, where similar dynamics of fictitious capital, household debt, and overaccumulation in housing played out on a larger scale. The argument about the relationship between technological revolution and falling profitability is developed further in his writings on the "long depression" after 2008, and in his contributions to the debate on the secular stagnation thesis. Readers should consult Roberts's later articles on marxist.com, particularly those analysing the 2008 crash and its aftermath, as well as his book The Long Depression. The argument also connects to the broader Marxist tradition of crisis theory, including the work of Henryk Grossmann, Paul Mattick, and more recent contributions by Andrew Kliman and Michael Heinrich.
Connections¶
The article should be read alongside Marx's discussion of fictitious capital and credit in Capital Volume III, particularly chapters 25-27 and 30-32. It also connects to Lenin's Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism on the role of finance capital and the export of capital in postponing crisis. Within the contemporary Marxist tradition, it anticipates arguments made by David Harvey about the "spatial fix" and the role of financialisation in managing overaccumulation, though Roberts is more insistent on the centrality of the falling rate of profit. The article also implicitly critiques the "regulation school" and post-Keynesian approaches that see the post-war boom as sustainable through institutional management — a position Roberts rejects as reformist.
Key Quotes¶
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"The huge rise in the US stock market in 1999 has created the paper wealth that has convinced millions of Americans to go on spending."
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"Under US accounting procedures, company profits include 'inventories', in other words, notional profits from gains in share prices of investment held by companies. So company profits go up, because the stock market goes up. And the stock market goes up because company profits are reported as going up!"
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"If you strip out these gains, then company profits from actual production in the US fell in the last half of 1999. Only profits from abroad kept US companies in the black."
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"The information technology revolution is for real. But there have been many similar technical advances in human history, and in modern capitalism. And capitalism always wildly overreaches itself in speculating on the gains from new technology."
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"A tip down in the stock market will turn a virtuous circle of share price rises, climbing consumer spending and fast growth into a vicious circle of consumer and corporate spending slump, increased costs and falling output very soon."
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"And this time globalisation and deregulation have taken off all the controls over international capital. There is not even the regulating power of the gold standard of the 1920s, which at least helped keep currencies stable for a while. This time a world recession will see huge collapses in currencies, Mexico and Asian style, in those advanced capitalist economies with the biggest deficits and debts with the rest of the world."