OMB — Condensed Reference

2026-05-27

Section 1: Limitations

1.1 General

Refer to: ATR FCOM Chapter General Limitations, ATR AFM Chapter Limitations, Aeroconseil STC 0110-11 Bulk Freighter Conversion on ATR 72.

1.1.1 Certification Status

The aircraft is certified under EC Regulations CS-25 and ICAO Annex 16.

1.1.2 Bulk Freighter Configuration

G-LMRV, G-LMRX, G-LMRY, G-LMRZ modified by Aeroconseil STC 0110-11.

1.2 Aircraft Cabin Configuration

500-Series / 600-Series.

1.3 Types of Operations and Limitations of the AOC

Certified for day/night operations under CS-25 and ICAO Annex 16: • VFR • IFR • PBN Airspace • Low visibility take-off • Flight in icing conditions • Steep Slope Approach

1.4 Crew Composition

Minimum two flight crew.

1.5 Mass and Centre of Gravity

1.5.1 Design Weight Limits

Max Weight	ATR 42-500	ATR 42-600	ATR 72-600	ATR 72-500F
Taxi	18,770 kg	18,770 kg	22,970 kg	22,970 kg
Take Off	18,600 kg	18,600 kg	22,800 kg	22,800 kg
Landing	18,300 kg	18,300 kg	22,350 kg	22,350 kg
Zero Fuel	16,700 kg	16,700 kg	20,800 kg	20,800 kg
Min Flight Wt	N/A	N/A	N/A	13,000 kg

1.5.2 Mass & CG Limits

Refer: ATR AFM LIM.2, Aeroconseil STC 0110-11 W&B supplement.

1.5.3 Max Cargo — Freighter

ATR72-500F: 8,900 kg (incl. 250 kg ballast in compartment J).

1.6 Speed Limitations

Refer: ATR AFM LIM.3.

1.7 Flight Envelope

Refer: ATR AFM LIM.4.

1.8 Wind Limitations

METAR/ATIS: 10-min average incl. gusts; gust reported if factor ≥10 kts. ATC: 2-min average incl. gusts; may report max/min. No TO or approach beyond DA/MDA unless crosswind (incl. gust) within limits.

1.8.1 Standard Operations

	ATR 42		ATR 72
	TO	LDG	TO	LDG
Dry X-Wind	35 kts		35 kts	35 kts
Wet X-Wind			28 kts	28 kts
Tailwind D&W	10 kts		10 kts
Ground Ops	55 kts		55 kts
RWY≤35m X-W	25 kts		25 kts
LCY Tailwind	5 kts		5 kts

	ATR 42-500
	TO	LDG
Dry X-Wind	25 kts	25 kts
Wet X-Wind	20 kts	20 kts

1.8.2 Narrow Runway Ops

	ATR 42		ATR 72
	TO	LDG	TO	LDG
X-Wind D&W	15 kts		15 kts
Tailwind D&W	10 kts		10 kts
Headwind D&W	—	15 kts	29 kts

1.8.3 CAT II & LVTO (Vis ≤400 m)

Brake	RWYCC	ATR 42 X-W	ATR 72 X-W
GOOD	5	35	28
G/M	4	30	22
MEDIUM	3	22	16
M/P	2	22	16
POOR	1	10	10

1.8.4 Special Ops

Refer: FCOM PRO.SPO.

1.9 Runway Slope

Max mean slope: ±2%.

1.10 Wet/Contaminated Runways

Ref Section 2.11 for braking action.

1.10.1 Runways >35 m

Brake	RWYCC	A42 X-W	A72 X-W
GOOD	5	25(1)	25(1)
G/M	4	25(1)	25(1)
MEDIUM	3	22	16
M/P	2	22	16
POOR	1	10	10

(1) Company limit for RWY <35 m.

1.10.2 Runways ≥30 m ≤35 m

Brake	RWYCC	ATR 42 X-W
GOOD	5	20
G/M	4	16
MEDIUM	3	13
M/P	2	13
POOR	1	10

1.10.3 Runways <30 m

Same as 1.10.2 — see AFM.

1.11 Airframe Contamination

Must be free prior to departure: engine inlets, cowlings, drains, propellers, pack inlets, landing gear, pitot/static, AOA sensors, fuel vents, all external surfaces, control surfaces, flaps.

Limited frost on lower wing (cold fuel) if: • Lower wing only • ≤2 mm • Leading edges, upper wing, control surfaces, props free of ice • Icing procedure applied

Thin hoarfrost OK on upper fuselage only (surface features distinguishable beneath).

Ref: FCOM PRO.NOP.

1.12 System Limitations

Refer: ATR AFM LIM.5.

1.13 Aircraft Categories

	A42-500	A42-600	A72-600	A72-500F
Approach	B	B	B	B
Circling(1)	C	C	C	C
RFFS	4	4	5	5
ICAO Code	2C	2C	2C	2C
ICAO Wake	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
UK Wake(2)	Small	Small	Small	Small
RWY Width(3)	30 m	30 m	30 m	30 m
ACN(4)	11	11	14	14

(1) Company limit. (2) For sep minima see Ops Man Pt A §8.3.11. (3) Unless narrow RWY approved. (4) High tyre pressure, rigid subgrade.

1.14 PBN Capabilities

ATR certified for PBN ops. See AFM LIM.5.1.7 for full matrix by reg. • RNAV 10 / RNP 4: oceanic/remote only • LPV: currently prohibited

500-Series: Honeywell HT-1000 FMS. 600-Series: FCOM FMS Pilots Guide.

Section 2: Normal Procedures — Condensed

2.1 General

EASA-ORO GEN 110(h): Checklists used in all phases — normal, abnormal, emergency. Freighter ops same as standard unless stated; omit passenger/cabin crew references.

CM1 = Captain, CM2 = First Officer, PF = Pilot Flying, PM = Pilot Monitoring. PF monitors/controls aircraft; PM monitors PF and provides support. All selections announced: PF names control + setting, PM checks speed, pauses, then selects. 500-Series: Monitor autopilot + ADU. 600-Series: Monitor autopilot + FGCP. Automation recommended at high workload; both crew monitor automated systems. Aircraft walkaround for first flight of day; discrepancy → LMC/Tech Log.

2.1.3 Use of Automation

Automation recommended at high workload. Both crew must monitor systems to ensure appropriate flight path. Autopilot may be engaged above 400 ft AAL (except LVTO where AP must be engaged at or before 400 ft). CAUTION: Do not use LS button for non-precision approaches (e.g. LOC, LNAV) as it erases FD command bars when LOC not received.

2.1.4 EFB Policy

EFB used on flight deck. Loganair EFB User Guide applies. CAUTION: EFB must not obstruct any flight instruments, controls, warning/caution lights, or crew view.

2.1.5 Use of FMS Equipment — Dual Control Check

If #1 and #2 FMS give conflicting data: STOP — cross-check with conventional navaids. Both PG FMS INST.

2.1.6 FMS Waypoint/Airway Validation

SID/STAR/WPT/airway validation vs approved charts required. Check lateral path on ND.

2.1.7 Primary Reference System (PRS)

One pilot uses left-side instruments, one uses right-side. Both PF and PM use and cross-check each other's PFD/ND. Heading must be synchronised between both sides.

2.1.8 GNSS / FMS Integrity Monitoring

Position must be cross-checked against conventional navaids. Loss of GPS: FMS reverts to DME/DME or IRU — continue with conventional navaids.

2.1.9 Radio Communication

Primary: COM1. Secondary: COM2. ATC logs/changes read back by PM, confirmed by PF.

2.1.10 Altitude Alerting — Callout SOP

At 1000 ft below cleared level: "1000 to go" / "1000 above" within ±250 ft. Level bust protection: verify selected altitude, call at 1000 ft, then approaching level.

2.1.11 Use of Aircraft Lights

TO: Landing lights ON when on runway, take-off clearance received. Above FL100/10000: lights off unless in cloud/precip/within 10 NM of aerodrome. Below FL100: lights on. If strobes cause discomfort to others, select OFF during taxi/ground ops.

2.1.13 TAWS Warnings

CAUTION: On receipt of any TAWS aural warning both pilots must immediately declare "TERRAIN" and take action. Too Low Terrain: immediate recovery. Terrain Pull Up: full power + rotate to 20° nose-up. "Altitude" call: check and correct. "Glideslope": immediate action if below 1000 ft.

2.1.14 TCAS Warnings

TA: maintain visual scan, no manoeuvre. RA: follow RA immediately, PM calls escape manoeuvre on PFD. CAUTION: If ATC instruction contradicts RA, follow RA.

2.2 Pre-Flight

2.2.2 Aircraft Walkaround

CM2 performs walkaround prior to first flight (CM1 only with agreement). Freighter: CM2 checks cargo doors/cockpit door.

2.2.4 Cockpit Preparation

Plan to arrive ≥30 min before STD. GPU: 28–29.5V, 300–400A (1275A for start). >29.5V: do not use. CAUTION: If GPU voltage ≤26V after load shedding, GPU unusable — use battery start.

Battery start: ENG 2 in hotel mode for DC power. No fuelling or AFT loading in hotel mode.

Preliminary Cockpit Prep sequence: - Circuit breakers check, brake PARK, PL check GI, MFC autotest, gust lock ON - Battery ON, MFC monitor, EMER BUS/ESS BUS arrows check - NAV lights ON, EXT PWR press - Gear pins/covers, documentation, APM test, stick pusher/shaker, fire test, trims test, ATPCS, CVR-DFDR, NWS - FMS programming by PF, cross-checked by PM. Secondary FPLN: return to departure + engine failure routing + holding + approach + weather. - Loadsheet entry: CM1 reads, CM2 enters, CM1 verifies.

Short Transit: reduced checks — cockpit hatch open, gear pins on board, APM test, stick pusher/shaker, NWS setting. First flight: CM2 performs preliminary checks. Subsequent: PF.

2.2.5 Final Cockpit Preparation

Parking brake ON (pressure checked), altimeters cross-checked (QNH set, standby/right altimeter), landing elevation, FMS/COM/NAV, fuel qty balanced/min block, engine fuel used reset, memo panel, PWR MGMT set TO, departure briefing complete. T/O bugs, trims, tail prop, doors, seat belts, mobiles/EFB in Flight Safe Mode. Prop brake ON/OFF, beacon ON.

2.2.6 Before Taxi

Prop brake OFF, cockpit hatch closed, CL1+2 AUTO, anti-icing (call required, de-icing OFF), anti-skid test, flaps 15°, NWS ON, TRU ON, start selector OFF & Start Abort.

2.2.7 Taxi

Taxi & TO lights ON, brakes checked, FGCP/FMA set, TO config test performed. Cabin report received (flip card/tick PLOG).

2.2.8 Before Take-Off

TO briefing (changes or "No Changes"), gust lock OFF, flight controls checked, XPDR/TCAS ALT & ABOVE, boost function OFF, air flow NORMAL, cabin crew ADVISED, bleed valves as required, ext lights ON, lateral FD bar centred, rudder cam centred. CAUTION: Do not take off with locked differential on slippery runway — only use limited slip.

2.3 In-Flight Procedures

2.3.1 Climb

CM1 vs CM2 altimeter cross-check at first stable level. PF sets power/PWR MGT; PM monitors.

2.3.2 Cruise

PF/PM both monitor FMS position, fuel, systems. Any deviation from flight plan called and corrected.

2.3.3 Descent

CCAS recalled, landing elevation checked, FMS set, bugs set, DH/MDA set, arrival briefing complete. Altimeter: 1013 set passing transition level. Cross-check: "1013 set and cross checked...".

2.3.5 Approach Checks

QNH set → "QNH XXXX Set and Cross Checked" → Approach Checklist. If gap between QNH setting and approach initiation: repeat accuracy check. Altitude change sequence: set altitude → FD/AP modes → subscale → callout.

2.3.7 Altitude Selector

500-Series: PF sets ADU, PM writes clearance, acknowledges ATC, checks ADU. 600-Series: PF sets FGCP, PM writes clearance, acknowledges ATC, checks FMA. If one crew off frequency: confirm clearance with ATC "For crew coordination, confirm cleared FL/Alt".

2.3.8 Terrain Awareness

PF announces "Passing MSA" during climb/descent; PM checks/confirms. MSA sectors valid for 25 NM unless on STAR/SID.

2.3.9 Sterile Cockpit

Below 10,000 ft: non-operational conversation prohibited.

2.3.10 Cabin Crew Communication

Call bell test required each sector. 500-Series EMER call: 3 rings on cabin call panel. Do not send FAP/PA messages from flight deck unless doing so in aircraft with reliable crew.

2.4 Take-Off and Landing

2.4.1 Take-Off Alternate

Aircraft must carry fuel to reach TO alternate if weather below landing minima or cannot return within 60 min. 500-Series FM only. 600-Series not applicable unless weather below landing minima.

2.4.2 Contaminated Runway TO

Apply contaminated TO procedures (Section 2.11).

2.4.3 Rejected Take-Off (RTO)

Decision speed: V1. Below V1: reject. Above V1: continue unless unsafe. RTO after V1 (technical only): investigate cause, inspect brakes/tyres. Hot brake procedure: do not park on grass, chocks only after 30 min if no fire. CAUTION: Do not approach landing gear within 150 m for at least 30 min after RTO. WARNING: Do not pressurise brake accumulator if accumulator temp >125°C or indications of fire. Wheel inspection required if multi-wheel gear deflation suspected. Engineer must perform before next flight. RTO = mandatory occurrence report (MOR).

2.4.4 Take-Off Procedure

CM1 confirms runway on EHSI/MCDU. Verbal confirmation of clearance/heading. No turns normally before 1500 ft AAL unless SID/ATC specified — brief OEI obstacle clearance. Power: PL to notch within 1 sec, 90% in 4 sec, TO TQ in 5–6 sec. Abort if ATPCS light not on and steady. Expected TQ must be reached by 70 kts — otherwise abort. NP target: 100% (-0.6%/+0.8%). NWS hand on, aileron held into wind. PM calls "70 kts" then V1, VR, V2. Control transfer: "My Controls" / "Your Controls" at 70 kts. Rotate at VR to 10-12° nose-up. WARNING: Rejected take-off after V1 is only permitted if aircraft unable to fly. Stick shaker/actual stall after V1 — reject. CAUTION: If AP not engaged by 400 ft in LVTO, continue manually to safe altitude.

2.4.5 After Take-Off

Above 400 ft (or 1500 ft for 500-series circuit pattern): Gear UP, flaps ZERO, PWR MGT CLIMB/NP 82%, bleed valves ON, taxi/TO lights OFF.

2.4.6 Circuit Pattern Conventional

Base turn: FD standby, TQ 40%, speed 170 kts. Gear extension: 170 kts max. Flap 15° at 180(185) kts, 25° at 160 kts, 35(30)° at 150 kts. Final approach: PWR MGT TO, crew ADVISED, timing started at base turn completion. Before Landing Checklist complete, stabilised by 500 ft. Go-around if unstabilised.

2.4.7 Precision Approach (ILS)

PF engages AP at ≥400 ft. LOC capture monitored, then G/S capture. At decision height: "Decide" → Land or Go-Around.

2.4.8 Non-Precision Approach (NDB/VOR/LNAV)

Standalone managed or selected lateral guidance. Final approach speed VAPP. Altitude/step-down fixes: cross-check against DME/time. CAUTION: Do not use VNAV PATH below MDA — use selected VS.

2.4.10 Circling Approach

Requires visual reference with runway environment. Circling minima: CAT C. Defined circling area, speed ≤160 kts. 500 ft: stabilised. MDA maintained until positioned for final. WARNING: If visual contact lost after commencing circling, turn toward landing runway and climb on missed approach.

2.4.12 Flap/Slat Limitation (VFE)

Flap Setting	VFE (kts)
0°	200
15°	180 (185 max)
25°	160
35° (500-Series)	135
30° (600-Series)	150

Gear extension: 170 kts. Max speed with gear extended: 200 kts.

2.5 Go-Around

If go-around required: "Go Around" call, TOGA power, flaps one notch. Positive rate → gear UP. Flaps retract per SOP. Missed approach per published procedure unless ATC revises.

2.6 Operation in Icing Conditions

2.6.1 General

Do not dispatch into known/severe icing. Forecast icing en-route or at destination: evaluate via flight planning procedures. Ice detection: visual cues + empirical ice rate + crew judgement. CAUTION: In severe icing (rapid ice build even on protected surfaces): leave icing conditions immediately — change altitude/route. Uncommanded pitch changes, 2x ice accretion rate, decrease in speed/handle forces = leave icing conditions. WARNING: If stick shaker or abnormal vibration occurs — reduce angle of attack. Do not retract flaps to 0° until ice accretion removed and airspeed ≥215 kts.

2.6.2 Pre-Flight in Icing Conditions

Check prop de-icing, pitot heat, windshield heat, wing de-icers operational. If frost/ice/snow on critical surfaces: de-ice/de-icing fluid required. CAUTION: Do not use de-icing fluid when OAT > -3°C unless SLUSH, SAE Type I hot water + glycol allowed. Anti-icing fluid holdover time depends on OAT, precip type, fluid type.

2.6.3 Taxi and Take-Off in Icing Conditions

Anti-ice ON before taxi if OAT ≤3°C with visible moisture or standing water/slush/snow. De-icing after holdover time exceeded: return for re-spray. Take-off with anti-ice ON: 1.5% TO N1 correction applies. CAUTION: If de-icing completed on stand (not holding point): taxi at reduced power, avoid spray ingestion. WARNING: Do not exceed holdover time — if exceeded, return for inspection and re-spray.

2.6.4 Post Take-Off Ice Protection

PITOT/STATIC HEAT ON after TO. Wing de-icing: ice accumulation 5 mm on leading edge → activate. In icing conditions: maintain speed ≥195 kts (≥200 kts flap 0) or ice protection +10 kts below normal speed.

2.6.5 Approach and Landing in Icing Conditions

Anti-ice ON from first ice encounter to end of landing roll. In icing below 1000 ft: flap 30° (600-Series) / 35° (500-Series). VAPP +20 kts or ice speed schedule. If severe icing: do not extend flaps beyond 15°. Use +20 kts on VREF. WARNING: If ice accumulation prevents normal flap extension — do not extend past current setting. Land at higher speed.

2.7 Operation in Turbulence

Turbulence penetration speed (VRA): - Flap 0°: 160 kts / M0.47 - Flap 15°: 145 kts - Flap 25°: 135 kts - Flap 35° (500) / 30° (600): 125 kts Seat belts ON, AP engaged if mode holds, consider turbulence penetration altitude/wind. CAUTION: Turn seat belt sign ON at first indication of turbulence. Inform cabin crew.

2.8 Operation on Wet and Contaminated Runways

2.8.1 Definitions

• Wet: surface moisture ≤3 mm.
• Contaminated: >3 mm standing water/slush/snow/ice.
• Slippery: braking action poor (MU ≤39 / RWYCC 1-2). Refer to Ops Manual Part A for full definitions.

2.8.2 Braking Action Reports

Braking action reports: tower relay of pilot reports or runway friction measurements. MU values converted to braking action coding.

2.8.3 Landing Distance

Use AFM landing distance for actual conditions. Factor 1.67 for wet, 1.92 for contaminated. CAUTION: Do not land on runway with standing water/slush >13 mm (13 cm) ATR72 / >10 mm ATR42. Minimum landing distance factored must be ≤ LDA.

2.8.4 Crosswind on Wet/Contaminated

See Section 1.10 for crosswind limitations by RWYCC.

2.9 Operation at High Altitude Airfields

High altitude: pressure altitude >4000 ft. PA >8000 ft: use oxygen. TO / LDG distances increase. Hot/high: derated TO thrust, check VMC limitations. CAUTION: Above 8000 ft PA, crew must use oxygen during critical phases (TO, LDG).

2.10 Operation from Unpaved Runways

Gravel/grass runways: check NOTAM for surface condition. Reduced speeds. Increased risk of FOD. CAUTION: Avoid reverse on gravel — prop erosion risk.

2.11 Aircraft De-Icing / Anti-Icing

Holdover times per fluid type. OAT, precipitation rate determine holdover. Standard fluids: SAE Type I (de-ice), II/IV (anti-ice). CAUTION: Do not apply de-icing fluid if OAT > -3°C — only SAE Type I with hot water (+glycol) permitted. De-ice boots: cycle as required during flight. Ice bridge prevention: allow ice to shed, do not cycle boots early. WARNING: Wings must be free of ice before take-off. After de-ice, do not apply further treatment beyond holdover time without repeat inspection.

Section 3: Abnormal & Emergency Procedures

3.1 General

FLT 3.11.18 The Emergency Procedures have been established for application in the event of a serious failure whilst following failure procedures deal with less serious (abnormal) failures. Procedures for Emergency and Abnormal situations are contained in the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) on each aircraft. 600-Series These procedures are also contained in the database of the Electronic Checklist, (ECL). The ECL will automatically present the relevant checklists to the crew in the event of failures. Crews are encouraged to use the ECL. If known anomalies exist between the ECL and the QRH, crew will be advised and the QRH must be used. Expanded procedures and further details of failures can be found in the FCOM Chapter Procedures PRO NNO sections EMR and ABN. Refer to Section2.1, General. End 600-Series Any accident, incident, occurrence of system failure requires a Mandatory Occurence Report, (MOR). These must be reported by the company to the CAA no later than 72 hours from the time of the event. Crews must therefore raise an air Safety Report (ASR) via the Q-Pulse reporting system at the earliest opportunity to aid compliance with this requirement, as per OM-A 11.2 and OM-A AppendixI.

3.2 Priority Management

When dealing with an abnormal or an emergency situation, tasks should be managed according to a strict priority: • Fly the aircraft • Who is PF – need to change roles? • Maximum use of available automation • Continue to Aviate, Navigate, Communicate • Identification/Diagnosis of Failure/Abnormal Situation • Memory Actions and or Checklists • Decision Making

• Execution of Plan

3.3 Failure Treatment Concept Don’t hurry – take time to analyse the failure

A systems check should be carried out in all circumstances to aid in the correct identification of the failure. Six checks must be performed for failure confirmation. They are triggered by PF calling “MY RADIO, SYSTEM CHECK”. The PM will then review the systems status using the following format: CONTROL • Is the system control in a relevant position? INDICATOR • Is the indication relevant? Is the indication in compliance with the corresponding indication and with the control? SUPPLY • Are the supply source(s) available? CIRCUIT BREAKERS • Flight crew may reengage a tripped CB only if he/she judges it necessary for a safe continuation of the flight or it is part of an approved Emergency or Abnormal checklist. In this case only one reengagement should be attempted. If the failure alert disappears continue normal operation and record the event in the maintenance log. If not apply the associated failure procedure. On the ground a pilot may re-engage a tripped CB provided the action is co-ordinated with the maintenance team. LIGHTING • Are the bulb(s) digit(s) working? RESET • At PF discretion one reset of a push button of a failed system, associated with an amber caution may be performed by selecting system related PB OFF for 3 secs and then ON.

EXCEPTIONS: Bleed Leaks, Lo Level, EEC, PEC, BUS, CAB Press MAN CM1 should then positively assign the pilot roles ie “I/you have control”. PF shall then call for the relevant checklist. CM1 may reassign roles at a later stage depending on the failure.

3.4 Failure Consequences Analysis (ATR QRH Chapter General Information QRH.GEN.3(a))

The flight crew must assess the failures when fully identified and the constraints it imposes and make decision based on the remaining aircraft capabilities with the awareness of the current operational situations (condition, environment, and/or constraint).

3.4.1 System Reset

At flight crew discretion, one RESET of a failed system associated to an amber caution may be performed by selecting the related pb (Push-button OFF (for 3 s then ON except for systems listed below. If the failure alert disappears, continue normal operation and record the event in the aircraft maintenance logbook for information. If not, apply the associated abnormal procedure. For the following systems the flight crew should strictly follow the abnormal procedure and RESET only when it is called by the abnormal procedure:

WARNING: Fuel Pump CB(s) MUST NOT be reset.

CAUTION: • ECU/EEC. • PEC. • CAB PRESS MODE SEL. • BAT CHG (EMER & MAIN). In case of BLEED LEAK, or BUS FAULT alerts, do not reset the associated systems BLEED VALVE pb or GEN pb.

3.5 Circuit Breaker Policy (QRH GEN.3(b))

Flight crew may reengage a tripped CB only if he/she judges it necessary for a safe continuation of the flight or it is part of an approved Emergency or Abnormal checklist. In this case only one re-engagement should be attempted. If the failure alert disappears, continue normal operation and record the event in the maintenance log. If not, apply the associated failure procedure. On the ground a pilot may re-engage a tripped CB provided the action is coordinated with the maintenance team.

WARNING: DO NOT RE-ENGAGE THE C/B OF THE FUEL PUMP(S).

Note: before taking any action on a C/B, the flight crew must crosscheck that the C/B label corresponds to the affected system.

CAUTION: Circuit Breaker (C/B) must not be RESET by the flight crew unless otherwise specified in the operational documentation by ATR. Flight Crew may REENGAGE a tripped circuit breaker ONLY IF HE/SHE JUDGES IT IS NECESSARY FOR A SAFE CONTINUATION OF THE FLIGHT. In this case only ONE re engagement should be attempted. If the failure alert disappears, continue normal operation, if not apply the associated abnormal procedure. Regardless the outcome on system behaviour, when reengaging a tripped C/B, the flight crew must make a Maintenance Action Required entry in the Aircraft Technical Log describing the event.

3.6 Checklist Priority

When dealing with a failure the following checklist priority applies: 1. M EMORY ITEMS 2. E MERGENCY CHECKLIST 3. N ORMAL CHECKLIST 4. A BNORMAL CHECKLIST

3.7 Failure Identification

All failures must be identified in the following manner:

500-Series On the first indication of a malfunction – normally a Master Warning or Master Caution, PM cancels the warning and calls “Master Warning” or “Master Caution” and identifies the failure on the CAP followed by the local alert. End 500-Series 600-Series On the first indication of a malfunction – normally a Master Warning or Master Caution, PM cancels the warning and calls “Master Warning” or “Master Caution” and identifies the failure on the EWD followed by the local alert. On the 600 Series, system failures will be displayed on the EWD and the corresponding system schematic will automatically be displayed on the PM multifunction display. End 600-Series Failure Identification In case of system failure, information is provided to the crew:

500-Series PM call “MASTER WARNING/ CAUTION” (Continuous repetitive chime) (Single chime) End 500-Series

600-Series PM call “MASTER WARNING/ CAUTION” (Continuous repetitive chime) (Single chime) End 600-Series All actions which require a change in status of an item must be confirmed by the PF before the selection is made. For example, the following procedure would be used for pulling a fire handle: PM – Points to handle 1 and announces “Fire Handle 1” PF – Checks that the correct fire handle is pointed at and announces “Confirm” PM – Pulls the Fire Handle and calls “Pulled” starts the timing and calls “Timing” This philosophy does not apply for the On Ground Engine Fire where actions are completed without confirmation.

3.7.1 Memory Items 500-Series

ATR 42-500 & 72-500 Memory Item Cards. End 500-Series 600-Series ATR 42-600 & 72-600 Memory Item Cards. End 600-Series They are flow of actions known by heart that must be performed by crew. Memory items are boxed inside relevant checklists. They need to be read back when related checklists are performed. As soon as aircraft and flight path are under control, when emergency and/or abnormal statuses are entailed, PF commands “xxx MEMO ITEMS”. The PM says the memo item, obtaining confirmation if required and completes the drill. Once the memory items are complete, PM announces: “xxxxxxx Memory Items complete” 500-Series Once all Memory Items, Emergency or Following Failures Checklists are complete, PF should review the illuminated items on the CAP and if satisfied, announce “Clear the CAP”. PM then depress the CLR push button. End 500-Series 600-Series Once all Memory Items, Emergency or Following Failures Checklists are complete, PF should review all failed items displayed on the EWD and if satisfied, announce “Clear the EWD”. PM then depress the CLR push button. End 600-Series

600-Series On the Electronic Checklist, memo items are displayed between two white dotted lines. End 600-Series

3.7.2 AFM, FCOM & QRH AFM

Procedures are developed in the Aircraft Flight Manual, which takes precedence as the only certified manual. FCOM Flight Crew Operating Manual provides developed information relevant to related procedures. Once QRH procedure is completed, if required, on workload basis, it can be used in flight.

QRH Quick Reference Handbook is used in flight and only deals with procedures and checklists. Preconditions QRH  Preconditions are highlighted through black squares. PM will question “YES or NO?” following related item, to know whether related precondition applies to relevant scenario. If PF answers “YES”, apply following actions. If answer is “NO”, skip the related item.  Black dots are more dealing with “when” do the relevant actions must be applied.

600-Series The same symbology applies to electronic checklists displayed on EWD. End 600-Series

3.8 Decision Making

3.8.1 DODAR

Pilots should use the DODAR decision-making process to manage abnormal occurrences. It is normal carried out upon completion of the necessary checklists, but is valid for non-technical occurrences as well as technical occurrences. DODAR stands for the following: • Diagnosis – determine the nature of the problem. • Options – consider the alternative courses of action available. • Decision – decide which course of action to take. • Assign/Action Tasks – allocate PF, management, RT, cabin crew tasks (NITS), etc as appropriate.

• Review and Risk Assessment – review the previous stages, especially in light of any change in the situation or new information, so that the decision followed is the most suitable. Tasks should be assigned or reassigned to suit any change of decision. Assess the level of risk of the current situation.

3.8.2 Guidance for Diversion in Case of Technical Failures Definitions

In some malfunction checklists there is a recommendation to terminate the flight – “land at the nearest suitable airport” or “land without delay”.

3.8.2.1 Land at Nearest Suitable Airport Land at nearest suitable airport means to land at the nearest suitable

airport, depending on circumstances, which has the required weather situation and necessary facilities. Commanders should consider the following when selecting the nearest suitable airport: • If operating One Engine Inoperative the drag is less with one engine in flight idle and one propeller feathered than with two engines at Flight Idle. If the final approach has a glidepath steeper than 3° there may be difficulty reducing speed on final approach increasing the risk of an OEI go-around. • A non – precision approach with One Engine Inoperative has a higher workload than a precision approach. • A circling approach with One Engine Inoperative has a very high workload. • A radar vectored approach can reduce workload considerably compared to a procedural approach. • The wind and weather conditions at altitude en-route to the aerodrome. • The Commander’s familiarity with the aerodrome. Commanders should consider the relative risks of proceeding to a more distant airfield with better facilities, versus the risks associated with landing at a closer airfield with a higher degree of risk in terms of workload and landing performance.

The UK CAA do not consider the following as justifying a decision to continue beyond the nearest suitable aerodrome: • Sufficient fuel remains to fly to a further destination. • Better maintenance/repair facilities are available elsewhere. • More convenient passenger handling is available elsewhere. Nothing in the above guidance is intended to prevent a Commander, in the interests of safety, from landing at an aerodrome which poses the least risk to overall safety of the flight.

3.8.2.2 Land Without Delay Land without delay is used for urgent malfunctions such as fire, smoke etc

within the fuselage.

3.9 Crew Communications

3.9.1 General

The following procedures are a summary of the cabin safety procedures. All flight deck crew must familiarise themselves with all cabin safety procedures outlined in the Cabin Crew Safety Manual. Actions in the event of an Emergency 500-Series In the event of an emergency, the flight deck should alert the cabin crew with six chimes of No Smoking Sign or by use of the PA system using of the phrase “Number one to the flight deck immediately”. End 500-Series 600-Series In the event of an emergency, the flight deck should alert the cabin crew with six chimes of No Devices Sign or by use of the PA system using of the phrase “Number one to the flight deck immediately”. End 600-Series

3.9.2 Cabin Crew Briefing

CM1 shall ensure that Cabin Crew are fully briefed in all emergency situations using the N.I.T.S. formula. The N.I.T.S. formula is a two-way communication system to be used between cabin-crew and flight crew in any emergency situation. It should be conducted ‘face to face’ in the flight-deck, however where this is not possible, it may be completed over the interphone. In any case it should be announced to the cabin crew, “This is a NITS brief” N – NATURE of situation I – INTENTIONs – CM1 will brief CCM1 for either a NORMAL or an EMERGENCY landing T – TIME AVAILABLE remaining to landing, this should also include, where possible, the actual expected landing time. S – SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Normal Landing The CM1 will brief SCCM for a NORMAL landing if they judge that there is a low risk of significant danger to the Aircraft. Cabin Crew should remain alert to changing circumstances and follow the Captains Instructions. Emergency Landing The Captain will brief for an EMERGENCY landing if he judges that there is high risk to the Aircraft occupants. Cabin Crew must ensure that passengers are briefed as appropriate and that the Cabin is prepared for an emergency landing and a potential evacuation. It should be noted that whilst the NITS formula can be used for any abnormal situation, it must always be clearly communicated to the cabin crew what type of landing to anticipate. Air Traffic Control Time permitting consideration should also be given to giving a NITS brief to ATC.

3.9.3 Landing

At approximately 1,000ft AGL, PM should alert the cabin crew prior to landing in emergency situations if cabin crew require notice by use of the PA and the phrase: “Take up landing/ditching positions”

At 200ft AGL PM should alert the cabin crew by use of the PA and the phrase: “BRACE, BRACE”

3.9.4 Evacuation

For an unplanned emergency event, CM1 or CM2 will alert the cabin crew of a possible evacuation by use of the PA and the phrase: “ATTENTION, CABIN CREW TO STATION” In the event of an evacuation being required, this will be initiated by one of the flight deck, by use of the PA and the phrase: “EVACUATE, EVACUATE” If the Cabin Crew have been put on alert by a NITS brief for a planned emergency or “Attention Cabin Crew to Station” for an unplanned emergency and the situation has improved to a level whereby the cabin crew are no longer required to be on alert, CM1 shall communicate this as soon as practical. “Cabin Crew resume normal operations”.

3.10 Crew Incapacitation Incapacitation of a crew member can occur either very obviously and

suddenly, or more subtly and gradually over a long period, and possibly without loss of consciousness. It is therefore important that pilots are aware of the symptoms that lead up to this latter type of incapacitation. These include failure to correct sloppy and inaccurate flying and airmanship, failure to respond to calls or checks, slurred speech, or irrational behaviour. If a pilot observes any of these symptoms or becomes otherwise suspicious of their colleague’s actions, they should immediately question them, repeating the question if necessary, and if the answer is not forthcoming or is unsatisfactory, they should assume control and command of the aircraft. The controlling pilot must maintain control of the aircraft whilst a member of cabin crew (or supernumerary crew if available) attends to the incapacitated pilot and secures them in their seat, using and locking the full shoulder harness, and sliding the seat all the way back from the control column and rudder pedals. A member of the cabin crew/supernumerary crew may remain on the flight deck to assist with reading the checklist and to ensure the incapacitated pilot is kept well clear of the controls, however primary Cabin Crew concern is with the passengers.

The following points should be considered: 1. Landing at the nearest suitable airfield to obtain medical assistance for the incapacitated pilot. 2. If the commander is incapacitated the first officer is now the pilot in command. 3. The aircraft is being operated below its minimum crew complement and ATC must be informed through a Pan call. If the weather conditions at the landing airfield necessitate an instrument approach, plan for an ILS approach (if possible), monitored by radar. Avoid hurrying the approach, and allow time to complete the approach and landing checks. If the pilot now handling the aircraft is in the right hand seat he must consider loss of rudder control towards the end of the landing roll, and be prepared to maintain directional control with the foot brakes. In this case do not attempt to taxi beyond runway clearance. Commander Incapacitation During Take-off It is company policy that only the commander will call “STOP, STOP” and that either pilot will call malfunctions as they are detected. When any malfunction arises and is detected or observed by the CM2, they are only to call the generic failure mode and not the side to which it relates; i.e. “ENGINE FAILURE”, not “RIGHT ENGINE FAILURE”. Should CM2 call the nature of the malfunction i.e. “ENGINE FAILURE”, and no decision is made by the CM1, then the CM2 should restate the malfunction. If no response is received after this second challenge then CM2 is to assume commander incapacitation and take control of the aircraft whilst simultaneously calling “I HAVE CONTROL”. The decision to stop or continue is then to be made by CM2, stopping before V and continuing 1 after V . 1

3.11 Fire and Smoke Drills

In all cases of smoke or fire onboard an aircraft, it is vital to ensure that the aircraft lands as soon as possible and that when required, passengers are evacuated from the aircraft.

3.11.1 On Ground Engine Fire

Refer to: FCOM Chapter Procedures PRO NNO EMR.70 QRH Chapter Emergency E70.03 or EWD

An engine fire can occur at any time that the engine/s are running. In all circumstances, the aircraft must be brought to an immediate stop before CM2 completes the memory items. 500-Series Flight Event CM1 CM2 Calls “ENGINE FIRE” Calls “STOP, STOP” Immediately and simultaneously Actions: PL................................................GROUND IDLE To stop the aircraft and prevent brake overheat, the power levers should be retarded immediately to GI by using the triggers. Control Column..........................................PUSH Keep wings level with aileron Brakes.........................................AS REQUIRED Actions: LO PITCH.......................CHECK & ANNOUNCE Engine Fire Between 70 kts and V 1 Actions: The effect of asymmetrical reverse thrust is not predictable with sufficient accuracy on Reverse........................................IF REQUIRED contaminated runways, it is therefore not recommended to use single engine reverse thrust. Actions: ATC........................................................ADVISE Calls “MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY” At a suitable moment Actions: ATC........................................................ADVISE Calls “CABIN CREW TO STATION” Calls “70 kts” Calls “My Steering” Passing Actions: Actions: 70 kts NWS...................................................CONTROL Control Wheel.......................HOLD IN TO WIND Keep wings level with aileron.

Flight Event CM1 CM2 Actions: Actions: Calls “On Ground Engine Fire Memory Items” Memory Items (1) E70.03 Stopped If Fire Persists Agent 1 (affected engine)...............DISCHARGE If Fire Persists after 30 Sec Agent 2 (affected engine)...............DISCHARGE Calls “On Ground Engine Fire Memory Items Complete” Calls “On Ground Engine Fire Checklist” Actions: E70.03 On Ground Engine Fire Checklist.....COMPLETE Memory Read as Read and Do Items Complete Calls “On Ground Engine Fire Checklist Complete, is Emergency Evacuation required YES/NO?” (4) Calls “YES, Emergency Evacuation Checklist” E99.05 Actions: Actions: Fire Not ATC........................................................ADVISE Evacuation Checklist (2)...................COMPLETE Extinguished Read as Challenge, Action, Response Calls “LOG XXX Evacuating Aircraft” After Evacuation...............................................ASSIST 30Seconds Calls “Evacuation Checklist Complete” Calls “Evacuate, Evacuate, Evacuate” Actions: Evacuation...............................................ASSIST Note 1: No confirmation of actions is required on the ground. Note 2: This is the only checklist that is actioned as a Challenge, Action and Response. All other Emergency/Following Failure checklists are to be actioned as Read and Do. Note 3: If fire was extinguished or no fire was present after failure a precautionary deplaning of the aircraft may be considered. Full guidance on deplaning can be found in Section11.3. | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | Parking Brake | SET Memory Items...................................COMPLETE | | CCAS | RCL |

Action	Value
CL 1 & 2	FTR then FUEL S.O
Once Aircraft Fire Handle (affected engine)	PULL

Note 4: Following any on ground command of “Attention Cabin Crew to Station” if the crew decide then an evacuation is not required they should make the following announcement. “Cabin Crew Resume Normal Operations”. End 500-Series 600-Series Flight Event CM1 CM2 Calls “ENGINE FIRE” Calls “STOP, STOP” Immediately and simultaneously Actions: PL...............................................GROUND IDLE To stop the aircraft and prevent brake overheat, the power levers should be retarded immediately to GI by using the triggers. Control Column.........................................PUSH Keep wings level with aileron Brakes.........................................AS REQUIRED Actions: LO PITCH......................CHECK & ANNOUNCE Engine Fire Between 70 kts and V 1 Actions: The effect of asymmetrical reverse thrust is not predictable with sufficient accuracy on Reverse........................................IF REQUIRED contaminated runways, it is therefore not recommended to use single engine reverse thrust. Actions: ATC.........................................................ADVISE Calls “MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY” At a suitable moment Actions: ATC.........................................................ADVISE Calls “CABIN CREW TO STATION” Calls “70 kts” Calls “My Steering” Passing Actions: Actions: 70 kts NWS...................................................CONTROL Control Wheel.......................HOLD IN TO WIND Keep wings level with aileron.

Flight Event CM1 CM2 Actions: Actions: FWS.............................................................RCL Calls “On Ground Engine Fire Memory Items” Memory Items (1) EWD Stopped If Fire Persists Agent 1 (affected engine)...............DISCHARGE If Fire Persists after 30 Sec Agent 2 (affected engine)...............DISCHARGE Calls “On Ground Engine Fire Memory Items Complete” Calls “On Ground Engine Fire Checklist” EWD Actions: On Ground Engine Fire Checklist....COMPLETE Memory Read as Read and Do Items Complete Calls “On Ground Engine Fire Checklist Complete, is Emergency Evacuation required YES/NO?” (4) Calls “YES, Emergency Evacuation Checklist” Fire Not EWD Extinguished Actions: Actions: After ATC........................................................ADVISE Evacuation Checklist (2)...................COMPLETE 30Seconds Read as Challenge, Action, Response Calls “LOG XXX Evacuating Aircraft” Evacuation..............................................ASSIST Note 1: No confirmation of actions is required on the ground. Note 2: This is the only checklist that is actioned as a Challenge, Action and Response. All other Emergency/Following Failure checklists are to be actioned as Read and Do. Note 3: If fire was extinguished or no fire was present after failure a precautionary deplaning of the aircraft may be considered. Full guidance on deplaning can be found in Section11.3. Note 4: Following any on ground command of “Attention Cabin Crew to Station” if the crew decide then an evacuation is not required they should make the following announcement. “Cabin Crew Resume Normal Operations”. End 600-Series | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | Parking Brake | SET Memory Items..................................COMPLETE | | FWS | RCL |

Action	Value
CL 1 & 2	FTR then FUEL S.O
Once Aircraft Fire Handle (affected engine)	PULL

STUO-LLAC 1MC STUO-LLAC 2MC SNOITCA 1MC :DEPPOTS C/A NEHW L/C NOITAUCAVE ,SEY ”POTS“ TFARCRIA DEPPOTS L F L F U O P T U .. H .. S .E L D E IS U F D / E R T E C H E T F A F E A F E .. L .. D .. N .2 A H & 1 E R L I C F– – ”ERIF ENIGNE“ HCSID...EDIS DETCEFFA TNEGA TSRIF– s 03 RETFA ERIF FI EGRAHCSID..................TNEGA DNOCES SNOITCA 2MC GNINRAW RETSAM SSERP LEEHW LORTNOC YLMRIF DLOH at 12/02/2026, BY Maarten.Vanheuverswyn

3.11.2 Engine Fire after Take-Off Refer to: FCOM Chapter Procedures PRO NNO EMR.70 & QRH Chapter Emergency E70.01/2 3.11.2.1 Engine Fire After Take-Off 500-Series Flight Event PM PF Calls “V” 1 Reaching V Actions: CM1 1 PL 1 & 2............................................................................................................................RELEASE Calls “Rotate” Actions: Reaching V R Calls “Positive Climb” Actions: Calls “Gear Up” Positive Calls “Engine Fire” Calls “Check” Engine Fire Actions: Master Warning.....................................CANCEL Calls “Engine Fire at Take-Off Memory Items” All Landing Calls “Gear Up” Gear Lights Extinguished In case of high published Acceleration Altitude, Captain may decide to start memory items before reaching it but never below 400 ft AAL. Calls “Acceleration Altitude” Calls “PL in the Notch, Set MCT” Action: PWR MGT....................................................MCT On Passing Calls “MCT Set” Acceleration Calls “Set IAS V ” FTO Altitude Action: IAS MODE.....................................................SET Calls “IAS V Set” FTO Calls “Set Speed Bug V ” FTO Action: Set speed bug to V FTO Calls “Speed bug set V ” FTO | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | Pitch | ROTATE to 8° | | FD Bars | FOLLOW |

Action	Value
Climb Landing Gear	UP
Yaw Damper	ENGAGE
Taxi & T.O Light	OFF

Flight Event PM PF Calls “V ” FTO Calls “Normal Conditions Flap 0° or Icing Reaching Conditions Flaps 15°” V Calls “Speed checked, Flaps 0° (or 15°)” FTO Action: Flaps...........................................AS REQUIRED Calls “Flap 0°” Flaps 0°/15° Normal Conditions on Indicator or “Maintaining Flap 15°” Icing Conditions Calls “Confirm Engine 1 (or 2) Fire?” Calls “Confirm” Action: Affected PL................................................POINT Calls “PL 1 (or 2)” Visually verifies correct PL. Calls “Confirm” Action: Affected PL..................RETARD GENTLY TO FI Calls “Flight Idle” Action: Affected CL...............................................POINT Calls “CL 1 (or 2)” Visually verifies correct CL. Calls “Confirm” Action: Flight Path Stabilised Affected CL.........................FTR then FUEL S.O Shut-Off step by step. Stay 1 sec in FTR position before setting CL to FUEL S.O. Calls “Feather, Fuel Shut-Off” Action: Fire Handle................................................POINT Calls “Fire Handle 1 (or 2)” Visually verifies correct Fire Handle. Calls “Confirm” Action: Affected Fire Handle...................................PULL Calls “Pulled” Action: Timing......................................................START Calls “Timing”

Flight Event PM PF Action: AGENT 1...................................................POINT 10 Seconds Calls “10 Seconds Agent 1 (or2)?” Visually verifies correct Agent 1. After Fire Calls “Confirm” Handle Pulled Action: AGENT 1........................................DISCHARGE Calls “Discharged” 1st Discharge Action: Amber Light Time.......................................MONITOR 30 Sec on Fire Panel Calls “MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY” Action: AGENT 2...................................................POINT If Fire Calls “30 Seconds, Agent 2?” Visually verifies correct Agent 2. Remains Calls “Confirm” After 30 Sec Action: AGENT 2........................................DISCHARGE Calls “Discharged” Calls “Memory Item Complete” Calls “Engine Fire at Take-Off Checklist” Action: 2nd Discharge Engine Fire at Take-Off Checklist....COMPLETE Amber Light Read and Do on Fire Panel Refer to QRH 70.01 Calls “Engine Fire at Take-Off Checklist Complete” Any pilot shall call “Fire Stopped” as soon as the Red light disappears on CAP/FIRE HANDLE. Calls “Clear CAP” Action: CAP..........................................................CLEAR Engine Fire at Calls “CAP Cleared” Take-Off Calls “After Take-Off Checklist” Checklist Action: Complete After Take-Off Checklist...................COMPLETE Calls “After Take-Off Checklist Complete” Calls “Single Engine Operation Checklist” Continue with Single Engine Operation

Note:

End 500-Series

600-Series Flight Event PM PF Calls “V” 1 Reaching V Actions: CM1 1 PL 1 & 2............................................................................................................................RELEASE Calls “Rotate” Actions: Reaching V R Calls “Positive Climb” Actions: Calls “Gear Up” Positive Calls “Engine Fire” Calls “Check” Engine Fire Actions: Master Warning.....................................CANCEL Calls “Engine Fire at Take-Off Memory Items” All Landing Calls “Gear Up” Gear Lights Extinguished In case of high published Acceleration Altitude, Captain may decide to start memory items before reaching it but never below 400 ft AAL. Calls “Acceleration Altitude” Calls “PL in the Notch, Set MCT” Action: On Passing PWR MGT....................................................MCT Acceleration Altitude Calls “MCT Set” Action: FMA mode...............................................CHECK Calls “Speed V Magenta” FTO Calls “Speed V Magenta” FTO Calls “V ” FTO Calls “Normal Conditions Flap 0° or Icing Reaching Conditions Flaps 15°” V Calls “Speed checked, Flaps 0° (or 15°)” FTO Action: Flaps...........................................AS REQUIRED | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | Pitch | ROTATE to 8° | | FD Bars | FOLLOW |

Action	Value
Climb Landing Gear	UP
Yaw Damper	ENGAGE
Taxi & T.O Light	OFF

Flight Event PM PF Calls “Flap 0°” Flaps 0°/15° Normal Conditions on Indicator or “Maintaining Flap 15°” Icing Conditions Calls “Confirm Engine 1 (or 2) Fire?” Calls “Confirm” Action: Affected PL................................................POINT Calls “PL 1 (or 2)” Visually verifies correct PL. Calls “Confirm” Action: Affected PL..................RETARD GENTLY TO FI Calls “Flight Idle” Action: Affected CL...............................................POINT Calls “CL 1 (or 2)” Visually verifies correct CL. Calls “Confirm” Action: Flight Path Stabilised Affected CL.........................FTR then FUEL S.O Shut-Off step by step. Stay 1 sec in FTR position before setting CL to FUEL S.O. Calls “Feather, Fuel Shut-Off” Action: Fire Handle................................................POINT Calls “Fire Handle 1 (or 2)” Visually verifies correct Fire Handle. Calls “Confirm” Action: Affected Fire Handle...................................PULL Calls “Pulled” Action: Timing......................................................START Calls “Timing” Action: AGENT 1...................................................POINT 10 Seconds Calls “10 Seconds Agent 1 (or 2)?” Visually verifies correct Agent 1. After Fire Calls “Confirm” Handle Pulled Action: AGENT 1........................................DISCHARGE

Flight Event PM PF Calls “Discharged” 1st Discharge Action: Amber Light Time.......................................MONITOR 30 Sec on Fire Panel Calls “MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY” Action: AGENT 2...................................................POINT If Fire Calls “30 Seconds, Agent 2?” Visually verifies correct Agent 2. Remains Calls “Confirm” After 30 Sec Action: AGENT 2........................................DISCHARGE Calls “Discharged” Calls “Memory Item Complete” Call “Engine Fire at Take-Off Checklist” Action: 2nd Discharge Engine Fire at Take-Off Checklist....COMPLETE Amber Light Read and Do on Fire Panel Refer to EWD Calls “Engine Fire at Take-Off Checklist Complete” Any pilot shall call “Fire Stopped” as soon as the Red light disappears on FWS/FIRE HANDLE. Calls “After Take-Off 1 EO Checklist” Action: Engine Fire at After Take-Off 1 EO Checklist..........COMPLETE Take-Off Refer to EWD Checklist Complete Calls “After Take-Off 1 EO Checklist Complete” Calls “Single Engine Operation Checklist” Continue with Single Engine Operation

Note:

End 600-Series

3.11.3 Smoke Drills

Refer to: FCOM Chapter Procedures PRO NNO EMR.26 & QRH Chapter Emergency E26.01 The correct identification of the smoke source is vital to ensure that the correct check list is followed. It should be noted that air conditioning smoke will trigger the ELEC SMK warning once the smoke is drawn from the cockpit by the avionics vent fan over the ELEC SMK detector. An electrical smoke warning will normally trigger the ELEC SMK warning before the smoke becomes apparent. Air conditioning smoke will normally be noticed before the ELEC SMK warning is generated. Whether or not smoke has dissipated, if it cannot be visibly verified that the fire has been extinguished following the fire and/or smoke drills, land immediately at the nearest suitable airport. In the event of smoke or fire, prepare to land without delay while completing the fire and/or smoke drills. The flight crew should always go on 100% oxygen (emergency setting) whenever a hand held fire extinguisher is to be discharged in the cockpit, or when required because of smoke accumulation. Whilst using the oxygen masks the intercom selector on the ACP should be selected to OFF to reduce the noise level caused by the flow of oxygen within the masks. To communicate with other crew member the intercom switch on the control wheel should be used when communication is required. 600-Series The EWD will show FWD SMK/AFT SMK which do not have memory items, however, the first item on each checklist is “Smoke Procedure” which does have memory items. At the first display of any smoke warning the call should be “Smoke Procedure Memory Items”. Bear in mind that donning of masks etc. depends on whether there are smoke/fumes in the cockpit. End 600-Series

Note: AFT SMK smoke to reflect changes embodied in Aeroconseil Bulk Freighter STC 0110-11. Modified pages contain an amended data-block at top of checklist pages.

3.12 Duties in the Event of an Evacuation

CM1 duties: Depending on the circumstance, the commander will remain on board to monitor the situation internally and assist with the forward evacuation. On completion of the evacuation, CM1 will check the cabin, and evacuate the aircraft taking the available emergency equipment. For whatever reason, if the commander deems it necessary to action an emergency evacuation, this shall be communicated to ATC as soon as practicable. CM2 duties: Once engine shutdown and radio calls are completed, CM2 will evacuate the aircraft through the nearest usable exit which may be the overhead escape hatch.

CAUTION: Care must be taken when using the overhead escape hatch due to the probes on the aircraft fuselage around the noise area. Once evacuated, CM2 will assist the passenger evacuation, by directing the passengers away from the aircraft, at least 200 metres upwind.

3.13 Engine Failure

Refer to: FCOM Chapter Procedures PRO NNO EMR.70/ABN.70. Refer to: QRH Chapter Emergency E70.04/.05 & Chapter Following Failures Powerplant A70.07/.08/.09/.12

3.13.1 No Autofeather

The AFM Deviation Guide contains procedures for dispatch with 1 EEC Off, Auto Feather INOP or ATPCS off, dictates that in the event of an Engine Flame Out at Take-Off the power lever should not be reduced below 45° until feathering of the engine is complete. This is due to the fact that an increase in drag occurs with the reduction in power lever angle, thus decreasing the controllability of the aircraft. If no autofeather occurs during a flame out at take-off, the same procedure applies. The failure of autofeather shall be confirmed by PM as per the Engine Flameout at Take-Off memory items. At an appropriate time, PM shall slowly retard the respective Power Lever but not below 45° until the feathering of the failed engine is complete. Before any engine controls are moved, PM must confirm the correct lever with PF. The movement of the power lever before the condition lever acts as a safeguard against shutting down the wrong engine.

3.13.2 Engine Flameout Procedures

In accordance with CAT.POL.A.210(c), Loganair has established engine failure procedures following engine failure after take-off to provide a safe route to a holding pattern to enable the aircraft either land at the aerodrome of departure or at a take-off alternate aerodrome. In following such procedures a climb to the applicable MSA shall be executed unless clearance for a lower altitude can be obtained under positive radar control. These procedures shall be briefed prior to each departure and where required shall be complied with.

CAUTION: An engine failure during flight and NOT immediately after take-off is not deemed as emergency situation within the QRH. Care must therefore be taken when selecting the correct engine flameout procedure from the QRH. For engine flameouts NOT occurring at Take-off then Following Failure Procedure A70.07 applies. 500-Series

CAUTION: RTE 2 should be activated by PM when the aircraft is inbound to the engine flamout holding fix. End 500-Series

600-Series CAUTION Care must be taken when activating FPLN2 for an engine flame out. Manually created single engine procedures often have a straight ahead to a defined DME or altitude and a turn left or right to a holding point. The direction of turn cannot be manually programmed and the FMS will automatically turn in the shortest direction. End 600-Series 3.13.3 Engine Flameout After Take-Off 500-Series Flight Event PM PF Reaching V Calls “V” 1 1 Actions: CM1 PL 1 & 2............................................................................................................................RELEASE Calls “Rotate” Actions: Reaching V R Calls “Engine Failure” Anticipate unexpected roll and dissymmetric Expect to see abnormal engine parameters (TQ handling. decrease and rapid ITT decrease). Calls “Engine Flameout at Take-Off Memory Actions: Items” Flameout Calls “Uptrimmed, Autofeathered” Actions: Master Warning.....................................CANCEL If no Up-Trim, PF requests PL 1 and 2 to the ramp. If no Autofeather, requests PROP 1 (or 2) manual feathering. Calls “Positive Climb” Actions: Calls “Gear Up” If bleed fault not illuminated, PF requests BLEED 1(or 2) OFF Calls “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday...STANDBY” Suitable TimeInclude emergency turn procedure in MAYDAY call and ask ATC to STANDBY | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | Pitch | ROTATE to 8° | | FD Bars | FOLLOW |

Action	Value
Up-Trim Green Lights 1 (or 2)	CHECK
Engine Autofeather ENG 1 (or 2)	CHECK

Action	Value
Landing Gear	UP
Positive Yaw Damper	ENGAGE
Climb Taxi & T.O Light	OFF
Bleeds Fault	ILLUMINATED

Flight Event PM PF Calls “Acceleration Altitude” Calls “Set ALT” Action: ALT mode.............................................ENGAGE Calls “ALT Set” Acceleration Calls “ALT Green” Altitude Calls “ALT Green” Calls “Set Speed Bug V ” FTO Action: Speed Bug....................................................................................................Set speed bug to V FTO Calls “Speed bug set V ” FTO Calls “V ” FTO Calls “Power Lever in the Notch, set MCT” Actions: V FTO Calls “MCT Set” Calls “Normal Conditions Flaps 0° or Icing Conditions Flaps 15°” Calls “Speed checked” Action: Flaps...........................................AS REQUIRED Calls “Flaps 0°” Normal Conditions or “Maintaining Flaps 15°” Flaps 0°/15° Icing Conditions on Indicator Calls “Set IAS V ” FTO Action: IAS mode......................................................SET Calls “IAS V set” FTO | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | PL 1 & 2 CHECK | IN THE NOTCH | | PWR MGT | MCT | | Reaching TQ/NP | CHECK/ADJUST |

Flight Event PM PF Calls “Confirm Engine 1 (or 2) Flameout?” Action: Affected PL................................................POINT Calls “PL 1 (or 2)” Visually verifies correct PL. Calls “Confirm” Action: Affected PL..................RETARD GENTLY TO FI Calls “Flight Idle” Action: Affected CL...............................................POINT Calls “CL 1 (or 2)” Visually verifies correct CL. Flight Path Calls “Confirm” Stabilised Action: Affected CL.........................FTR then FUEL S.O Shut-Off step by step. Stay 1 sec in FTR position before setting CL to FUEL S.O Calls “Feather, Fuel Shut-Off, Memory Items Complete” Calls “Engine Flameout at Take-Off Checklist” Action: Engine Flameout after Take-Off Checklist............................COMPLETE Read and Do QRH Page E70.04 Once Checklist complete. Calls “Engine Flameout at Take-Off Checklist Complete”

Flight Event PM PF Action: CAP.....................Cross-Check with Local Alerts Calls “Clear CAP” Action: Engine CAP..........................................................CLEAR Flameout at Take-Off Calls “CAP Cleared” Checklist Calls “After Take-off Checklist” Complete Action: After Take-Off Checklist...................COMPLETE Calls “After Take-Off Checklist Complete” Calls “Single Engine Operation Checklist” Continue with Single Engine Operation

Note:

End 500-Series demmirt ylreporp si tfarcria eht nehwnoitercsid ta tes si PA :ETON

600-Series Flight Event PM PF Reaching V Calls “V” 1 1 Actions: CM1 PL 1 & 2............................................................................................................................RELEASE Calls “Rotate” Actions: Reaching V R Calls “Engine Failure” Anticipate unexpected roll and dissymmetric Expect to see abnormal engine parameters (TQ handling. decrease and rapid ITT decrease). Calls “Engine Flameout at Take-Off Memory Actions: Items” Flameout Calls “Uptrimmed, Autofeathered” Actions: Master Warning.....................................CANCEL If no Up-Trim, PF requests PL 1 and 2 to the ramp. If no Autofeather, requests PROP 1 (or 2) manual feathering. Calls “Positive Climb” Actions: Calls “Gear Up” If bleed fault not illuminated, PF requests BLEED 1(or 2) OFF Calls “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday...STANDBY” Suitable TimeInclude emergency turn procedure in MAYDAY call and ask ATC to STANDBY Calls “Acceleration Altitude” Calls “Set ALT” Action: Calls “ALT Set” Acceleration Action: Altitude Calls “ALT Green” Calls “ALT Green” Calls “Speed V Magenta” FTO Calls “Speed V Magenta” FTO | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | Pitch | ROTATE to 8° | | FD Bars | FOLLOW |

Action	Value
Autofeather ENG 1 (or 2)	CHECK
Engine Up-Trim Green Lights 1 (or 2)	CHECK

Action	Value
Landing Gear	UP
Positive Yaw Damper	ENGAGE
Climb Taxi & T.O Light	OFF
Bleeds Fault	ILLUMINATED

Flight Event PM PF Calls “V ” FTO Calls “Power Lever in the Notch, set MCT” Actions: V FTO Calls “MCT Set” Calls “Normal Conditions Flaps 0° or Icing Conditions Flaps 15°” Calls “Speed checked” Action: Flaps...........................................AS REQUIRED Calls “Flaps 0°” Check V Normal Conditions indicated FTO or “Maintaining Flaps 15°” Flaps 0°/15° Check V Flap 15° Icing Conditions FTO on Indicator indicated. Calls “Set IAS” Action: FGCP: IAS mode.................................ENGAGE Calls “IAS set” | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | PL 1 & 2 CHECK | IN THE NOTCH | | PWR MGT | MCT | | Reaching TQ/NP | CHECK/ADJUST |

Flight Event PM PF Calls “Confirm Engine 1 (or2) Flameout?” Checks engine instruments to verify which engine has flamed out and Calls “Confirm” Action: Affected PL...............................................POINT Calls “PL 1 (or 2)” Visually verifies correct PL. Calls “Confirm” Action: Affected PL..................RETARD GENTLY TO FI Calls “Flight Idle” Action: Affected CL..............................................POINT Calls “CL 1 (or 2)” Flight Path Visually verifies correct CL. Stabilised Calls “Confirm” Action: Affected CL.........................FTR then FUEL S.O Shut-Off step by step. Stay 1 sec in FTR position before setting CL to FUEL S.O Calls “Feather, Fuel Shut-Off, Memory Items Complete” Calls “Engine Flameout at Take-Off Checklist” Action: Engine Flameout after Take-Off Checklist............................COMPLETE Read and Do Refer to EWD Once Checklist complete. Calls “Engine Flameout at Take-Off Checklist Complete” Calls “After Take-off 1 EO Checklist” Action: After Take-Off 1 EO Checklist..........COMPLETE Engine Refer to EWD Checklist Flameout at Calls “After Take-Off 1 EO Checklist Complete” Take-Off Action: Calls “Single Engine Operation Checklist” Checklist Complete Single Engine Operation Checklist...COMPLETE Refer to EWD Checklist Calls “Single Engine Operation Checklist Complete”

Note: End 600-Series demmirt ylreporp si tfarcria eht nehwnoitercsid ta tes si PA :ETON

3.13.4 OEI – Landing Landing with one engine inoperative does not normally present any

special problems as sufficient power is available and the performance is good so long as the approach and landing is properly executed. • Plan properly. The configuration points to manage speed decay in a timely manner and management of AFCS/FGCP may need to vary slightly depending on various factors utilising TEM, e.g. aircraft weight, low platform altitude, manually flown approaches etc. • BLEED Valve on operating engine is selected OFF. • CL on operating engine is set to 100% OVRD. • Minimise drag. • Use Correct V Speed. APP • For performance reasons delay landing configuration (Flaps 30/35) until start of descent on final glide path. 500-Series • Use the YD until landing is assured. End 500-Series 600-Series • Use the YD until landing is assured. On the ATR-600 this will ensure Auto Rudder trim is active in the event of a go around. End 600-Series • Centre yaw trim (Trim zero) prior to landing flare. • Do not allow the aircraft to get slow or the power corrections necessary to restore speed may de-stabilise the approach.

500-Series

End 500-Series

600-Series

End 600-Series

Aircraft Altitude	Time of Useful Consciousness
FL250/25,000 ft	3–6 minutes
FL220/22,000 ft	5–10 minutes
FL180/18,000 ft	20–30 minutes
FL150/15,000 ft	30+ minutes
FL100/10,000 ft	Indefinite
3.14 Emergency Descent
3.14.1 General
An emergency descent may be required primarily due to a sudden, rapid loss of pressurisation at high altitudes. It should be noted that an excess
cabin altitude warning does not necessarily require an emergency descent. Following an excess cabin altitude warning, the aircraft
pressurisation should first be checked to ascertain if an emergency descent is required.
Following a rapid decompression or loss of pressurisation the amount of time an individual is able to perform flying duties efficiently (defined as
dependent on the aircraft altitude and is outlined below:
500-Series
In the event that an Emergency Descent is required, crew must follow the actions as defined in QRH E99.04
End 500-Series 600-Series
In the event that an Emergency Descent is required, crew must follow the actions as defined on EWD or QRH E99.04
End 600-Series
In order to alert cabin crew of the Emergency Descent, PM shall use the aircraft PA system and announce “EMERGENCY DESCENT, REMAIN
SEATED”.

3.14.2 Emergency Descent Procedure 500-Series Flight Event PM PF Loss Of Calls “Emergency Decent Memory Items” Pressurisation Autopilot remains engaged Or Structural Damage Actions: Actions: Oxygen Mask...............................................DON Oxygen Mask...............................................DON Breathing 100% oxygen for a long period may Breathing 100% oxygen for a long period may cause communication difficulties. Return to cause communication difficulties. Return to Normal setting if no smoke presence. Normal setting if no smoke presence. Calls “Oxygen ON” Calls “Oxygen ON” Actions: Actions: ICAO Guidance HDG.................................................TURN ± 45° UK Airspace Depending on potential structural damage (1) PA “Emergency Decent, Remain Seated” Calls “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday LOG XXX Emergency Decent, Standby” Calls “HDG Mode, IAS, Speed 180/240 kts, ALT White” Calls “Emergency Decent Checklist” Actions: HDG.......................................................ADJUST Adjust as required for flight path, ATC Actions: Emergency Decent Checklist...........COMPLETE Calls “Emergency Decent Checklist Complete” | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | Goggles (if require) | ON Goggles (if require)........................................ON | | Crew Communication | ESTABLISH Crew Communication.......................ESTABLISH |

Action	Value
Pax Oxygen supply	ON ALT SEL.......................................FL100 or MSA
Seatbelt Signs	ON Whichever is highest
Transponder	7700 IAS Mode......................................................SET
MSA	CHECK HDG Mode...........................................ENGAGE

Action	Value
HDG	MAINTAIN
PL 1&2	FI
CL 1&2	100% OVRD
IAS	170/240 kts

Flight Event	PM	PF
Loss Of Pressurisation Or Structural Damage		Calls “Emergency Decent Memory Items” Autopilot remains engaged
Calls “You can remove oxygen mask” Actions: Actions:
Passing FL100Oxygen Mask.......................................REMOVE Oxygen Mask.......................................REMOVE Oxygen Hatch..........................................CLOSE Oxygen Hatch.........................................CLOSE
Oxygen Test pb...................................DEPRESS Oxygen Test pb..................................DEPRESS Enables normal headset use Enables normal headset use
Calls “Emergency Descent Complete, SCCM to Unpressurised the Flight Deck”
Rate of Decent Actions:
Reached Situation................................................ASSESS NITS Briefing....................................COMPLETE
Note: If structural damage is suspected set IAS initially to 170kts. At 170kts, lower landing gear and then increase speed to 180 kts. If
no structural damage is suspected set IAS to 240 kts and maintain aircraft in clean configuration.
End 500-Series 600-Series
Loss Of Calls “Emergency Decent Memory Items” Pressurisation Autopilot remains engaged
Or Structural Damage

Flight Event PM PF Actions: Actions: Oxygen Mask...............................................DON Oxygen Mask...............................................DON Breathing 100% oxygen for a long period may Breathing 100% oxygen for a long period may cause communication difficulties. Return to cause communication difficulties. Return to Normal setting if no smoke presence. Normal setting if no smoke presence. Calls “Oxygen ON” Calls “Oxygen ON” Actions: Actions: ICAO Guidance HDG.................................................TURN ± 45° UK Airspace Depending on potential structural damage (1) PA “Emergency Descent, Remain Seated” Calls “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday LOG XXX Emergency Decent, Standby” Calls “HDG SEL, IAS, Speed 180/240 kts, ALT Blue” Calls “Emergency Decent Checklist” Actions: HDG.......................................................ADJUST Adjust as required for flight path, ATC Actions: Calls “Emergency Decent Checklist Complete” Calls “You can remove oxygen mask” Actions: Actions: Enables normal headset use Enables normal headset use Calls “Emergency Decent Complete, SCCM to Unpressurised the Flight Deck” Rate of Decent Actions: | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | Goggles (if require) | ON Goggles (if require)........................................ON | | Crew Communication | ESTABLISH Crew Communication.......................ESTABLISH |

Action	Value
Pax Oxygen supply	ON ALT SEL.......................................FL100 or MSA
Seatbelt Signs	ON Whichever is highest
Transponder	7700 Speed Man....................................................SET
MSA	CHECK IAS Mode......................................................SET
HDG Mode	ENGAGE

Action	Value
HDG	MAINTAIN
PL 1&2	FI
CL 1&2	100% OVRD
Speed Target	170/240 kts

Action	Value
Passing FL100Oxygen Mask	REMOVE Oxygen Mask.......................................REMOVE
Oxygen Hatch	CLOSE Oxygen Hatch.........................................CLOSE
Oxygen Test pb	DEPRESS Oxygen Test pb..................................DEPRESS

Action	Value
Reached Situation	ASSESS
NITS Briefing	COMPLETE

Note: 170kts, lower landing gear and then increase speed to 180 kts. If no structural damage is suspected set IAS to 240 kts and maintain aircraft in clean configuration. End 600-Series

3.15 TAWS/GPWS Terrain Awareness Warning System

Please refer to: FCOM.DSC.34.8 and FCOM.PRO.NOP.NSU 34.5 for ATR TAWS procedures and Loganair Operations Manual Part A 8.3.5 When Ground Proximity Warnings are received by the crew they should recognise; • The need, without delay, to initiate a climb in the manner specified by the AFM and SOPs. • The need, without delay, to maintain the climb until visual verification can be made that the aircraft will clear the terrain or obstacle ahead or until above the appropriate sector safe altitude (if uncertain about the location of the aircraft with respect to terrain) even if the TAWS warning stops. If, subsequently, the aircraft climbs up through the sector safe altitude, but the visibility does not allow the flight crew to confirm that the terrain hazard has ended, checks should be made to verify the location of the aircraft and to confirm that the altimeter subscale settings are correct. • When the workload permits that, the flight crew should notify the air traffic controller of the new position and altitude/flight level, and what the commander intends to do next. TAWS Alert Modes are: Reactive warning modes: Mode 1 – Excessive descent rate. Mode 2 – Excessive terrain closure rate. Mode 3 – Altitude loss after takeoff or go around. Mode 4 – Unsafe terrain clearance not in landing mode. Mode 5 – Excessive descent below glide slope.

Mode 6 – Excessive bank angle and altitude callouts. Predictive warning modes: Terrain Caution and Warning Obstacle Caution and Warning Avoid Terrain Action to be taken on receipt of a TAWS Caution When a TAWS Caution occurs, verify the aircraft flight path and correct it if required. If in doubt, perform a climb until the caution alert ceases. Callout Action “Terrain Ahead or Adjust flight-path to avoid the obstacle until warning ceases. Obstacle Ahead” “Sink Rate” Increase pitch and power until warning ceases. “Dont Sink” Adjust pitch & power to maintain altitude or a positive climb gradient. “Too Low Gear or Change aircraft configuration or perform a go-around. Too Low Flaps” Adjust flight-path to regain glideslope or if the approach is intentionally “Glideslope” performed below the glideslope, depress the GS button to cancel the warning. Action to be taken on receipt of a TAWS Warning

Flight Event PM PF Simultaneously Actions: Actions: Maintain Maximum Climb angle until reaching Power.........................ADJUST ACCORDINGLY MSA. Calls “Calls out Radio Altimeter height until If terrain contact appears imminent increase power terrain clearance is assured” to maximum physically available and increase pitch attitude to stick shaker or stall warning. Safe Flight Call “LOG xxx, resuming …….” Actions: Profile Pitch.....................................................REDUCE Resumed and Speed................................................INCREASE Warning Configure.....................................AS REQUIRED Ceased Note: A technical log entry is to be made for all TAWS Warnings so that the TAWS system memory may be downloaded by Engineering. An ASR or technical log entry is not required for a TAWS Caution. WARNING Limitations of EGPWS System During 3D Barometric & 2D Approach The EGPWS may not generate a “PULL UP” Warning in the Landing Configuration during 3D Barometric and 2D Approach. This is especially critical if the Altimeters are set to the incorrect QNH. The risk of miss setting the QNH may increase considerably in a congested radio environment, during times of high cockpit workload, or when transitioning from Standard Terminal Arrival Route (STAR). 3.16 TCAS Warnings 600-Series The TCAS (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System) is integrated in the T2CAS (TAWS TCAS). End 600-Series Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System is used for detecting and tracking aircraft in the vicinity of the aircraft. By interrogating their transponders, it analyzes the replies to determine range, bearing, and if reporting altitude, the relative altitude of the intruder. When the TCAS | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | CL’S | 100% OVRD Power............................................GO-AROUND | | PWR MGT | TO AP.................................................DISCONNECT | | TAWS Seat Belt Signs | ON Pitch.................INCREASE TO STICK SHAKER | | Warning FD | STBY |

processor determines that a possible collision hazard exists, it issues visual and aural advisories to the crew for appropriate vertical avoidance manoeuvres. There are two types of cockpit displays: • Traffic Advisory (TA) • Resolution Advisory (RA)

Note: transponder or in case of transponder failure. In case of TCAS resolution, ATC is not responsible for aircraft separation until resuming the initial clearance.

3.16.1 Traffic Advisory Traffic Advisory informs the pilot of any surrounding traffic. The TA display

shows the intruding aircraft’s relative position and altitude with the trend arrow indicating if it is climbing or descending at a rate greater than 500ft/ min. The TA display identifies the relative threat of each intruder by using various symbols and colors and provides appropriate synthetic voice call-outs. Non-Threat Traffic Advisory Information about any non-threatening traffic in the vicinity. Proximity Intruder Traffic Advisory Information about any traffic in proximity. “TRAFFIC, TRAFFIC” Information about intruding aircraft considered potentially hazardous. The crew should attempt to establish visual contact with the intruder and access the potential collision risk.

Flight Event	PM	PF
“Traffic Traffic”	Calls “Traffic in Sight or Not Visual”	Actions: TCAS DISPLAY.......................................CHECK
		e.g. Call “3 o’clock, 500 ft Below”
3.16.2 Traffic Advisory Procedure Actions:
“Traffic TCAS DISPLAY.......................................CHECK Traffic”
Important:At this step, the crew must take no evasive action, have to remain on the same route, maintain the autopilot ON, even
if the opposite traffic is in sight.
Note: Traffic advisory may become a RA within 15 seconds. If the intruder is Non-Altitude reporting the traffic symbol appears without
an altitude number or trend arrow. The type of symbol selected by TCAS is based on the intruder location and closing rate.
Important:The crew must not turn their overall attention to establishing visual contact with the intruder. The crew
must prepare for a potential RA.
3.16.3 Resolution Advisory Resolution Advisory warns the pilot on the vertical
manoeuvre to carry on to avoid collision with the surrounding traffic. Red and green areas are displayed on the VSI to
indicate the required rate, or limitation of climb or descent to avoid a possible collision.
Resolution Advisories can be preventive or corrective:
• Preventive advisories require that NO action be taken to alter the flight path of the aircraft. Vertical Speed must remain outside the red sector.
• Corrective advisories require the crew to act following the green sector indication on the VSI and escaping the red sector (when Vertical
Speed is currently in the red sector).
Combined with the Resolution Advisory, the TCAS triggers an aural synthetic voice call-out describing the avoidance maneuver required.
TCAS Operating Characteristics and Limitations
For a full descrition of TCAS limitations see FCOM LIM 5.34.9

CONFIGURATION	RA CLIMB	RA INCREASE CLIMB
FLAPS 0	AUTHORIZED	AUTHORIZED
FLAPS 15	AUTHORIZED	INHIBITED
FLAPS 25	AUTHORIZED	INHIBITED
FLAPS 35	AUTHORIZED	INHIBITED
CONFIGURATION	RA CLIMB	RA INCREASE CLIMB
---	---	---
FLAPS 0	AUTHORIZED	AUTHORIZED
FLAPS 15	AUTHORIZED	INHIBITED
FLAPS 25	AUTHORIZED	INHIBITED
FLAPS 35	AUTHORIZED	INHIBITED
RA Inhibition in Non Icing Conditions RA Inhibition in Icing Conditions
The “INCREASE CLIMB” RA is inhibited for certain above conditions.
In non altitude crossing encounters for which a “CLIMB” RA is posted, the threat may maneuver or accelerate toward own aircraft and cause a
reduction in vertical separation despite the RA. Since the “INCREASE CLIMB” RA is inhibited, the climb RA remains posted. As soon as the
threat passes through own aircraft’s altitude, the RA sense will be reversed and a “DESCEND” RA will be posted. If the threat never crosses
through, the “CLIMB” RA will remain posted for the duration of the encounter.
“DESCEND” RAs are inhibited:
• Below 1200 ft AGL (during a climb) at takeoff • Below 1000 ft AGL in approach (during a descent)
“INCREASE DESCEND” RAs are inhibited:
• Below 1650 ft AGL during a climb • Below 1450 ft AGL during a descent
All RAs are inhibited:
• Below 1100 ft AGL when aircraft is climbing

Resolution Advisory	Downward	Upward	Vertical Speed Required (V/S)
INITIAL PREVENTATIVE RA	“Monitor Vertical Speed”	“Monitor Vertical Speed”	0
CORRECTIVE RA	“Descend, Descend”	“Climb, Climb”	Monitor
ANY STRENGTHING OF AN RA	“Increase Descent, Increase Descent”	“Increase Climb, Increase Climb”	± 2500ft/Min
ANY WEAKINGING OF AN RA	“Adjust vertical Speed, Adjust”	“Adjust vertical Speed, Adjust”	± 1500ft/Min
OPPOSITE RA	“Descend, Descend Now”	“Climb, Climb Now”	Adjust
CROSSOVER RA	“Descend, Crossing, Descend, Descend Crossing, Descend”	“Climb, Crossing Climb, Climb, Crossing Climb”	± 2500ft/Min
MAINATIN EXISTING SPEED RA	“Maintain Vertical Speed, Maintain”	“Maintain Vertical Speed, Maintain”	± 1500ft/min
MAINTAIN EXISTING VERTICAL SPEED WHILE CROSSING THREATS ALTITUDE	“Maintain Vertical Speed, Crossing Maintain”	“Maintain Vertical Speed, Crossing Maintain”	Maintain ± 4400ft/Min > V/S > ± 1500ft/Min
LEVEL OFF	“Level Off, Level Off”	“Level Off, Level Off”	0
END OF RA	“Clear of Conflict”		0
• Below 900 ft AGL when aircraft is descending There can be a case where the threat aircraft track on altitude information
is lost during an RA. In this case, the RA will terminate without a “CLEAR OF CONFLICT” annunciation.
When a climb or increase climb RA occurs with the aircraft in the landing configuration or in the go-around phase, a normal procedure of go-around
should be followed including the appropriate power increase and configuration changes.
Resolution Vertical Speed Advisory Required (V/S)
INITIAL PREVENTATIVE 0
Speed” Speed” RA
ANY “Increase Descent, “Increase Climb,
Increase Descent” Increase Climb” OF AN RA ANY
AN RA “Descend, Descend “Climb, Climb
Now” Now” “Descend, Crossing, “Climb, Crossing
Crossing, Descend” Crossing Climb” MAINATIN
“Maintain Vertical “Maintain Vertical Speed, Maintain” Speed, Maintain”
SPEED RA MAINTAIN
EXISTING VERTICAL “Maintain Vertical “Maintain Vertical
Maintain ± 4400ft/Min > SPEED WHILE Speed, Crossing Speed, Crossing
CROSSING Maintain” Maintain” THREATS
ALTITUDE “Level Off, Level
Off”

Important:Resolution Advisories commands are based on aircraft performance assumed within a flight envelope defined during the TCAS certification. When the current conditions are outside the flight envelope, the RA commands may not be appropriate. In any case, stall warning must take precedence above before RAs commands. 3.16.4 Resolution Advisory Procedure In response to a manoeuvre Resolution Advisory, PF must manoeuvre the aircraft promptly (within 5 seconds) and smoothly. The autopilot MUST be disconnected before responding to a manoeuvre RA. Flight Event PM PF Some TCAS RAs will only advise to “Monitor Vertical Speed” (Preventative RA) or “Maintain Vertical Speed” (Corrective RA). Others will advise to manoeuvre the aircraft. If a “Monitor Vertical Speed” RA or a “Maintain Vertical Speed” RA is received the autopilot can remain On, however crews should anticipate disconnecting the autopilot if the preprogrammed flight guidance is going to contravene the action required by the RA. E.g. if the RA commands “Maintain Vertical Speed” and the flight guidance is about to command a level off, then the autopilot must be disconnected. If a Manoeuvre RA is commanded the following procedures must then be applied. Actions: Actions: ATC...........................................................Inform A/P.....................................................Disconnect RA Command Triggered Call “LOG XXX TCAS RA” Calls “My Controls” Actions: Actions: MCT en route or TO in other phases e.g. Take-off, Approach and Landing and if required set CL to 100% OVRD TCAS Call “CLEAR OF CONFLICT” Actions: Actions: Clear of Flight path resume to initial FL/ALT(1) ATC...........................................................Inform Conflict A/P..................................................................On Call “LOG XXX, Clear of Conflict, resuming FL/ ALT XXX” 1. If initially in level flight, promptly but smoothly return to the previously assigned FL/ALT unless otherwise directed by ATC. If previously climbing or descending resume the planned climb or descent unless otherwise directed by ATC. | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | SEAT BELT SIGNS | On PITCH......................Follow Green sector on VSI | | CL’s | 100 % OVRD Pitch promptly and smoothly | | PWR MGT | MCT PL....................................................As Required | | FLIGHT DIRECTORS | STBY |

CAUTION: Do not follow the Flight Directors and do not change the altitude selected on AFCS. Control the aircraft only with a pitch attitude to obtain the commanded vertical speed. Average pitch attitudes are: • ± 5° for climb or descent orders • ± 8° for increase climb or increase descent orders • ± 1° for adjust vertical speed orders (following climb or descent initial orders) • For all other cases follow Green sector indication. Do not over react to a Resolution Advisory. The aircraft should be pitched promptly and smoothly to the green sector on the VSI. Two TCAS equipped aircraft will coordinate their Resolution Advisories using a Mode S transponder air-to-air data link. The coordination ensures that complementary advisories are issued in each aircraft. Since maneuvers are coordinated, the crew must never maneuver in the opposite direction of the advisory. TCAS resolution has absolute priority over ATC orders.

3.16.5 Reporting

If a TCAS warning is experienced, it must be reported to Air Traffic Control immediately and an air safety report must be completed after the flight.

3.17 Upset Recovery

3.17.1 Definition

An airplane upset is an undesired airplane state characterised by unintentional divergences from parameters normally experienced during operations. An airplane upset may involve pitch and/or bank angle divergences as well as inappropriate airspeeds for the conditions. Deviations from the desired airplane state will become larger until action is taken to stop the divergence. Return to the desired airplane state can be achieved through natural airplane reaction to accelerations, auto-flight system response or pilot intervention.

3.17.2 Monitoring Flight crew engagement combats complacency through active monitoring.

Therefore, active monitoring is the critical element to ensure awareness and avoidance of undesired airplane states and provides the strongest countermeasure against startle. An engaged crew is in the best position to cope with undesired airplane states. In the context of undesired airplane states, active monitoring means keeping track of the environment, the airplane’s energy state and flight path trajectory. This creates expectations about future airplane state to detect deviations in order to take timely corrective actions. Effective monitoring of the environment, the airplane energy state and flight path depends very heavily on an accurate and comprehensive understanding of the current airplane’s energy state and flight path trajectory based on the relevant indications of its status. This understanding, or mental model, can then be used to create expectations about future state and deviations from the expected state. These expectations then serve as a baseline for monitoring. Active monitoring is the responsibility of all crew members to ensure the airplane state is understood and correct for the situation. Each pilot should: • Know and understand the expected airplane state for the situation • Communicate expectations • Keep track of current airplane state • Detect and communicate deviations from expectations • Assess risk and decide on a response • Update and communicate understanding • Take timely corrective actions

3.17.3 Energy States/Aircraft Performance

A pilot has three sources of energy available to manage or manipulate the flight path of an airplane. The term ‘energy state’ describes how much of each kind of energy the airplane has available at any given time. Pilots who understand the airplane energy state will be in a position to know instantly what options they may have to maneuver their airplane and therefore manage the trajectory. The three sources of energy are: 1. Kinetic energy, which increases with increasing airspeed. 2. Potential energy, which is proportional to altitude. 3. Chemical energy, from the fuel in the tanks which can be converted to thrust. These three types of energy can be traded, or exchanged: • Airspeed can be traded for altitude (kinetic to potential energy) • Altitude can be traded for airspeed (potential to kinetic energy) • Thrust can be converted into airspeed and/or altitude (chemical to either kinetic or potential energy) Kinetic energy needs to be replenished (from potential or chemical energy), as it is continuously expended in the process of generating the aerodynamic forces acting on the airplane which result in controlled flight (lift and drag). This process of consciously controlling the energy state of the airplane is referred to as 'energy management'. The trading of energy must be accomplished with a view toward the final required energy state.

The objective of energy management is to keep the desired kinetic, potential and chemical energy within operating limits. This objective is especially important during an inadvertent upset and the ensuing recovery. The process of controlling forces to produce a new energy state takes time. Airplanes of larger mass generally take longer to change orientation than airplanes of smaller mass. The longer time requires the pilot to plan ahead more in a large-mass airplane to make sure that the actions taken will achieve the final desired energy state. The amount of time required is a function of the mass of the airplane and the magnitude of the applied forces. It is also a function of the aircraft actual performance versus the expected performance, for example when encountering icing conditions, an unusual power required and/or unusual acceleration rate or vertical speed can be an indicator of ice accretion effect. In that intent, it is crucial that pilots are aware of and expect their aircraft performance and presets during climb (vertical speed) and level off (target speed, acceleration rate) in order to perform the most effective monitoring and ensure a timely recovery.

3.17.4 Monitoring or Aircraft Performance in Icing Conditions

In-service events have evidenced that many upset situations where associated with a lack of flight crew active monitoring linked to aircraft performance degradation. These situations mainly occurred during operations in icing conditions where the aircraft had been flown at or below minimum icing speeds without recovery actions until the aircraft stalled or became unstable in roll. Active monitoring and of the aircraft performance expectations, in terms of climb performance and cruise parameters, are key to prevent any undesired airplane state and to detect and to recover early enough any aircraft performance degradation. The effects of ice accretion on the airplane first consist in a drag increase. It can generate either a loss of climb rate in climb or a loss of airspeed in cruise. Therefore the monitoring of the rate of climb (in climb) or of the airspeed (in cruise) should be tight to allow detection of icing conditions that may not be obvious from a visual standpoint (such as clear ice accretion for instance). The rate of ice accretion depends on a lot of parameters and induced drag increase can be very slow and progressive or on the contrary fast and massive. The lower is the airspeed, the quicker and the more important can be such performance decrease. This underlines the importance of an early identification of loss of performance of the airplane especially when margin to V icing is limited. mLB0 Climb In climb, the AP/FD must be used in IAS mode that maintains the aircraft speed by adjusting the pitch, which impacts the rate of climb. Any other vertical mode (pitch hold, V/S) is prohibited. Anticipating the entry into icing conditions: if the airplane is not in icing conditions yet but approaches icing conditions (for instance, a cloud layer above and/or TAT progressively decreasing), the target climb speed should be increased and the anti-icing systems engaged before actually entering icing conditions. The flight crew should monitor the rate of climb to identify any possible loss of performance. At any time above Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA), a decrease in performance can lead the flight crew to choose a cruise level below the initial target. For information,in terms of energy exchange, a

climb rate of 100ft/min is equivalent to a speed increase of 10Kts. For example, if climbing at 400Ft/min the aircraft will accelerate by 40Kts when leveling off. Given the factors that influence the rate of climb (weight, temperature, turbulence, etc.), it may not be easy for the flight crew to detect a climb performance lower than normal. However the operational ceilings are defined when the rate of climb reaches a threshold of: -300 Ft/min in normal condition -100 Ft/min in icing condition Since they are computed with a lower residual rate of climb in icing conditions, the operational ceiling values may be higher than in normal conditions. In such case, the operational ceiling is the lowest of the two. Therefore if the climb rate decreases under 300 ft/min, it means that the aircraft is reaching its operational ceiling and a level off should be considered. At the latest when climb rate reached 100 ft/min or less, a level off will certainly not be enough to regain airspeed and the severe icing procedure has to be applied. Cruise Depending on the altitude and temperature, this power level should bring the aircraft to a specific IAS. This target airspeed should be known by the flight crew and bugged so that a deviation from this value could be easily identified. Any ice accretion will generate an increase in drag and a decrease in airspeed. Whatever the severity of ice accretion, there will still be a loss due to ice on unprotected areas (e.g. radome, wipers, spinners, …). In most situations, the use of anti and de-icing systems will be enough to limit the loss of performance and it may even be almost transparent. As soon as a loss of airspeed is identified, the flight crew should monitor that it stabilises. If the airspeed keeps decreasing, the flight crew should take all necessary actions to maintain airspeed above V icing+10 kt. mLB0 The time available to the flight crew between the moment they identify the loss of airspeed and the moment they need to take an action depends on the margin that is available above the minimum speed and the rate of ice

accretion. That is the reason why it is recommended, if icing conditions are likely on the planned route, to choose a flight level that provides a cruise speed at least 40 kt above the minimum icing speed. To regain or maintain airspeed, a first action can be to increase the rotation speed of the propellers (CL set to 100%) that helps de-icing the blades. If this is not enough and the IAS continues to decrease, the flight crew should prepare a descent strategy (MSA, escape route, …). If the airspeed cannot be maintained above V icing+10 kt, the flight mLB0 crew shall immediately apply the severe icing procedure and initiate a descent.

3.17.5 Causes of Aircraft Upsets

An airplane upset is not a common occurrence. There are a variety of reasons why upsets occur, including: • Pilot-induced. • Mis-use of airplane automation. • Environmentally-induced. • Systems-induced.

3.17.6 Pilot Induced Aircraft Upsets Instrument Cross Check

Pilots must cross-check and interpret the instruments. When a divergent indication exists from what was intended, it must be communicated to the other pilot and corrected with proper pitch, bank and power adjustments. Misinterpretation of the instruments and/or lack of “active monitoring” by the pilots can lead to an airplane upset. An important factor influencing cross-check technique is the ability of the pilot: all pilots do not interpret instrument presentations with the same speed; some are faster than others in understanding and evaluating what they see. One reason for this is that the natural ability of pilots varies. Another reason is that the experience levels are different. Most of the time, the level of crew “active monitoring” is a prime factor. Proper instrument crosscheck must be adequately trained and practiced. Because situations may change rapidly during high work-load periods, it is crucial for both pilots to monitor the flight path and instruments.

In a low workload environment, one pilot can usually monitor the airplane as there is normally little change. Since it is difficult to stay focused on monitoring during low workload periods, it may be beneficial for pilots to alternate this responsibility. The important thing to remember is that at least one pilot must monitor the airplane at all times. Effective active monitoring allows the crew to intervene before an upset can occur. Adjusting Attitude and Power A satisfactory instrument cross-check is only part of the task because it is necessary for the pilot to ensure the correct adjustments to pitch, bank and power are made in order to control the airplane. Airplane upsets have occurred when the pilot has made incorrect adjustments. This can happen when the pilot is not familiar with the airplane response to power adjustments or control inputs. Pilots are very well experienced in the low altitude environment, but usually only observe the autoflight systems handle the airplane at high altitude. For this reason, they tend to make larger than necessary control inputs (inputs which would be appropriate at low altitude will most likely be too large at higher altitudes). Control inputs are usually based upon understanding what the outcome should be. If the pilot’s control inputs are reactionary, unplanned or excessive, the airplane reaction may be a complete surprise. A continued divergence from what is expected due to excessive control inputs can lead to an upset. There have also been instances when two pilots have applied opposing inputs simultaneously leading to an upset or a failure to recover from an upset.

Inattention and Complacency A review of airplane upsets shows that inattention or neglect of “actively monitoring” can result in upsets. Many events can be traced to inadequate instrument cross-check; for example, neglecting to monitor all the instruments or fixating on certain instrument indications and not detecting changes in others. Although flight path control responsibility is shared while under ATC radar vectoring, situational awareness and vigilance cannot be relaxed and/or delegated to ATC. Distraction from Primary Cockpit Duties Distractions can be external or self-induced. “Control the airplane first” has always been a guiding principle in flying. Cockpit discipline is the principle that must be respected to ensure that at least one pilot is actively monitoring. It is impossible to intervene to stop a divergence if the crew is not actively monitoring the airplane. A pilot who is aware of the energy and flight path is less likely to be startled and therefore more likely to deal with the situation with controlled inputs versus reactive responses.

3.17.7 Miss-use of Aircraft Automation Technology in modern airplanes includes flight directors, autopilots,

auto-throttles and flight management systems. Systems will react to what the pilot commands even if it is not what the flight crew intended. Failure to confirm and monitor intended modes of operation may lead to an airplane upset. Reliability of modern technologies can lead to overconfidence and eventual complacency. Pilot Induced Oscillations (PIO)/Airplane-Pilot Coupling (APC) All airplanes are developed and certified to ensure control is easy and well-behaved throughout the operational flight envelope. Testing to ensure these good handling characteristics assumes that pilots are utilizing typical piloting techniques. In some circumstances, pilot control inputs can cause unwanted secondary airplane motion that could lead or contribute to an upset or loss of control.

This condition occurs when a pilot’s commands become out of phase with the airplane’s motion. There could be a number of technical or human factor causes for this condition, including over-speed, some out-of-trim conditions or some flight control system failures. To the pilot, all of the causes result in the airplane not responding as quickly, or as aggressively, as the pilot desires. This leads to pilot inputs that grow increasingly out of phase with the airplane response. During an upset recovery a PIO/APC can also be initiated when the pilot reacts with large rapid inputs before determining what is happening. The net effect is that pilot inputs may produce unexpected airplane motion with accompanied pitch or roll oscillations. Sometimes, the PF may be so involved in regaining control, s/he may not be aware of this oscillatory motion. In this case, the pilot monitoring may need to verbalize the PIO/APC condition or be prepared to take control.

3.17.8 Environmentally Induced

3.17.8.1 Wake Turbulence Description

Wake turbulence is the leading cause of aircraft upsets. Vortex Generation The phenomenon that creates wake turbulence results from the forces that lift airplanes. High-pressure air from the lower surface of the wings flows around the wingtips to the lower pressure region above the wings. A pair of counter rotating vortices is thus shed from the wings: the right wing vortex rotates counterclockwise, and the left wing vortex rotates clockwise. The region of rotating air behind the airplane is where wake turbulence occurs.

Vortex Strength The strength of the turbulence is determined predominantly by the weight, wingspan, and speed of the airplane. The greatest vortex strength occurs when the generating aircraft is heavy-clean-slow. Generally, vortices descend at an initial rate of about 300 to 500ft/min for about 30sec. The descent rate decreases and eventually approaches zero between 500 and 900ft below the flight path. Flying at or above the flight path provides the best method for avoidance. Maintaining a vertical separation of at least 1000ft when crossing below the preceding aircraft may be considered safe.

Induced Roll An encounter with wake turbulence usually results in induced rolling or pitch moments; however, in rare instances an encounter could cause structural damage to the airplane. In more than one instance, pilots have described an encounter to be like “hitting a wall.” The dynamic forces of the vortex can exceed the roll or pitch capability of the airplane to overcome these forces. During test programs, the wake was approached from all directions to evaluate the effect of encounter direction on response. One item was common to all encounters: without a concerted effort by the pilot to check the wake, the airplane would be expelled from the wake and an airplane upset could occur.

MTOW	Wake Turbulence Category
> 136 tons	Heavy
7 tons < MTOW < 136 tons	Medium
< 7 tons	Light
MTOW	Wake Turbulence Category
---	---
≥ 136 tons	Heavy
> 104 tons & ≤ 136 tons	Upper Medium
> 40 tons & ≤ 104 tons	Lower Medium
> 17 tons & ≤ 40 tons	Small
≤ 17 tons	Light
ICAO Recommendations
For full Wake Turbulence information please refer to OMA Section8.3.10.
ICAO Aircraft Category United Kingdom Aircraft Category

ICAO Landing Separation ICAO Take-Off Separation United Kingdom Landing Separation

United Kingdom Take-Off Separation * Add one minute if departing from an intersection and preceding aircraft used full length.

3.17.8.2 Windshear

FLT 3.11.39 Description Windshear is a notable change in wind direction and/or speed over a short distance.

Note: spreads outward in all directions. Windshear can be encountered in the vicinity of thunderstorms, into rain showers (even without thunderstorms), during a frontal passage or on airports situated near large areas of water (sea breeze fronts). Severe windshear encountered above 1000 feet, whilst unpleasant, can generally be negotiated safely. However if it is encountered below 500 feet on take off or approach/landing it is potentially dangerous. If a slow moving airplane passes through windshear, the winds can cause it to lose control and plunge toward the ground.

Here is an example of the windshear effects during approach: Detection The following are indications that the aircraft is encountering windshear conditions. On Ground • Unusual lack of speed acceleration during rolling phase. • Unusual time to reach V1/VR. In Flight Unacceptable flight path deviations recognized as uncontrolled changes from normal steady state flight conditions below 1,000 feet AGL: • Indicated airspeed variations in excess of 15 kts; • Groundspeed variations (decreasing head wind or increasing tail wind, or a shift from head wind to tail wind); • Vertical-speed excursions of 500 ft/mn or more; • Pitch attitude excursions of 5° or more; • Glide slope deviation of one dot or more; • Heading variations of 10° or more; and, • Unusual Power Lever activity or unusual Power Lever position for a significant period of time; • Or a combination of all these effects.

Defence Effective defence against windshear is performed by: • Forecasting, recognizing and avoiding windshear. • Correctly reacting to windshear encountered during the takeoff, initial climb, approach and landing. Take-Off Procedure If windshear is forecast or reported, delay the take-off. If a risk of low-level windshear is expected; • Calculate V ,V for the maximum limiting take-off weight for the day.If R 2 performance allows, speeds for icing conditions can be applied. On the 72-600, this can be achieved by inserting these manual speeds in the FMS. • Closely monitor the airspeed and airspeed trend during the take-off roll to detect any evidence of impending windshear. • If a windshear is experienced before V the take-off MUST be rejected 1 if unacceptable airpseed variations occur (not exceeding the target V ) 1 and if there is sufficient remaining to stop the aircraft. • On encountering wind-shear, PF shall announce “Windshear, Set Power”. Flight Event PM PF Calls “Windshear, Set Power” Actions: Actions: Take-Off Actions....................................................VERIFY PL......................................ADVANCE TO RAMP Ensure all actions have been completed and call Increase PL to the WALL if required any omissions. Configuration......................................MAINTAIN Maintain current configuration until out of windshear condition (Positive ROC on 2 instruments for 5 seconds) Once Positive Actions: Actions: ROC Profile..................................................MONITOR Normal Climb Profile............................RESUME Established Monitor vertical speed and altitude. | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | FD Bars | STBY Pitch.......................................INCREASE to 10° | | PL’s | RAMP Disregard the FD indications. Increase pitch to |

Approach Procedure If a windshear is forecast or reported, delay the approach. If a windshear is experienced, abort the approach. • On encountering windshear, PF shall announce “Windshear, Go Around”. Flight Event PM PF Calls “Windshear, Go-Around” Actions: Actions: Approach Actions....................................................VERIFY PL......................................ADVANCE TO RAMP Ensure all actions have been completed and call Increase PL to the WALL if required any omissions. Configuration......................................MAINTAIN Maintain current configuration until out of windshear condition (Positive ROC on 2 instruments for 5 seconds) Once Positive Actions: Actions: ROC Profile..................................................MONITOR Normal Go-Around............................PERFORM Established Monitor vertical speed and altitude. • A microburst reduces airspeed and lift at normal attitude which results in a pitch down tendency to regain airspeed. Flight path must be controlled with pitch attitude. 10 degrees pitch attitude is the best compromise, making it to ensure a climbing slope while respecting acceptable high value of AOA. If necessary, increase power to the ramp and increase pitch up to the limit of stick shacker activation. • Leaving the gear down until the climb is established will allow absorption or some energy on impact, should a microburst exceed the aircrafts ability to climb. • A positive rate of climb must be verified on at least two instruments. | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | FD Bars | STBY Pitch.......................................INCREASE to 10° | | PL’s | RAMP Disregard the FD indications. Increase pitch to |

3.17.9 Approach to Stall and Stall Recovery

Refer to: FCOM PRO.NOP.ANOP 1.4. Description Stall occurs when the wing's critical angle of attack is exceeded and lift is reduced substantially due to the airflow separation over the upper surface of the wing. The secondary stall is a premature increase in angle of attack that results in another stall event during stall recovery, prior to establishing stable flight conditions. When approaching the stall, there is no noticeable change in the ATR behavior; that is the reason why the aircraft is equipped with two “artificial” devices, a stick shaker and stick pusher, which alerts the crew to the approaching stall. Detection Natural or artificial clues may be detected as a consequence of an approaching or imminent stall; • Buffeting. • Reduced roll stability and aileron effectiveness. • Low airspeed visual or aural indications. • Reduced elevator (pitch) authority. • Inability to maintain altitude or rate of descent. • Stick shaker that warns the pilot on approaching the stall. • Stick pusher if angle of attack continues increasing despite stick shaker alerts.

Note: there will be no warnings of degraded performance/increase speed etc. Stall Recovery Procedure At the first indication of stall (see detection clues above) or in case of effective stall, during any flight phases (except lift-off), immediately apply the following: Flight Event PM PF Actions: AOA......................................................REDUCE If activated follow stick pusher, Nose down pitch control until stick shaker stops. Nose pitch down trim as needed Power......................INCREASE AS REQUIRED At First If Flaps 0° Calls “Flaps 15°” Indication of Actions: If Flap 0° call for Flaps 15°, otherwise leave current the Stall Flaps setting. Flaps..............................................................15° Actions: Wings............................................BANK LEVEL

WARNING: DO NOT oppose the stick shaker. DO NOT retract the Flaps. Actions: Actions: ATC........................................................NOTIFY Flight Path....................RECOVER SMOOTHLY Recovering abruptly may induce a secondary stall. Out of Stall

CAUTION: The use of the rudder is not recommended during a stall recovery as it can worsen the situation. Stick Pusher Procedure If angle of attack continues increasing up to the stick pusher angle of attack threshold, the control column is suddenly and abruptly pushed forward. This initiates the stall recovery. • Apply the stall recovery procedure above. • Never counteract the stick pusher action.

Procedure at Lift-Off Incursion in stick shaker range during lift-off can be generated by; • Excessive pitch up during rotation. • Excessive rate of pitch rotation. • Turbulence. • Windshear. In this case, maintatin 10 degrees pitch and when out of the stall warning, follow FD bars.

3.17.10 Unusual Attitude Recovery

An unusual attitude is generally defined as unintentionally exceeding the following conditions: • Pitch attitude greater than 25° nose up, or • Pitch attitude greater than 10° nose down, • Bank angle greater that 45°, • Or within above parameters but flying at airspeeds inappropriate for the conditions, • Or a spatial disorientation. Important:Crew members have to recover from an upset anytime the aircraft is diverging from what it was expected to do. Such situations rarely occur, but may be encountered when flying into a large aircraft wake vortex, a rotor downwind of a mountain, severe turbulence or mechanical failure. The following procedures give a logical process to recover the aircraft. the are guidelines that have to be considered and used depending on the situation. Roll may be controlled through careful use of the rudder only if the wing roll control is inefficient and the aircraft not stalled. Important:Excessive use of rudder may worsen an upset situation or may result in a loss of control and/or high structural loads. If the aircraft is stalled, recovery from the stall must be performed at first. Refer to FCOM PRO.NOP.ANOR 1.4 Stall.

3.17.10.1 Nose Up Detection

• Steep nose up and possible high bank. Eyebrow: Guidance to nose down. • Speed reducing rapidly. Procedure Flight Event PM PF Actions: Actions: Profile..................................................MONITOR Control Column.........................................PUSH Initial Monitor attitude, airspeed and altitude throughout Follow eyebrow as it appears. Recovery the recovery. Verify all required actions have been PL’s...................................ADVANCE TO RAMP completed and call any omissions. Actions: When Nose Wings.............................................ROLL LEVEL Below Descent......................................................STOP Horizon PL’s.......................................................ADJUST

3.17.10.2 Nose Down

Detection • Steep nose down and possible high bank. Eyebrow: Guidance to nose up. • Speed increasing rapidly. Procedure Flight Event PM PF Actions: Actions: Profile.................................................MONITOR PL’s................................................FLIGHT IDLE Initial Monitor attitude, airspeed and altitude throughout Control Column..................ROLL WINGSLEVEL Recovery the recovery. Verify all required actions have been Pull back smoothly following eyebrow if it appears. completed and call any omissions. When Nose is Actions: 3.17.10.3 ATR UPRT APP ATR has developed and APP that helps pilots train for Upset Recovery Situations. • The UPRT trainer application is available on iTunes for Apple platforms. 3.18 ATC Avoiding Action Expected Response to Avoiding Action When a pilot receives an avoiding action instruction ATC expect that the response will be immediate and executed briskly, but not so abruptly that there is a risk of losing control, of exceeding performance margins, or of exposing occupants to unnecessary hazards. | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | on the Trajectory | STABILISE | | Horizon PL’s | ADJUST |

When an avoiding action instruction is given pilots should initiate their response without delay and maintain the required rate of turn, climb or descent until the requested heading, altitude or flight level has been attained. When initiating a turn in response to an avoiding action instruction it is acceptable to roll the aircraft to a recommended maximum bank angle of 45 degrees in order to ensure an effective manoeuvre is executed if required. Commanders may use their discretion with this manoeuvre and increase the recommended maximum bank angle if they feel it is necessary to avoid an imminent collision. Due to the design of auto flight systems, the turn, climb or descent will be initiated too slowly to meet the required avoiding action. The auto flight system must be disconnected and the avoiding action manoeuvre executed manually. Pilots receiving simultaneous instructions from a controller and a TCAS RA must ensure that the action indicated by the RA is initiated immediately even if this is in conflict with the ATC instruction. Even if an ATC avoiding action manoeuvre has been commenced, the RA supersedes this and takes priority. Pilots in receipt of a radar control service in class A, C and D airspace must comply with avoiding action, which will be issued as a mandatory instruction to aircraft in receipt of a Deconfliction Service in Class F or G airspace, controllers will issue advice on avoiding action. A pilot who does not wish to comply with this advice on avoiding action becomes responsible for his own separation and any avoiding action that may subsequently become necessary. When executing a visual manoeuvre against traffic observed from the flight deck, pilots must be aware that this may not be the aircraft against which the avoiding action was given. Pilots of IFR flights in Class E Airspace must comply with ATC instructions. In Class E airspace VFR flight without an ATC clearance is permitted. VFR pilots are encouraged to contact ATC and comply with instructions.

3.19 Hijacking

In the event that a crew member is TOLD to bring a passenger to the flightdeck (under duress), the crew member must advise the passenger that the door to the flightdeck is locked and can only be opened by the flightdeck crew. The crew member should use the interphone system to advise the Commander using the hijack code phrase: “Captain, It is IMPERATIVE that I speak to you”

On hearing this statement from the cabin crew member, the flightdeck crew will automatically assume that a hijack is being attempted and take all appropriate measures to prevent entry to the flight deck.

3.20 Other Abnormal Situations

The procedures to follow in the event of a Technical Failure are covered in the ATR QRH and FCOM. In addition, the following should also be noted.

3.20.1 Abnormal Engine Parameters or Engine Over-Limits

The first action that should be taken in the event of Abnormal Engine Parameters or Engine over Limits being noted, provided flight conditions permit, is to reduce the affected engine PL towards Flight Idle and attempt to restore normal parameters. Abnormal engine parameters can be either fluctuations or abnormal steady indications. It should be noted that the ATRFCOM PRO.NOP.NSU.70.5 does allow engine parameter fluctuations within certain limits. It should also be noted that when analysing engine parameter fluctuations, the digital gauge will normally provide greater accuracy than the analogue gauge. Care should be taken when analysing abnormal engine parameters to ensure that the correct action is taken and if possible, crew should attempt to positively ascertain that the abnormal parameters are genuine not simply gauge indication faults) before shutting down an engine. Once an engine has been shut down due to Abnormal Parameters or Over Limit, a restart should not be attempted unless this is required for the safe continuation of the flight.

3.20.2 In Flight Vibration ATR have issued an Operations Engineering Bulletin (OEB), informing

operators of the ATR 42 and ATR 72 of damage on propeller pitch change mechanisms. Those occurrences were associated with sudden and severe propeller vibrations during the descent performed at a speed close to V with MO power levers in the Flight Idle position, often associated with PEC faults found upon subsequent maintenance troubleshooting.

As preventive measures to limit the risk of occurrence of such phenomenon, the following is recommended: 1. Crews should follow as closely as possible ATRs recommendation for a standard descent speed at maximum 240knots (refer to ATR FCOM Chapter Performance PER.8.1). If, for any reason, during descent the speed becomes close to VMO and the power levers have to be reduced to ‘flight idle’ position, a smooth and progressive reduction of the power levers should be performed. 2. Should a sudden and severe propeller vibration be felt during descent, the crew should try to identify and shut down the affected engine; continuing operations with one engine operative (refer to Operations Engineering Bulletin (OEB) 25). 3. In the event that the affected engine cannot be identified and shut-down, the crew should avoid using ‘reverse’ mode on engines.

Note: during descent or approach by making an entry in the aircraft technical log and filing an occurrence report.

3.20.3 Unsafe Gear Indications after Retraction Following a gear unsafe indication and after completion of the associated

procedure, once the landing gear has been successfully selected down, the gear may not be subsequently retracted, except in the case of an emergency. The gear must be left in the “locked down” position and the aircraft should land at the nearest suitable airfield.

3.20.4 High ITT Indications

A significantly high engine ITT can cause serious damage to an engine and can lead to engine failure. In the event of a high ITT warning, if flight conditions permit, the power lever on the affected engine should be retarded to try and reduce the ITT to a normal temperature.

3.20.5 Low Fly-by

The general philosophy is that, a low fly-by is of limited benefit and may actually provide conflicting information to what is available to the crew from cockpit indication. In addition to receiving conflicting information, a low fly-by can unnecessarily alarm passengers. Whilst a low fly-by should not be ruled out if it is deemed to be beneficial, crews should rely primarily on flap, gear and other indication in the cockpit as their primary source of information.

3.20.6 Excursions from Paved Surfaces

The seriousness of an aircraft departing from a paved surface should not be underestimated and can lead to significant abnormal stress and strain on the landing gear. In addition, taxying over an unpaved surface can result in foreign matter being picked up by the aircraft wheels and cause interference with brake units and normal gear operation. In the event that any Loganair aircraft departs from a paved surface the following action must be taken: • Bring the aircraft to a standstill and set the park-brake. • Advise ATC and request assistance from airport operations. • If applicable, shut-down engine No. 1 and engage the propeller brake on engine No. 2. • If possible, CM1 should leave the aircraft to inspect the area of the excursion. • Contact LMC with as much information regarding the incident as possible. • After approval from LMC, the aircraft may be towed or taxied to an appropriate parking area. • Notify Loganair operations. • An entry must be made in the aircraft technical log. • As soon as possible, an occurrence report must be filed. Following an excursion from a paved surface, no matter how minor, the aircraft must be grounded and may not depart until a qualified engineer has inspected and released the aircraft to service.

3.20.7 Bird Strikes Bird Strikes, from the safety point of view, can vary greatly in significance.

Approximately 85% of reported bird-strikes occur within the airport environment, 50% occurring during take-off or landing. If required, request bird dispersal before take-off. On short finals, do not go around if birds are encountered, but fly through the bird flock and land. Try to maintain a low TQ setting. After landing, minimise Reverse Thrust usage after a bird strike if not operationally required.

Following a bird strike or suspected bird strike, Loganair engineering must be contacted and the appropriate aircraft technical log entry must be made. Crew authorised by LMC are permitted to carry out the required bird strike inspection and in conjunction with LMC may dispatch the aircraft provided no damage is found.

3.20.8 Flap, Landing Gear or V Over-speed Warnings MO

The aircraft over-speed warning system is designed to alert the crew to an impending over-speed situation. It is obviously desirable to avoid the likelihood of an over-speed warning by: • Rigorous compliance with SOPs, including descent and approach profiles. • Ensuring that flap selection is at an appropriate speed. Selecting flaps at a lower speed will reduce the aerodynamic forces which can result in a “balloon” and a destabilised approach. • Ensuring that all approaches are stabilised by the appropriate point. • Maintaining a sterile cockpit and careful monitoring by both PF and PM. • Ensuring that the correct speeds are selected and flown, particularly in icing conditions. • Ensuring that you are 100% familiar with all aircraft technical limitations. Under certain circumstances such as icing conditions, significant gusts and aircraft at or close to maximum weights, the margins between limiting and minimum speeds is obviously reduced and particular vigilance is required to ensure that an over-speed warning does not occur. Crews should also be cognisant of the fact that an over-speed warning may be generated slightly below the limiting speed. In the event that an over-speed warning is generated, crews should attempt to note the maximum indicated airspeed in relation to the warning. In the event that crews can positively ascertain that, despite the warning, the technical limitation was not exceeded, an aircraft technical log entry is not required. However, if the limiting speed is exceeded or may have been exceeded, a tech log entry is required and LMC must be contacted before the aircraft is dispatched. The aircraft is grounded until released for service by a qualified engineer. For further guidance see Section3.22, Overspeed Event.

In all cases, an ASR must be filed at the first opportunity.

3.20.9 Severe Turbulence or Extreme Weather Conditions

Any encounter with severe or extreme turbulence or any other weather where it is suspected that the aircraft technical limitations are exceeded require that an aircraft Tech Log entry is made at the first opportunity. In situations where crew encounter or expect to encounter turbulence it is important to give adequate notice to cabin crew. The Captain should decide in good time whether the anticipated turbulence will constitute a safety risk in order to brief cabin crew that they should cease the service immediately and take their crew seats. Cognisance should be given to the time required for cabin crew to secure the cabin in these circumstances. Crew shall ensure that EFBs are stowed in the viewable storage devices when turbulence is expected or encountered. Where turbulence is expected on departure, the Captain may keep the cabin crew seated for a longer period until suitable. On descent, The Captain should consider requesting cabin crew to secure the aircraft sooner. The table below defines and describes the levels of turbulence which may be encountered. Definition Description Light Turbulence: Crew may feel a slight strain against seat Turbulence that momentarily causes slight erratic belts or shoulder straps. changes in altitude and/or attitude (pitch, roll, Unsecured objects may be displaced yaw). slightly. Report as Light Turbulence Moderate Turbulence: Turbulence that is similar to Light Turbulence but of greater intensity. Changes in altitude and/or Crew feel definite strains against seat attitude occur but the aircraft remains in positive belts/shoulder straps. control at all times. It usually causes variations in Unsecured objects are dislodged. IAS. Report as Moderate Turbulence;

Definition Description Severe Turbulence: Turbulence that causes large, abrupt changes in Crew are forced violently against seat altitude and/or attitude. It usually causes large belts/shoulder straps. variations in IAS. Aircraft may be momentarily out Unsecured objects are tossed about. of control. Report as Severe Turbulence. Extreme Turbulence: Turbulence in which the aircraft is violently tossed about and is practically impossible to control. It may cause structural damage. Report as Extreme Turbulence.

3.20.10 Electromagnetic/Radio Interference on the Ground

In the event of Electromagnetic or Radio Interference affecting the ability to taxi the aircraft (e.g. B raking or Steering system affected) or affecting satisfactory communications: • The Flight Crew shall stop the aircraft. • Passengers shall be instructed to turn OFF all mobile phones and PEDs. • If necessary, communications shall be established by an alternate means (VHF2). • If affected aircraft control systems have not recovered, consider taxi or tow to gate.

3.20.11 Refuelling using Manual Magnetic Indicators Refuelling operations in the event of a fuel gauge failure or discrepancy

should be completed in accordance with FCOM Chapter Procedures PRO NOP NSU.28.3.4. The magnetic dips can be found on the inboard part of the wing, between the fuselage and the engine, and one at the mid-point of the wing. Both are accessible using steps or a refuelling ladder. When using the Manual Magnetic Indicators for refuelling, the following procedure should be applied. 1. Record pitch attitude (from EADI) and the roll attitude (from the Aircraft Clinometer). 2. Calculate the total fuel required (Including additional fuel as required).

1. Refuel manually.
2. Perform MLI reading for the unserviceable gauge.
3. Uplift additional fuel as required. When dealing with an unserviceable fuel gauge, if passenger figures permit, it is recommended that “round trip” fuel is carried.

3.20.12 Hard Landing

If the crew suspect the aircraft has suffered a hard landing the Load Factor can be checked on the FMS. In all cases of a suspected hard landing LMC should be contacted. In this example the Load Factors are as follows: Minimum Load Factor during flight +0.78 Maximum Load Factor during flight +1.22 Maximum Load Factor on landing +1.12

Note: display the G-METER page. If this apply s then follow advice given from LMC.

3.20.12.1 ATR 42 Hard Landing Determination Graph

2.3 11000 11500 12000 12500 13000 13500 14000 14500 15000 15500 16000 16500 17000 17500 18000 18500 19000 WEIGHT (kg)

3.20.12.2 ATR 72 Hard Landing Determination Graph

3.20.13 Operations from and to Airfields with Arrester Cables

3.20.13.1 General

It is dangerous to trample a raised cable with an ATR at anything above walking pace but it may be necessary from time to time to operate to or from RAF airfields which have arrester cables. )g( ROTCAF DAOL LACITREV 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3

3.2 GRAPH APPLICA B B O L T E H O M N A L I Y N F L O AN R D S IN Y G M M G E E T A R R I S C F A I L R T S O T UCH-DOWN ON

3.1 HARD LANDING ZONE W O E V IG E H R T 3.0 LA Z N O D N I E NG

2.9 2.8 2.7 NORMAL LANDING ZONE 2.6 2.5 2.4 3.7 3.6

3.5 GRAPH APPLICA B B O L T E H O M N A L I Y N F L O AN R D S IN Y G M M G E E T A R R I S C F A I L R T S O T UCH-DOWN ON

3.4 HARD LANDING ZONE

3.3 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 NORMAL LANDING ZONE 2.5 2.4 2.3 12000 12500 13000 13500 14000 14500 15000 15500 16000 16500 17000 17500 18000 18500 19000 19500 20000 20500 21000 21500 22000 22500 23000 WEIGHT (kg) )g( ROTCAF DAOL LACITREV OVER WEIGHT LANDING ZONE

3.20.13.2 Aircraft Arresting Gears Rotary Hydraulic Arresting Gear (RHAG) are arresting cables, which

terminate in energy-dissipating devices, and are designed to bring military Fast-Jet aircraft quickly to a halt in emergency situations. With some types of arresting gear the cables can be engaged at either the approach or overrun ends of the runway. Runways at major UK military airfields possess 2 cables positioned about 500 m from each threshold. Typically, airfields that operate Fast-Jet aircraft will have a standard configuration of approach cable down and overrun up. Other airfields operating larger types usually have the cables de-rigged and clear of the runway. Precise locations are published in the appropriate airfield data documents shown as “STOP” info and cable configuration in the Remarks section under Runway Characteristics. See example extracts below with distance from threshold measured in feet: RAF Lossiemouth STOP Rwy 05 RHAG (1,300ft) RHAG (7,635ft) Rwy 10 RHAG (530ft) RHAG (4,666ft) Rwy 23 RHAG (1,400ft) RHAG (8,635ft) Rwy 28 RHAG (1,400ft) RHAG (5,536ft) RMKs Arresting Systems – Normal operations: App cable down, overrun cable up. RAF Brize Norton STOP Rwy 07 RHAG (1,837ft) RHAG (8,166ft) Rwy 25 RHAG (1,837ft) RHAG (8,166ft) RMKs For normal ops, both cables de-rigged minimum 20 mins PNR. Visually, the cable position on the runway can be identified by vertical arrester gear markers on each side of the runway along. The markers are usually sited between 15m and 23m (50ft and 75ft) from the runway edges comprising a yellow disc of 1m (3ft 3in) diameter on a black background. In conditions of poor visibility, or at night, the disc is illuminated when the cable is in the UP position. Sometimes, arresting cable location warning marks are painted on the surface indicated by yellow circles in a string across the runway.

3.20.13.3 Cable Readiness States ATIS will only broadcast information on cable states if different from

published. ATC can report cable readiness in any of the following three ways for each cable. 1. Up: When ‘up’, the cable is stretched across the runway and raised three inches above it by means of doughnuts or bow-springs, and is ready for engagement. 2. Down: When ‘down’, either the doughnuts are slid clear of the runway or the bow-springs are retracted, leaving the cable stretched across the runway but lying on the surface under tension. 3. De-rigged or Standby: When ‘de-rigged’ or ‘standby’, the cable is removed altogether from the runway.

3.20.13.4 Trample Clearance Up Cables

Cable bounce may occur caused by the nose or main wheels crossing an ‘up’ cable at high speed. Aircraft should only ‘trample’ these cables at a slow walking pace to prevent damage to the airframe and cable system, except in emergency. Do not brake going over cables. The doughnuts should be avoided when taxiing over the cable, where possible. Down Cables Whilst the risk of damage is greatly reduced, there is still potential to damage the aircraft or cable system. It is recommended that the maximum speed to cross a down cable is 40kts ground speed. Of note when trampling cables, a small bump will be felt through the airframe as the wheels cross. This is normal. De-rigged or Standby No restrictions, normal runway.

3.20.13.5 Take off/Landing Considerations

Crews may start the take-off over a “down” approach cable but should plan to be less than 40kts anticipated ground speed when crossing. This may necessitate pulling forward on runway, prior to commencing take off roll. ATC should be notified of this intention and performance calculations adjusted accordingly. If the overrun cable is in the “Up” position, a take may be commenced as long as airborne prior to this point. If runway available is affected by presence of either a “down or up” cable at either end, operations must be contacted for a TODC. Details of shortening should be provided. For example, for case of Rwy 23 at RAF Lossiemouth with standard cable configuration of approach end “down” and overrun “up”. If the takeoff was started from the approach cable, then the takeoff run should be reduced by 1400ft and lift off end by 1300ft giving total runway shortening of 2700ft. Thus Rwy 23 TORA of 9039ft reduced by 2700ft leaving 6339ft. Alternatively, if insufficient performance, prior to start it may be requested to de-rig the approach cable and place the overrun in “down” position or de-rig both cables adjusting TODC as required. This may involve a delay to departure. In the event of a rejected take-off, an “up” cable may be trampled at higher speeds in an emergency situation with priority given to carrying out a safe abort. During landing for a scheduled arrival, normally the approach cable will be de-rigged and this request should be passed by Operations as part of the Airfield Booking Request. Crews should establish the cable state on first contact with ATC. If approach cable either “down” or “up” request the cable be de-rigged. Normally this takes approximately 10 mins but potentially up to 20 mins subject to other traffic. Landing roll out should be planned on crossing an “up” overrun cable at slow walking pace as above, for a “down” overrun cable, maximum ground speed of 40kts. This should not normally be a problem with length of most military runways. In the event of an unplanned or emergency divert, time may not be available to remove the approach cable. If possible and only if safe to do so, a landing/touch down should be carried out just beyond the cable. Typically, the cable (yellow circles) is located just beyond the instrument touch down point as per photograph below:

However, in an emergency situation, the overall main consideration should be a safe landing and if the cable cannot be positively identified, the landing should be carried out in the normal place. Cable System Landing direction Cable Location

3.20.14 Volcanic Ash

3.20.14.1 Description Volcanic ash is, essentially, extremely fine particles of glass shards and

pulverized rock, the composition of which reflects the composition of the magma inside the volcano. It is composed predominantly of siliceous materials (> 50%) that are both very hard and very abrasive. The melting point of glassy silicates is around 1 100°C that is close to the operating temperature of the engine at cruise thrust. The ash is accompanied by gaseous solutions of sulphur dioxide (sulfuric acid) and chlorine (hydrochloric acid).

3.20.14.2 Avoidance Flight operations in volcanic ash are extremely hazardous and must be

avoided. Flights in areas of known volcanic activity must be avoided. When a flight is planned into an area with known potential for volcanic activity: • All NOTAMS and air traffic advisories have to be checked for current status of volcanic activity.

• The planned route has to avoid significantly the area of volcanic activity • If possible, stay upwind of volcanic ash. The first two or three days following an explosive eruption are especially critical because high hazardous concentration of gas could be encountered at cruise levels some considerable distance from the volcano. Beyond three days, it is assume

3.20.14.3 Detection Volcanic ash cloud does not produce “return” or “echoes” on the airborne

weather radar. Volcanic ash may be difficult to detect visually, especially at night or on instrumental meteorological conditions. However, the following have been reported by flight crew: • Acrid odor, similar to electrical smell, burned dust or sulfur • Smoke or dust appearing in the cabin and cockpit, leaving a coating on cabin and cockpit surfaces • Multiple engine malfunctions, such as stall, increase ITT, flameout • Airspeed fluctuating not regularly • At night, static electric discharges (St. Elmo’s fire) visible around the cockpit windshields • At night, landing lights cast sharp, distinct shadows on the volcanic ash clouds as opposed to the normally fuzzy, indistinct shadows cast on water/ice clouds.

3.20.14.4 Effects on Powerplant

The melting point of volcanic ash is close to the operating temperature of the engine at cruise power. This can cause serious damage in hot section of the engine that may result in engine thrust loss and possible flame out. Flight crew is therefore asked to reduce engine power settings to flight idle when possible to lower the engine operating temperature below the melting point of volcanic ash. The volcanic ash, being abrasive, also damage engine components causing loss of engine thrust. The erosion also results in a decrease in the engine stall margin. Although this abrasion effect takes longer than the melting fusion of volcanic ash to shut down the engine, the abrasion damage is permanent and irreversible. Reduction of engine thrust to idle

slows the rate of erosion by the compressor blades but can not eliminate it entirely while the engine is still ingesting air contaminated by volcanic ash. Propeller blades may also be degraded by erosion inducing loss of traction efficiency. Oil cooler efficiency may also be decreased either due to excessive erosion of the cooler or due to blockage of the air intake by ashes.

3.20.14.5 Effects on Airframe and Equipment Volcanic ash abrades cockpit windows, airframe, and flight surfaces. Any

parts protruding from airframe such as antennas, probes, ice detectors can be damaged and made inoperable. • The abrasion of the cockpit window reduces the flight crew forward visibility. This can cause serious problems during landing phase • The abrasion damage of the wing or horizontal stabilizer leading edges can either prevent the correct operation of the deicing boots or even detached parts of the boots with subsequent drag increase • The abrasion damage of the landing lights can significantly reduce landing light effectiveness • Damage to the antennas can cause a complete loss of HF communications and a degradation of VHF communications • Damage to the various sensors can seriously degrade the information available to the flight crew through the instruments • Pitot probe can be blocked by volcanic ash resulting in unreliable airspeed indications or complete loss of airspeed indication in the cockpit. Volcanic ash can obstruct probes and penetrate into air conditioning and equipment cooling system. It can contaminates electrical and avionic units, fuel, and hydraulic system and smoke detection system. Volcanic ash columns are highly charged electrically. The static charge on the aircraft creates a “cocoon” effect which may cause a temporary defection, or even complete loss of VHF or HF communication with ground stations.

3.20.14.6 Volcanic Ash Encounter Procedure

Refer to QRH A99.06 Volcanic Ash Encounter.

3.21 Unpressurised and Partially Pressurised Flight Whilst unpressurised or partially pressurised flights are permitted under

the MEL, cognisance should be taken of the fact that flight conducted at lower altitudes or partially pressurised can cause significant passenger discomfort. Particular attention must be paid to en-route planning, including Minimum En-Route Altitudes and the effect that operating at a lower than normal altitude will have on fuel burn. When operating unpressurised due to a pressurisation or other defect in accordance with the MEL, the following limits should be adhered to for reasons of passenger and crew comfort: Climb – Max climb rate 1000ft per minute (Terrain clearance requirements considered.) Descent – Ideally 500ft per minute with a maximum of 1000ft per minute.

3.22 Overspeed Event Exceeding aircraft limitations must be avoided in all circumstances. Any

suspected exceedance must be recorded in the aircraft technical log at the first opportunity following the exceedance. Commanders should record details of the event including: • Speed attained during the overspeed Event • Aircraft Configuration • G-Meter Report from HT1000/FMS

Note: to display the G-METER page. If this apply s then follow advice given from LMC.

LMC should then be consulted to ascertain if any further action is required using thee Flow Procedures below. If LMC confirms that no action is required and the aircraft can return to service, LMC will issue the Commander with a maintenance manual reference. The Commander will then enter (under the Action Taken) the following: “LMC consulted and confirmed that no further action required as over-speed is within limits Reference AMM………” The Commander can then sign off the tech log in accordance with their authority. If LMC advise the over-speed is not within limits, Engineering action will be required prior to flight.

3.22.1 Overspeed Event Flow Procedure Diagram DEDNETXE

?NOITA S R PA U L G F IFNOC ON NOI L T A A R R E E T L A E L CCA ON ? OMV > V *?G4.0 > NAELC SEY SEY ON RO G2

GTRV RO G5,2 GTRV ON ON ?TK 01 + OMV > V ?G0 < GTRV ?G1- < GTRV SEY SEY SEY NOITAMROFNI ROF RTA OT TROPER A DNES DNA NOITAMROFNI ROF RTA OT TROPER A DNES NOITAMROFNI ROF RTA OT TROPER A DNES SNOITCEPSNI 2 LEVEL + 1 LEVEL OD DNA DNA SNOITCEPSNI 1 LEVEL OD SNOITCEPSNI 1 LEVEL OD ON DN ? I E F G U A O M Y A D D ID ON DN ? I E F G U A O M Y A D D ID ON DN ? I E F G U A O M Y A D D ID SEY SEY SNOITCEPSNI 3 LEVEL OD SEY SNOITCEPSNI 3 LEVEL OD DIA ROF RTA OT ETIRW ON DNIF UOY DID ? EGAMAD ON DNIF UOY DID ? EGAMAD SEY DIA ROF RTA OT ETIRW SEY DIA ROF RTA OT ETIRW OT TFARCRIA EHT ESAELER ECIVRES NEDDUS LACITREV NEDDUS LARETAL RO/DNA REVUENAM RO/DNA REVUENAM DEDEECXE OMV ECNELUBRUT ECNELUBRUT :ETON REVUENAM NEDDUS RO/DNA ECNELUBRUT FO ESUACEB = * DEEPS TFARCRIA = V DEEPS GNITAREPO MUMIXAM = OMV NOITARELECCA LACITREV = GTRV

3.22.2 Flap Overspeed Event Flow Procedure Diagram AIRCRAFT SPEED

MORE THAN THE NO VFO/VFE LIMIT? YES V > VFO/VFE + 5 kt CAS NO RELEASE THE AIRCRAFT YES EXAMINE THE AIRCRAFT FLAPS AND STRUCTURE

3.23 Lightning Strikes Lightning can occur both within and away from cumulonimbus clouds, with

discharges taking place either within the cloud or between neighbouring clouds. They commonly occur between a cloud and the ground and less commonly from the top of a cloud upwards. No physical danger exists to the occupants of a correctly bonded metal aircraft, but there is a danger that the disconcerting effects, particularly of dazzle, may lead to loss of control unless the pilots are fully prepared. If flying at night when lightning occurs, all cockpit and instrument lighting should be turned on and the intensity turned up to max. One of the pilots should wear dark glasses. Direct reading magnetic compasses and magnetically slaved compasses can be severely affected by lightning strikes. Magnetic compasses should not be relied upon after an aircraft strike and should be checked as soon as possible against a runway QDM, remembering to satisfy the requirements of use of the standby compass on the deviation card. More information regarding weather associated with Thunder cells can be found in Loganair Operations Manual Part A 8.3.9, Adverse and Potentially Hazardous Atmospheric Conditions.

3.24 Distress Communications and Alerting ATC

In Flight Radio Failure In the event of in-flight radio failure, follow the procedures detailed in the NavBlue Flight Guide. • International Emergency Transponder Codes:

• Distress 7700 • Radio Failure 7600 • Hijack 7500

3.24.1 Distress Definition

A condition of the aircraft or person(s) on board the aircraft being threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and or requiring immediate assistance. Distress Message A Distress Message shall be sent on the air-ground frequency in use or any other appropriate frequency. MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY and as many as possible of the following elements. NAME OF STATION ADDRESSED (time and circumstances permitting), AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION, NATURE OF THE DISTRESS, INTENTION OF THE CAPTAIN, PRESENT POSITION, FLIGHT LEVEL (or altitude) and HEADING. On departure the MAYDAY call should include the emergency turn procedure as ATC will be unaware of what our specific turn is. The call should also be ended with STANDBY to prevent ATC asking further questions about the nature of the problem or persons onboard. These requirements are not intended to prevent: 1. Distress Signal MAYDAY being used if necessary at the commencement of any subsequent communication; 2. Distress Message being broadcast if time circumstances make this course preferable; 3. Use by an aircraft in distress of any means at its disposal to attract attention, make known its position and obtain help.

Note: immediate “Mayday” call to be issued. Urgency Definition A condition concerning the safety of an aircraft or of some person on board or within sight, but which does not require immediate assistance.

Urgency Message An Urgency Message shall be sent on the air-ground frequency in use but does not prevent an Urgency Message being broadcast if this course of action is considered preferable. PAN PAN, PAN PAN, PAN PAN and as many as possible of the following elements: NAME OF THE STATION ADDRESSED. AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION. NATURE OF THE URGENCY. INTENTION OF THE CAPTAIN. PRESENT POSITION, FLIGHT LEVEL (or altitude) and HEADING. ANY OTHER USEFUL INFORMATION. Cancellation of Distress or Urgency If after initiating Distress or Urgency communication procedures, the emergency conditions cease to exist and no further assistance is required, the aircraft must cancel the Distress or Urgency. This should normally be done by transmitting a cancellation message giving the necessary information to the station controlling the Distress traffic, who will then be responsible for advising all stations on the frequency in use that the Distress traffic has ended. Alternatively, if circumstances require it, the aircraft may cancel the Distress by a message to “all stations”. It is important that the Distress should be cancelled on all frequencies used during the Distress traffic. A “MAYDAY” may be downgraded to a “PAN” once an Emergency has been brought under control e.g. an Engine Fire may be downgraded to PAN once the fire is out.

3.24.2 Interception by Military Aircraft

A military interception will normally occur if communications fail between a civilian aircraft and ATC. The cause of this could be technical failure or human error. If it is a technical failure, the radio failure procedure published in the Charts +/Guide/Communication/Radio Communication Failure section should be followed. SSR code must be changed to 7600. To guard against human error, ensure that positive communications have been established on hand over from one agency to another. RT function should be checked after a prolonged period of radio silence. If a military aircraft intercepts its intention will be to lead you to a suitable airfield to land. Guidance on the standard ICAO signals are found in the Charts +/Guide Emergency/Interception Proc & Signals section. Even if

radio communication is re-established the military aircraft’s instructions must be followed. If the radio is working attempt to make contact with the military aircraft on the emergency frequency 121.5.

3.25 Departure Contingency Procedure Every take-off must include a contingency plan in the event of a serious

malfunction requiring an immediate return for landing. Particular attention should be given to departures from short, limiting or remote airfields with limited services. In these cases, if conditions allow, it may be prudent to divert to the nearest suitable airfield. In the event that weather at the departure airfield is below minimums for a landing a take-off alternate must be nominated. This must be within 1 hours flying time on one engine in still air, ISA conditions at FL 100. • ATR 42 – 218nm (1) • ATR 72 – 199nm (1)

Note: Normal Conditions, ISA FL100.

Section 10: Emergency Equipment

10.1 Aircraft Emergency Equipment Location Diagrams 500-Series

CCSM Section5B.1.21.1 – G-LMRA, G-LMRB, G-LMRC, G-LMRD, G-LMRE & G-LMSA CCSM Section5B.1.21.2 – G-LMSB End 500-Series 600-Series CCSM Section5B.1.21.3 – G-LMSB CCSM Section5B.1.21.2 – G-LMTA, G-LMTC, G-LMTD, G-LMTE End 600-Series

Equipment	Quantity
Torch	2
Crew Life Jacket	3
Flight Deck Oxygen Masks	3

Equipment	Quantity
Smoke Goggles	3
Fire Gloves	1
PBE	1
Crash Axe	1
Escape Hatch	1
Escape Rope	1
Emergency Light Switch (ELS)	1
Exits	2
Fixed ELT	1
First Aid Kit	1
Fire Sack	1
Fire Gloves	1
BCF	1
Water Fire Extinguisher	1
PBE	1
BCF	1
End 500-Series

Section 11: Evacuation and Ditching

11.1 Evacuation and Deplaning

The aircraft Commander has various options as to how to ensure the safety of passengers during or following an Emergency or Abnormal situation. An Emergency Evacuation is very likely to result in a considerable number of injuries to the passengers due to the height of the exits above ground level. Furthermore passengers who are injured jumping from the forward and service door exits may impede the evacuation, if they are unable to vacate the area immediately outside the door. Emergency situations can develop rapidly and there may be only minimal amount of time in which to make a decision regarding Evacuation. Commanders should endeavour to obtain information from all available sources to assist in this decision, including observations from: • Cabin Crew. • Airport Fire Service. • ATC. • Ground Crew. The following should be considered as guidance only and the Commander will need to apply the most suitable procedure for the situation.

11.2 Evacuation

The aircraft should be evacuated using the Command “Evacuate, Evacuate” over the PA when there is an imminent threat to life to the occupants of the aircraft; such examples are: • A Visible Engine Fire which does not extinguish immediately by use of the aircraft extinguishers. • The presence of fire inside or outside the aircraft. • Dense smoke in the cabin. • Whenever the aircraft has left the paved surface and the integrity of the aircraft is uncertain. The call over the PA “Evacuate, Evacuate” should not be made until the CM1 has ensured that CM2 has completed the Evacuation Checklist.

The CM1 should not state which side to evacuate as in an unplanned Emergency situation as there can be confusion over Left and Right. The Cabin Crew are generally in a better situation to decide which exits to open as they can check the conditions immediately outside the exit prior to opening. Normally CM1 will order an evacuation, but in the event of a forced landing or the aircraft leaving the paved surface during take-off or landing, the Flight Crew may be incapacitated or the Communication System may fail. In these circumstances the Cabin Crew may need to initiate an Evacuation without any communication from the Flight Deck.

11.3 Precautionary Evacuation – Deplaning

The aircraft should be deplaned when there is no immediate threat of death or injury to the passengers or crew, but there is a considerable risk to the aircraft occupants if the situation deteriorates, or if the situation is uncertain. Such examples are (but not limited to): • The presence of smoke without fire outside the aircraft. • GPU fire. • Fuel leak or spillage. • Cargo Smoke Warning. • Engine Fire indication on the Ground that has extinguished immediately the First Fire Bottle discharged. • A Category Red Bomb threat.

Note: baggage with them).

Considerations Prior to Deplaning/Evacuation – Decision Tree EMERGENCY/ABNORMAL SITUATION Isthecabin environment NO YES safeand stable? EVACUATE Couldthecabin environment YES NO become unstable? DEPLANE NORMAL DISEMBARKATION

11.3.1 Deplaning Procedure

CM1 CM2 Cabin Crew Check Park Brake Set. Order “Shut down engines, De-plane the aircraft”. Select Condition Levers to FUEL SO. Select Emergency Lights to ON. Inform Tower and Ground Crew.

CM1 CM2 Cabin Crew Check Engines are shut Take Hi Viz jacket, enter the down. cabin and collect megaphone from Cabin Crew. Once Order over PA “Cabin Crew On hearing Command outside guide passengers to a de-plane the aircraft “Cabin Crew deplane the safe place away from the immediately, Cabin Crew aircraft immediately, Cabin aircraft using megaphone as de-plane the aircraft Crew deplane the aircraft required. If smoke is present immediately” followed by the immediately”. consider moving passengers PA, upwind of the aircraft. “Ladies and Gentlemen, Open main door and lower this is the Captain, for your aircraft steps. safety I need you to leave the aircraft immediately. If practical, pass megaphone Please leave the aircraft to First Officer.Using immediately by the door assertive and directive you came in. Leave all commands, instruct personal possessions passengers to: “Unfasten behind and move a safe your seat belts and leave distance away from the the aircraft immediately. aircraft.”. (Repeat at least Leave all personal once). belongings onboard”. Switch off aircraft batteries. Assist Cabin Crew in deplaning the passengers. Once all able bodied passengers and crew have After last able bodied disembarked. passenger disembarks assist First Officer in keeping passengers together. • Liaise with Emergency Services. • Advise of any PRMs left on Organise headcount with Assist First Officer in board. Cabin Crew and liaise with organising headcount and • Confirm headcount with handling agent to get liaising with handling agent. First Officer and Cabin passengers into terminal. Crew. • Advise Operations.

Deplaning Duties CM1 CM2 Once Deplaning Procedure Complete 5. ENG START Selector.OFF/START ABORT Before leaving aircraft. 6. BAT Switch...............................OFF 7. EMER EXIT lights......................ON Proceed to Cabin and assist deplaning, Leave Aircraft through main exit taking Hi taking Hi Viz vest. Viz vest. Check all occupants are deplaned. Check around aircraft for possible fire. Lead passengers away from aircraft. 11.4 Evacuation/Deplaning Not Required Following an in-flight Abnormal or Emergency situation the aircraft may be taxied on to Stand providing the situation has been contained by the Emergency/Following Failure Procedures and Checklists. Examples of situations where taxying on to Stand may be accomplished without deplaning the passengers on the Runway or Taxyway are: • Engine Fire Warning during flight which extinguished immediately with application of the appropriate drills and no indication of recurrence. • Cargo Smoke warning during flight which extinguished immediately with application of the appropriate drills and no indication or recurrence. • Engine failure. • A Category Amber Bomb threat. If the CM1 does not wish the aircraft to be Evacuated or Deplaned after landing, CM1 shall make the PA “Remain seated, remain seated”. Cabin Crew will not initiate an evacuation or deplane the aircraft if: 1. Flames and sparks come out of an engine exhaust on start up followed by stopping of the engine. This is a “wet start” and is a build up of fuel that burns out. | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | 1. Parking Brake | SET 1. Auto Press Dump......................ON | | 2. Deplaning Procedure | ORDER 2. Min CAB LT................................ON | | 3. Cabin Crew (PA) | TO STATION 3. Condition Levers 1+2......FUEL SO | | 4. TWR/Ground Crew | NOTIFY 4. Fire Handles 1+2...................PULL |

Action	Value
5. Deplaning (PA)	INITIATE
6. FUEL Pumps 1+2	OFF

1. A rapid deceleration on take-off or landing – take-off may have to be abandoned as a precautionary measure or landing run shortened due to airfield limitations.
2. If the Flight Deck command “Remain seated, remain seated”.

11.5 Crew Duties and Drills – Forced Landing/Ditching

11.5.1 Commanders Duties at Onset of Emergency

The CM1 is to call the Cabin Crew to the flight deck or interphone using the Emergency Signal and cycling the No Smoking sign OFF then ON 6 times, followed by, if necessary, the PA call “No.1 to the Flight Deck immediately”. CM1 should then brief the CM2 and Cabin Crew for an Emergency Landing or Ditching, including the NITS Brief. On aircraft with portable ELTs fitted 600 Series, the Commander may consider asking the Cabin Crew to activate the ELT as the aircraft position may be tracked below radar cover by satellite. If time is available CM1 should explain the nature of the Emergency to the passengers using the guidance given at the back of the Emergency Checklist. If necessary this may need to be delegated to the Cabin Crew. CM1 should: 1. Send distress message; select 7700 on Transponder. 2. Select landing area and direction. 3. Stow loose objects and prepare emergency equipment. 4. Activation of Flight Deck ELT switch (if fitted)*. 5. Remove sharp objects and obtain torch. 6. If ditching put on life jackets. 7. Check altimeter setting – Local or Regional QNH. 8. Give the PA “Take up Landing positions” at 1,000ft and “BRACE, BRACE” at 200 ft.

11.5.2 Evacuation Duties

In the event of an evacuation CM1 will call for the Evacuation Checklist. The Evacuation checklist is read by CM2 as a Challenge, Action and Response Checklist i.e. CM2 will call the challenge and CM1 will action and repsond to CM2 challenge.

11.6 Ditching

11.6.1 General

If possible, the gross weight should be reduced. If a pronounced sea is running, the landing should be made parallel to the line of the wave crests with the touchdown point on the back of the wave. Landings should be made with landing gear up and maximum available flaps. At touchdown, the aircraft should be in a nose up attitude with minimum speed and a rate of descent of not more than 300 ft/min. Landings should be made with wings level and no yaw.

Note: accuracy of touchdown at the correct speed at an appropriate spot is facilitated by a power-assisted approach.

11.6.2 Ditching Course Selection

11.6.2.1 Sea Conditions

In order to select a proper ditching course, correct evaluation of wind and sea conditions is required. Selection of the ditching heading may well determine the difference between survival and disaster.

WARNING: It is extremely dangerous to land into the wind without regard to sea conditions. The swell system or systems must be taken into account. The distinction between waves and swells must be understood: 1. A swell is the condition of the surface caused by a distant disturbance. The face of the swell is towards the observer, the backside is away from the observer. The primary swell is the swell in the system with the greatest height from trough to crest. Secondary swells are of lesser height than the primary swell. Swells can be large even in calm wind conditions. They do not necessarily indicate surface wind direction. 2. A wave is the condition of the surface caused by local winds. Waves move downwind and spray from their crests is also blown downwind. 3. A sea is a condition of the surface that is the result of both swells and waves.

When ditching parallel to a swell, touchdown should be on the top or backside of the swell if possible. When forced to ditch into a swell, touchdown should be made just after passage of a crest. If contact is made on the face of a swell the aircraft may be swamped or thrown violently into the air and drop heavily into the next swell.

WARNING: Always avoid touchdown in the face of a swell.

11.6.2.2 Estimating Wind Direction and Velocity Wind direction and velocity can be estimated by observation of the wind

streaks on the water. These streaks appear up and downwind. Wind direction is determined by the whitecaps, which fall forward with the wind but are overrun by the waves. This creates the illusion that the foam is sliding backwards. With this in mind and by observing the direction of the streaks the wind direction is easily determined. Wind velocity can be accurately estimated by noting the appearance of the whitecaps, foam and streaks. The following guidelines can be used to evaluate wind speed: • A few white crests: 8–17 kt • Many white crests: 17–26 kt • Streaks of foam along the water: 23–35 kt • Spray from the waves: 35–43 kt

11.6.3 Preparation for Ditching

11.6.3.1 Ditching and Survival Equipment

Each flight over water requires all necessary equipment to be aboard, serviceable and correctly stowed. Prior to ditching, the position of all equipment will be reviewed and if necessary moved to an appropriate position for rapid retrieval during the abandonment phase. Particular consideration will be made of emergency equipment normally stowed or located in the aft of the aircraft, i.e. first aid kits and fire extinguishers.

11.6.3.2 Aircraft Attitude In Case of Ditching

Note: wing which is down in case of ditching. WATER LEVEL AT SUNK WING SIDE WATER LEVEL AT UP WING SIDE

11.6.3.3 Ditching Exits Forward Exits – Passenger Configuration Only

Service Door Passenger Door

11.6.4 Abandoning the Aircraft Evacuation of the aircraft will be accomplished in an orderly manner in the

shortest time possible. Practice drills for emergency ditching evacuation will be completed periodically to enhance the successful outcome of aircraft ditching. When the aircraft has come to a complete stop, evacuation will commence immediately in accordance with the crew member duties specified. After the aircraft has come to a full stop, crew members will check personnel for injuries and assist where necessary. Additional equipment may be collected and distributed to personnel.

WARNING: Do not inflate life vests until clear of the aircraft. An inflated life vest may impede egress.

11.6.5 Ditching Instructions – Summary Table11.6.5(1) Ditching Instructions

First Action Ditching Imminent Provide After Ditching CM1 1. Establish location. 1. Direct CM2 to Ensure all personnel 2. Brief Passengers. transmit final and necessary distress signal. emergency supplies 3. Burn fuel if time and conditions 2. Ensure that all and equipment are allow. personnel are evacuated. prepared for 4. Don life jacket. ditching. 3. Fasten and lock safety belt and shoulder harness.

First Action Ditching Imminent Provide After Ditching CM2 1. Acknowledge 1. Transmit final Flashlight, First Aid Check all passengers CM1 order to distress signal. Kit. have left the prepare for 2. Fasten and lock aeroplane and then ditching. safety belt and advise the 2. Confirm with shoulder harness. Commander Cabin Crew that 3. On CM1 accordingly. passengers life instruction, call jackets fitted and “BRACE seat belts securely BRACE” on the fastened. PA. 3. Obtain D/F service, bearings, fixes, etc. 4. Don life jacket.

Note: crew members will check persons near them for injury and assist as needed.

11.7 Emergency Evacuation Procedures Freighter Operations

11.7.1 Basic Evacuation Procedures

In the freighter configuration there are ONLY 3 exists available to the operating crew, these are the overhead escape hatch, main entrance door and rear service door.

WARNING: When the aircraft is loaded with freight the sole means of escape is via the overhead escape hatch as the cargo door cannot be opened from the inside.

Section 12: Glass Cockpit (600-Series)

12.1 ATR 600-Series Flight Deck

EADI, EHSI, EWD, IESI. Differences from 500-Series: FGCP, FMA, MCDU, EFIS control panel.

12.1.1 System Differences

Dual FMS, autopilot/flight director integration, EFIS symbology.

12.1.2 Procedural Differences

600-Series ADU/FGCP differ from 500-Series. Refer FCOM for type-specific flows.

12.1.3 Trim and Speed Indication

Digital trim indicators, speed indication (IAS/mach).

12.1.4 Auto Speed Function

600-Series auto speed selection per flight phase.

12.2 APM (Aircraft Performance Monitor)

Monitors performance trends; engine health monitoring. APM data interface with FMS and EWD.

12.3 Refuelling

Ground refuelling panel operation, pipe draining (ATR 72 only), gravity refuelling, close-up.

Section 14: Operating Minima & Low Visibility Operations

14.1 General

EASA-SPA.LVO 100 Refer to ATR All Weather Operations.

14.1.1 Introduction ATR 42 and 72 aircraft are equipped with the required airborne equipment

and certified to operate to CAT II limits by qualified and authorised crew members. Loganair is approved to operate the ATR 42 and 72 aircraft to a minimum RVR of 300 m and a Decision Height of 100 ft.

14.1.2 Safety Levels

The object of the procedures and practices in this Section is to ensure that All Weather Operations do not increase the overall risk to commercial aircraft operations.

14.1.3 Operating Minima Criteria

The aerodrome operating minima for CAT II operations will be dependent on the following criteria: 1. The type, performance and handling characteristics of the aeroplane. 2. The composition of the flight crew, their competence and experience. 3. The dimensions and characteristics of the runways selected for use. 4. The adequacy and performance of the available visual and non-visual ground aids. 5. The equipment available on the aeroplane for the purpose of navigation and/or control of the flight path, as appropriate, during the take-off, the approach, the flare, then landing, roll-out and the missed approach. 6. The obstacles in the approach, missed approach and climb-out areas required for the execution of contingency procedures and necessary clearance. 7. The obstacle clearance altitude/height for the instrument approach procedures.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) 8. The means to determine and report meteorological conditions.

14.1.4 Applicability

The criteria above apply to United Kingdom aerodromes and to aeroplanes registered in the United Kingdom flying for commercial air transport in UK and internationally. They also apply to United Kingdom aerodromes, to operations by foreign registered aeroplanes engaged in International Air Transport if the state of registry has not promulgated equivalent requirements. The method of determination of such minima must be acceptable to the authority. Such minima shall not be lower than any that may be established for such aerodromes by the state in which the aerodrome is located, except when specifically approved by that state.

14.2 Definitions Aeroplane Categories for Aerodrome Operating Minima: The criteria

taken into consideration for the classification of aeroplane by categories is the indicated airspeed at threshold (VAT). The ATR 42 and 72 are both Category B. Alert Height: A specified radio altimeter height, based on the characteristics of the aeroplane and its fail-operational landing system. In operational use, if a failure occurs above the alert height in one of the required redundant operational systems the approach will be discontinued and a go-around executed unless reversion to a higher decision height is possible. If a failure on one of the required redundant operational systems occurs below the alert height the approach will be continued. Approach Ban: The criteria for the existence of an approach ban are specified in Loganair Operations Manual Part A Chapter8. Cloud Ceiling (ceiling): The height of the base of the cloud that is sufficient to obscure more than half of the sky. CAT II Approach: A 3D approach and landing using an ILS with a decision height below 200 ft but not lower than 100 ft and a minimum RVR of 300m. CAT II approaches require continuous use of the Automatic Flight Guidance System down to a height not greater than 80% of the applicable DH.

Note:

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) CAT II Decision Height (DH): Decision height for a CAT II approach is not lower than: 1. 100 ft measured by the radio altimeter; or 2. The DH to which the flight crew is authorised to operate if above (1).

Note: to terrain. In all cases the actual DH above runway threshold will never be less than 100 ft. CAT II Minima: The lowest minima to be used by Loganair for CAT II operations are Decision Height 100 ft and RVR 300 meters. Loganair is approved by the CAA to use CAT II minima published in company approved approach charts. In the absence of such minima CAT II approaches must not be flown. Commencement and Continuation of Approach: An approach may be started irrespective of the RVR, but must not be continued below an altitude of 1000 feet above aerodrome elevation unless the reported controlling RVR is equal to or better than the specified minimum. Once below an altitude of 1000 feet above aerodrome elevation, the approach may be continued to the landing irrespective of the reported RVR provided that the required visual reference has been established at DH and is maintained until touchdown. ILS Critical Area: An ILS Critical Area is an area of defined dimensions about the localiser and glide path antennae where vehicles including aircraft, are excluded during all ILS operations. The critical area is protected because the presence of vehicles inside its boundaries will cause unacceptable disturbance to the ILS signal. ILS Sensitive Area: An ILS Sensitive Area is an area extending beyond the Critical Area where the parking or movement of vehicles, including aircraft, is controlled to prevent the possibility of unacceptable interference to the ILS signal during ILS operations. The sensitive area is protected to provide protection against interference caused by large moving objects outside the critical area but still normally within the airfield boundary. Instrument Runway Visual Range: RVR measured by transmissometer at the Touchdown, Mid-point, and Stop-end of the runway.

Abbreviation	Meaning
ADF	Automatic Direction Finder
AFCS	Automatic Flight Control System
All Weather Operations (Prohibited)
Low Visibility Procedures: Ground procedures at an aerodrome designed to prevent the entry of ground vehicles and taxiing aircraft into
areas protected for take-off and landing. In addition they protect the sensitive areas of the aerodrome and regulate the flow of air traffic on the
approach.
ATC at the aerodrome will ensure these procedures have been implemented by the time:
1. The cloud ceiling is 200 ft or less.
2. The RVR has dropped to 600 m or less.
3. When rapidly deteriorating weather conditions dictate.
Low Visibility Take-off (LVTO): A take-off with RVR of less than 400 m.
Obstacle Free Zone: The OFZ is a volume of airspace extending outwards and upwards from an inner portion of the runway strip to
specified upper limits which is kept clear of all obstacles except for minor specified items.
Runway Visual Range: RVR is the maximum visibility in the direction of take-off or landing from a specific point on the axis of the runway at a
height corresponding to the average eye level of the pilot at touchdown.
In practice the minimum RVR value for each landing category is determined in such a way that the probability of obtaining adequate visual
reference for the end of the approach is high.
Touchdown Zone: The TDZ is the portion of a runway, beyond the threshold, where it is intended that landing aeroplanes first contact the
runway.
Visual Reference: The required visual reference for CAT II approach is a visual segment containing at least three consecutive lights, either the
centreline of the approach lights or touchdown zone lights or runway centre line lights or runway edge lights or a combination of these. This
visual reference must include a lateral element of the ground pattern, i.e.
an approach lighting crossbar or the landing threshold or a barrette of the touchdown zone lighting.

Abbreviation	Meaning
AHRS	Attitude Heading Reference System
AIC	Aeronautical Information Circular
AIP	Aeronautical Information Publication
AIS	Air Information Service
AP	Autopilot
ARTA	Above Runway Threshold Altitude
ATC	Air Traffic Control
ATIS	Automatic Terminal Information Service
ATR	Avions de transport régional
ATS	Air Traffic Service
AWOPS	All Weather Operations
CCAS	Centralised Crew Alerting System
CM1	Left Pilot
CM2	Right Pilot
DA	Decision Altitude
DH	Decision Height
DME	Distance Measuring Equipment
EADI	Electronic Attitude Display Indicator
EASA	European Aviation Safety Agency
ECAC	European Civil Aviation Conference
EFIS	Electronic Flight Instrument System
EHSI	Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator
FCS	Flight Control System
FD	Flight Director
FGCP	Flight Guidance Control Panel
FMA	Flight Mode Annunciator
GA	Go Around
HDG	Heading
HI	High Intensity
HW	Headwind

Abbreviation	Meaning
IAS	Indicated Airspeed
ILS	Instrument landing System
IRVR	Instrument Runway Visual Range
KTS	Knots
LI	Low Intensity
LOC/LLZ	Localiser
LSA	Localiser Sensitive Area
LVP	Low Visibility Procedures
LVTO	Low Visibility Take Off
M	Metres
MEL	Minimum Equipment List
MM	Middle Marker
MUH	Minimum Use Height
OCH	Obstacle Clearance Height
OCL	Obstacle Clearance Limit
OFZ	Obstacle Free Zone
OM	Outer Marker
PFD	Primary Flight Display
RA	Radio Altimeter
RVR	Runway Visual Range
RX	Receiver
SG	Signal Generator
SVR	Slant Visual Range
TDZ	Tough Down Zone
THR	Threshold
TW	Tailwind
TX	Transmitter
YD	Yaw Damper
All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.4 Low Visibility Cause and Effects

14.4.1 Causes of Low Visibility Reduction in visibility along the runway in use is caused by the presence

of opaque or translucent particles in suspension in or falling through the atmosphere. These particles consist of either solids derived from industrial or domestic pollution and naturally occurring dust and sand or water droplets and crystals.

14.4.2 Solid Particles Solid particles originating from industrial or domestic pollution tend to be

small and provided they do not combine with water droplets usually only give rise to haze. The resultant reduction in visibility by these particles is only moderate, giving visibility in excess of 1 km. Solid particles consisting of dust and sand when lifted or transported by wind can reduce visibility to very low values, i.e. less than 550 metres and are of significance to low visibility operations. However, these conditions are usually only experienced in arid areas.

14.4.3 Rain and Snow Precipitation in the form of heavy rain and snow can significantly reduce

visibility particularly with a low cloud ceiling. The visibility varies in relation to the intensity of precipitation.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.4.4 Fog

The most common cause of low visibility is fog which consists of water droplets in atmospheric suspension and can be complex in structure and very dense. Visibility can be reduced to just a few metres in extreme cases. Fog is formed when moist air is cooled below its dew point causing water droplets to condense into the atmosphere. It will only form and persist if particular values of temperature, humidity and wind all exist simultaneously. Small changes in any one of these parameters will result in variations in the extent, density and depth of the fog and it is this sensitivity that is responsible for its extreme and continuous variability. Even under stable conditions a large variation in he vertical plane of the concentration and size of water droplets is known to occur. The most significant features of fog from the pilot’s viewpoint are: 1. Density can vary considerably throughout the depth of the layer. 2. SVR can be considerably less than the measured RVR. 3. Shallow fog layers can appear almost transparent from above whilst low values of RVR are being measured. 4. Visibility in fog will vary with approach and runway lighting intensity and with day or night conditions.

14.4.5 Characteristics of Fog

Although visibility may be reduced by the presence in the air of solid particles such as smoke, dust or sand, most of the time low visibility conditions are caused by fog. There is fog if the visibility is less than 1000m and the obscuring agent is water droplets. Fog differs from rain or mist in that its water particles are more minute and suspended and do not fall earthward. The droplets of water suspended in the air near the earth’s surface act on scattering the light and thus reduce the visibility near the ground. The formation of a fog layer occurs when a moist air mass is cooled to its saturation point (dew point): the water vapor within the air mass condenses on small particles in the air to form liquid cloud droplets. There are various types of fog depending on how it is produced. Radiation Fog Radiation fog is caused by the radiation cooling of earth’s surface.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) Advection Fog Advection fogs are formed when air moves either over a cooler surface or over a warmer moist surface and, as a result, the air mass reaches saturation.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) Frontal/Precipitation Fog This fog type is due to the evaporation of falling rain and occurs under the frontal surface in the cold air mass. Upslope and Valley Fogs Upslope fog is caused by adiabatic cooling of rising air. When moist, warm air is forced to move over a terrain obstacle, it cools to some degree as it rises, the degree of cooling depending on the amount of rise.

FOGDENSITY
		INCREASING
		WITHHEIGHT
SVR
RVR	SLANT ANGLE
GROUND LEVEL
All Weather Operations (Prohibited)
14.4.6 Effects of Low Visibility Slant Visual Range
In general the density of fog tends to increase with height. Consequently the SVR decreases with increasing height relative to the measured RVR
as shown below:
SVR
With shallow fog the value of SVR remains constant so long as the aeroplane is descending above the top of the fog. Due to geometrical
effects this will cause the visual segment to decrease with descent until the aeroplane enters the fog. Whilst descending through the fog the visual
segment should increase.
It can be deduced from the above that all possible variables in fog density and depth will have an effect on the visual segment available to the pilot.
Visual Segment
An important factor to pilots attempting a landing in low visibility is the visual segment available to them as they look out of the cockpit. The
optimum position is attained by adjusting the seat position to align the red and white guidance balls on the screen centre post. The eye position and
the angle that the cockpit coaming cuts off the view down over the nose of the aircraft affect the visual segment available to the pilots. The far end
of the visual segment is determined by the SVR.
In general, when the aircraft is descending within the fog the visual segment should increase with decreasing height but this is not guaranteed
if fog density increases as the aircraft descends.
Variations in the amount and intensity of ground lighting will vary the perceived visual segment. An example of this is when the far point passes
the end of the approach lighting towards the less dense and less bright runway threshold, centreline and edge lighting. This causes the perceived

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) visual segment to reduce giving rise to the illusion of a wall of fog at the runway threshold. The perceived visual segment will appear to increase again when the far point reaches the end of the TDZ. At night, lights tend to provide more easily discernible visual information than during daylight; consequently, for the same density of fog the visual segment will appear to be less during the day. This effect is offset to a degree in that during daylight hours the runway markings and texture are more visible to the pilot, thus providing additional visual information. Heavy rain, sleet or snow can also significantly reduce visibility. In these conditions the visual segment characteristics previously described apply but variations with height are less predictable. The use of aeroplane landing or Taxi lights is not recommended when the RVR is less than 400 metres because the aeroplane lights illuminate the particles in suspension causing a dazzle effect, reducing the perceived visual segment.

14.5 Aerodrome SPA.LVO.115 Aerodrome Related Requirements

An aerodrome shall not be used for LVO’s below a visibility of 800 m unless: 1. The aerodrome has been approved for such operations by the State of the aerodrome; and 2. Low visibility procedures (LVP) have been established. General The aerodrome operator should consider the following factors before a runway can be considered satisfactory for Category II/III operations and approved as such by the authority.

14.5.1 Obstacle Clearance, Including the Obstacle Free Zone (OFZ)

Obstacle clearance criteria for Cat II operations are laid out in ICAO PANS.OPS.Doc. 8168 and is obviously more restrictive than for normal operations. An OFZ must be established around the runway to keep it clear of vehicles etc. during Cat II operations. Only essential equipment may protrude into the OFZ.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.5.2 Glide Path Angle

The normal glide path angle is 3°. ICAO Annex 1 – allows a maximum of 4° and a minimum of 2°. In practice 3° is often the maximum for an approval to Cat II operations.

14.5.3 Characteristics of Terrain on Approach

The Radio Altimeter (RA) will be adversely affected by sloping or uneven terrain on the approach and since it makes an input to the AP controller this may prevent a runway being approved. The published DH takes into account the terrain irregularities below the aircraft when it is at the point on the approach when the decision to land should be taken.

14.5.4 Instrument Landing System

The ILS installation must conform to the specifications, and be designed and operated in accordance with ICAO Annex 10 for Cat II. The integrity, site and continuity of service must also satisfy the Authority whose guidance should be sought before approval is given. Critical and sensitive areas for the ILS should be established. Aircraft and vehicles, which could cause deviations of the signal, should be kept clear of these areas during Cat II or LVTO operations. The authority will require the ILS to be flight checked in accordance with laid down instructions.

14.5.5 Low Visibility Procedures LVP’s should be applied at the aerodrome for the purpose of ensuring

safe operations when required for Cat II or LVTO operations. Special procedures for the control of the air and ground traffic are required when LVP’s are in force. They are designed to satisfy the requirements for Cat II operations and would normally be implemented when RVR falls to below 600 m or the ceiling falls below 200 ft. The runway operator must

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) provide a system to ensure that the aerodrome movement area is safe and that unwanted vehicles and personnel are excluded during LVP operations.

14.5.6 Approach and Runway Lighting and Markings Cat II operations require enhanced aerodrome visual aids, these are laid

down in ICAO Annex 14 and are briefly summarised as follows:

14.5.7 Low Visibility Procedures LVP’s should be applied at the aerodrome for the purpose of ensuring

safe operations when required for Cat II or LVTO operations. Special procedures for the control of the air and ground traffic are required when LVP’s are in force. They are designed to satisfy the requirements for Cat II operations and would normally be implemented when RVR falls to below 600 m or the ceiling falls below 200 ft. The runway operator must provide a system to ensure that the aerodrome movement area is safe and that unwanted vehicles and personnel are excluded during LVP operations.

14.5.8 Runway Markings There is a no specific CAT II or CAT Ill requirement concerning runway

markings except for the runway centreline that must have a width not less than 0.9 m. The touchdown zone markings are mandatory for all runways supporting precision approaches, but CAT 11/111 runways usually have a distance coding.

14.5.9 Holding Points CAT II and CAT Ill specific holding positions are normally located

upstream of the standard holding position to avoid aircraft entering into the obstacle free zone or the ILS sensitive area. The markings used are also specific. They are associated with CAT II or CAT Ill signs placed on either edge of the taxiway. The sign CAT Ill must be accompanied with flashing lights.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) Touchdown Zone Marking for runways with a length of 2400 m or more.

Taxiway Lights	Colours	Spacing	Special Features
Centre Line	Green	15 m on a straight section 7.5 m on curves	Requested for operations with RVR <350 m
Edge Lights	Blue	60 m on a straight section <60 m on curves	Not requested for Taxiways with centre lights
All Weather Operations (Prohibited)
14.5.10 Taxiway Lighting and Markings Taxiway
15 m on a straight section Requested for operations
7.5 m on curves with RVR <350 m
Not requested for 60 m on a straight section
<60 m on curves lights
Stop Bars Stop bars consists of red lights spaced at interval of 3 m across the
taxiway. In conditions with less than 350 m RVR a stop bar shall be provided at every runway-holding position, except where appropriate aids
and/or procedures (e.g. surface movement radar) are available to prevent inadvertent runway incursions. Stop bars are controlled by Air Traffic
Services; the switching is made in conjunction with at least 3 taxiway centre line lights.
Stop Bars Closed Stop Bars Open

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) Runway Guard Lights Runway guard lights consist of two pairs of flashing yellow lights located at each side of the taxiway. Runway guard lights are provided at each taxiway/Runway intersection where a stop bar is not installed.

14.5.11 CAT I Approach Lighting Systems Class of

Lighting Facility Length, Configuration and Intensity of Approach Lights FALS CAT I lighting system (HIALS ≥720 m) distance coded centreline, Barrette centreline IALS Simple approach lighting system (HIALS 420–719 m) single source, Barrette BALS Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MALS or ALS 210–419 m) NALS Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MALS or ALS <210m) or no approach lights

Note: MALS: Medium Intensity Approach Lighting System.

14.5.12 CAT II Runway Lighting Cat II operations require enhanced aerodrome visual aids, these are laid

down in ICAO Annex 14 and are briefly summarised as follows: 1. Green Bar for runway threshold lights. 2. White High Intensity (HI) runway edge lights. 3. White Centre Line (CL) lights along full length with coding red for distance markers at the stop end. 4. White Touch Down Zone (TDZ) lights. 5. PAPI’s. 6. White Centre Barrette Lighting on at least 300 m of Approach Lights.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) 7. Red Side Barrette Lighting on at least 300 m of Approach lights. 8. TDZ and Centre Line Markings. 9. HI Approach Lights for a minimum of 420 m. Runway Lights Colours Spacing Special Features Threshold Green – 3 m unidirectional Runway end Red – unidirectional 6 m At least 6 lights Edge • Variable white 60 m May be omitted at the • May be yellow intersection from 600 m to the runway end (limited to 1/3 of the runway) Centre line • Variable white 15 m – may be reduced • Alternate red and to 7.5 m white from 900 m (or runway mid point if RWY length <1800 m) to 300m from the runway end • Red from 300 m to the runway end Touchdown zone Barrette of variable • Barrettes – • A barrette is composed of white longitudinal spacing: at least 3 lights. Its length • Unidirectional 60 or 30 m is between 3 and 4.5 m • Barrettes – lateral • TDZ extends from spacing: 18 to 22.5 m threshold to 900 m from threshold (or to runway mid point if RWY length <1800 m)

14.5.13 Approach Lighting System

The approach lighting system consists of a row of lights on the extended centreline of the runway, extending, wherever possible, over a distance of 900 m from the threshold. In addition, the system has two side rows of red lights, extending 270 m from the threshold, and crossbars located at 150 m, 300 m, 450 m, 600 m and 750 m from the threshold. Such approach lighting intends to support all low visibility approaches. Depending on the operational regulations, reduced lengths may be acceptable for CAT II or CAT Ill operations (please refer to Section14.12,

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) Effect on Landing Minima of Failed Ground Equipment. For CAT I approaches a reduced approach lighting system causes an increase in operating minima.

14.5.14 CAT II Approach Lighting System Approach Lights Colours Spacing Special Features

Extended centre Barrettes of variable 30 m Minimum barrette length: line for the first white 4m. 300 m from the Maximum spacing between threshold barrettes’ lights: 1.5 m Extended centre Variable white 30 m Consists of either: line beyond 300m • Barrettes, as used on the from the inner 300 m threshold • 2 lights in the central 300m and 3 lights in the outer 300 m Side row Red • Barrettes – Length of barrettes and Longitudinal spacing: spacing of its lights equal to 30m those of the TDZ • Barrettes – lateral spacing: equal to that of the TDZ Crossbar located Variable white Lights’ lateral spacing: Fills the gap between the at 150m from ≤2.7m centre line and the side row threshold barrettes Crossbar located Variable white Lights’ lateral spacing: Extends to 15m on both at 300m from ≤2.7m side of the center line threshold

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) CAT II/III Approach Lighting System

14.5.15 Lighting System Condition

For a runway meant for use in low visibility conditions, the electrical systems for the power supply, lighting and control of the lighting are designed so that an equipment failure will not leave the pilot with inadequate visual guidance or misleading information. To achieve the required level of availability a secondary power supply must be able to switch over within one second (time extended to 15s for taxiway lights, edge lights and approach lights beyond 300 m from the threshold). The maintenance services must ensure that, during any period of Category II or Ill operations, all approach and runway lights are serviceable, and that in any event at least 95% of the lights are serviceable except for runway end lights (75%), approach lights beyond 450 m (85%) and TDZ lights (90%). In addition two adjacent lights should not remain unserviceable except for lights in a barrette or a crossbar.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.5.16 Control of Air and Ground Traffic

During LVPs the OFZ must remain free of obstacles and the LSA must be protected to preserve the integrity of the ILS signals. In practice the LSA encompasses the OFZ for ground movements and thus one set of procedures will normally satisfy both requirements. Protection of the ILS signal requires that no vehicle or taxying aircraft should be in the LSA when: • There is an aircraft inbound at less than 1 nm until it has completed its landing run, or • An outbound aircraft has completed its take-off run and is airborne. These procedures ensure that an approaching aircraft has adequate obstacle clearance even if it performs a go-around and that the ILS signal is not distorted by interference. The GS sensitive area will have its own area if not within the LSA. Flight crews must establish LVP are in force and will remain so. They may then assume that all promulgated services are available and any deficiencies notified by RT, ATIS, or NOTAM. Spacing between aircraft on final approach may have to be greater than normal to allow landing or departing aircraft to clear the LSA before the following aircraft reaches 1 nm from touchdown. To achieve this, an initial spacing of at least 10nm may be necessary. If landing clearance is not given by 2nm then pilots will be told to expect late landing clearance. Clearance to land or go-around should be given by 1 nm. Landing traffic should clear the LSA as soon as possible, exiting the runway at the designated LV runway exit point.

14.5.17 Meteorological Requirements Runway Visual Range

RVR reports for Touchdown Zone (TDZ), Midpoint (MID) and Stopend (STP) must be available and passed to the pilot within 15 seconds of any change. TDZ should always be passed, but values for other positions should normally only be passed either on request or when either or both values are: 1. Less than TDZ and less than 800 m; or, 2. Less than 400 m. The TDZ RVR is the governing value to be compared to the company minimum RVR.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) RVR Measuring Devices An RVR assessment system must be provided for all CAT II runways. Two methods of RVR assessment are available: 1. Human observer method. 2. Instrumented Runway Visual Range method (IRVR), using electronic equipment. IRVR is the more common system. The RVR measuring devices are be installed at three positions along the runway. Touchdown Zone (TDZ), Midpoint (MID) and Stopend (STP). Exceptionally, where the Human Observer Method is permitted for CAT II runways, observations are made in the vicinity of the touchdown point and at a second point representative of the RVR at the midpoint. RVR Reporting The standard for reporting RVR extends from zero to either 1100 metres or 1500 metres in the following increments: 0 to 200 m 25 m increments 200 to 800 m 50 m increments 800 to 1500 m 100 m increments IRVR reporting to aircraft is started: 1. Whenever the aerodrome meteorological report shows the visibility to be less than 1500 metres. 2. Whenever the IRVR display is indicating an RVR value equal to or less than the maximum for the system. 3. Whenever shallow fog is reported, and during the period for which it is forecast. RVR values are passed to the aircraft at the beginning of each approach for landing and thereafter, whenever there is a significant change in the RVR, until the aircraft has landed. The ‘Touchdown’ RVR will always be passed to the aircraft but with some installations the ‘Midpoint’ and ‘Stopend’ RVR’s will only be passed when they are less than 400 metres or when they are less than the ‘Touchdown’ RVR and less than 800metres.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.5.18 Control of Air and Ground Traffic Low Visibility Procedures will be implemented when the RVR reduces to

600 m and cloud ceiling is lower than 200 feet. Ground Traffic will be strictly controlled and Air Traffic suitably spaced to prevent ILS interference. Radiated signals may be produced for practice CAT II approaches in CAT I conditions. Air Traffic should be advised of a practice CAT II approach.

14.5.19 Runway Characteristics Runway width is normally 45 metres, but narrower runways may be used

provided they are load bearing out to 7.5 metres each side. The runway surface profile should conform to CAP 168.

14.5.20 Visual Aids Visual aids are designed to increase the conspicuity of the runway,

provide visual reference in the final stages of the approach and landing, and expedite ground movement. Their importance increases, as visibility becomes limited. Approach lighting, runway centre line and runway edge lighting are markings providing a reference for the pilot to assess lateral position and cross track velocity. The approach lighting and threshold lighting and markings provide a roll reference. Touchdown zone (TDZ) lighting and markings indicate the plan of the runway surface and show the touchdown area providing vertical and longitudinal reference. The visual guidance derived from runway lights and/or markings should be sufficient to ensure adequate take-off alignment and directional control for take-off and stopping after landing or in an emergency. Although additional instruments, such as head-up displays, may enhance the safety of the operation, reference to visual aids is a primary requirement. Reference to visual aids is a primary requirement even when some form of ground monitor and displays based on the use of external non-visual guidance are being used. Visual aids are also important for the safe, expeditious guidance and control of taxiing aeroplanes. Requirements may vary, but they may for example consist of markings and signs supplemented by tagging holding position lights to denote holding positions, taxiing guidance signs and markings on the centrelines and edges of taxiways. Centreline lights and stop bars may be selectively operated to indicate the assigned routing as well as for the control of aeroplanes. The Manual of Surface Movements Guidance and Control Systems (SMGCS) (ICAO Doc 9476) contains guidance for the selection of SMGCS aids and procedures.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.5.21 Non Visual Aids

The standard ICAO non-visual precision approach aid is ILS. PAR is also recognised as a precision approach aid. ILS ground equipment comprises a localiser, glide path and at least two marker beacons, or when the siting of marker beacons is impracticable, a suitably sited DME, provided that the distance information so obtained is operationally equivalent to that furnished by marker beacons. ILS may be used for all categories of operations, but the beam structure specifications, monitoring requirements and continuity of service requirements, are more stringent for CAT II Operations. The weather conditions experienced at some airports may be such that low minima may not be required. In some cases relatively high OCA/H minima preclude low decision altitudes/heights. Notwithstanding these considerations it is desirable to provide for coupled approaches to low heights, with provision for automatic landing and roll-out, thus ensuring that ILS installations meet the applicable ICAO standards referred to above. It is essential that all ILS installations be ground and flight checked at the time of commissioning and at regular intervals, to ensure an adequate and uniform standard of non-visual guidance. In the event that a facility fails to meet the requirements for which it was commissioned, or if a routine flight test cannot be completed within the appropriate time interval, its status must be reviewed and the facility downgraded as necessary. Users will be advised of changes in ILS status through the AIS. To ensure that the integrity of the guidance signal radiated by the ILS is maintained during aeroplane approaches, all vehicles and aircraft on the ground must remain outside the ILS critical areas. If a vehicle or aircraft is within the critical area it will cause reflection and/or diffraction of the ILS signals which may result in significant disturbances to the guidance signals on the approach path. Diffraction or reflection may also be caused by one or more large aeroplanes or vehicles in the vicinity of the runway that may affect both glide path elevation and localiser azimuth signals. This additional area outside the critical area is called the sensitive area. The extent of sensitive areas will vary with the characteristics of the ILS and the category of operations. It is essential to establish the level of interference caused by aeroplanes and vehicles at various positions in the aerodrome so that the boundaries of the sensitive areas may be determined.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) Critical areas must be protected if the weather conditions are less than 250 m (800 ft) cloud base or 3000 m visibility when instrument approach operations are being carried out. ILS critical and sensitive areas must always be protected if the weather conditions are lower than 60 m (200 ft) cloud base or 600 m RVR when instrument approach operations are being carried out. In the latter case, aircraft which will overfly the localiser transmitter antenna after take-off should be past the antenna before an aircraft making an approach has descended to a height of 60 m (200 ft) above the runway. Similarly, an aircraft manoeuvring on the ground, for example when vacating the runway after landing, should be clear of the critical and sensitive areas before an aircraft approaching to land has descended to a height of 60 m (200 ft) above the runway. The protection of these areas when the weather conditions are better than the minimum specified above will facilitate the use of automatic approach and landings systems and will provide a safeguard in deteriorating weather conditions and when actual weather conditions are lower than reported. Various ILS ground installations of suitable quality are routinely used to gain automatic approach and landing experience in visibility conditions permitting visual monitoring of the operations by the pilot. They should therefore be protected by interlocks from interference due to the simultaneous radiation of opposite direction localiser beams. Where this is impracticable for technical or operational reasons and both localisers radiate simultaneously, pilots should be notified by the appropriate ATS unit by ATIS broadcast, by NOTAM or in the relevant part of the AIP. Similarly harmful interference can occur if aircraft, in the final phase of approach or roll out pass closely in front of the ILS localiser

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) antenna serving another runway. The provisions listed above should therefore be applied to any such installations where experience shows this to be necessary. It is possible for ILS signals in space to be affected by the presence of signals from radio and television transmitters, citizen band radios, industrial welders, etc. Periodic measurements should be made and the level of signals detected, then compared with an acceptable maximum. Complaints by flight crews of signal disturbances will be investigated and special flight checks will be made when there is reason to believe that serious interference is occurring. Every effort will be made to identify and eliminate the cause of the interference. Terminology used and protection criteria for ILS critical and sensitive areas may vary between states. For example, some states use the term “Critical area” to refer to both ICAO critical and sensitive areas as specified in Annex 10. Thus, when terms used or protection provided require clarification or explanation, such clarifying information should be made available to relevant operators or states.

14.5.22 Secondary Power Supplies Requirements for the provision of secondary power supplies for visual and

non-visual aids are specified in ICAO Doc Annex 14, Volume 1, and Annex 10. Volume 1, part 1, respectively. Guidance material in the Aerodrome Design Manual (doc 9157), Part 5, and in Annex 10, Volume 1, Attachment C to Part 1 describes how to achieve the changeover times for these latter facilities.

14.5.23 Control of Air and Ground Traffic

14.5.24 Movement Area Safety

For low visibility operations additional precautions are usually needed to assure safety of aircraft operations, vehicle movement, and personnel. The aerodrome authority will need to complete a comprehensive safety assessment of the aerodrome movement area and its operations to facilitate the development of procedures to enable unwanted vehicles and personnel to be excluded from the movement area. Guidance material is contained in the Manual of Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (SMGCS – Doc 9476).

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.5.25 Low Visibility Procedures Special procedures for the control of air and ground traffic in low visibility

are required. They are additional to and dependent on normal ATC procedures and are designed to satisfy the requirements of CAT II operations. LVP will normally be implemented when the cloud base reduces to less than 200 ft & RVR reduces to 600 m. However, in rapidly deteriorating conditions an earlier decision to implement LVP may be made. Responsibility for the initiation of LVP will be clearly allocated. LVPs are based on the principles that the OFZ must remain free of obstacles during a CAT II operation and that the Localiser Sensitive Area (LSA) must be protected to ensure the integrity of ILS signals. In practice, the LSA encompasses the OFZ with respect to ground movements and so one set of procedures normally satisfies both requirements. Protection of the ILS signal requires that no vehicle or taxiing aeroplane should be within the LSA from the time when: 1. An arriving aeroplane is within 1 NM from touchdown until it has completed its landing run; or, 2. A departing aeroplane has commenced its take-off run until it is airborne. These procedures are designed first, to ensure that an aeroplane making a missed approach from a low height has adequate clearance from obstacles and second, that distortion of localiser signals by multi-path interference do not occur at a critical point in the approach. When LVP are implemented all relevant aerodrome services are to be informed. When the RVR or cloud ceiling requires the application of LVP, flight crews may assume that all promulgated aerodrome facilities are available and that safeguarding checks are complete. Any deficiencies will be notified to crews as soon as possible either by R/T or by arrival/ departure terminal broadcast (ATIS) and, if necessary, by NOTAM. The spacing between aeroplanes on final approach may have to be greater than normal to allow landed aeroplanes to clear the LSA before approach aeroplanes reach 1 NM; an initial spacing of about 10 NM may be necessary to achieve this. If landing clearance cannot be given by 2NM, pilots will be warned to expect ‘late landing clearance’ and the clearance to land or instruction to initiate a missed approach will be given by 1 NM. Landed crossing traffic should clear the LSA without delay. Traffic should exit at runway designated points.

System	Number Installed
Autopilot	1
Independent ILS Receivers	2
VOR Installations	2
Marker Receivers	2
Audio Annunciators	2
Visual Signal Display’s	2
DME Transmitter/Receiver	2
ADF System	2
Radio Altimeters	1
Weather Radar	1
All Weather Operations (Prohibited)
14.6 The Aircraft General
The ATR 42 and ATR 72 meets the criteria for operations to Cat II minima and conforms to the requirements laid down by the CAA airworthiness
division and are certified for Cat II operations.
Category II operations are based on a 2-engine, flap 30/35°, CAT II Auto-pilot coupled mode approach to a Radio Altimeter (RA) DH of not
less than 100 ft/RVR 300 m followed by a visual manual landing.
Note: Only runways specifically promulgated by European State operations instructions are approved for CAT II approaches.
14.6.1 Aircraft Equipment
The ATR has the following equipment:
500-Series components:
• One Computer • One Control Panel
• One Advisory Control Panel • Three Servo Actuators (one for each axis)

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) The computer receives data from several sensors and generates commands to the flight control actuators and to the FD bars. Dual microprocessor architecture and digital servo-monitoring techniques are used to provide an adequate safety level. In ILS approach mode, LOC and GS are displayed both on ADU and on EADI: In white during the arm phase In green with a star during the capture phase In green without star when in track phase

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) Track phase, for both LOC and G/S, can only take place below 1500 ft RA, but must be achieved before 800 ft RA. End 500-Series 600-Series The Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) is made up of the following components: • Two Core Avionics Cabinet (CAC 1 which controls the autopilot functions, and CAC 2 which monitors the autopilots functions) • Three control panel: one Flight Guidance and Control Panel (FGCP) and two Integrated Control Panel (ICP) • Two Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA), one on each PFD upper part • Three identical servo actuators on the three axes (pitch, roll, yaw) • One Power Trim Box (to interface with the pitch trim actuator). The computers (CAC 1/2) receive data from the Air Data Computers (ADC), the Attitude and Heading Reference Systems (AHRS), the radio-altimeter, the NAV 1/2, the FMS, and from some sensors. The CAC 1 generates commands to the flight control actuator and CAC 2 monitors the system.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) In ILS approach mode, LOC and GS are displayed both the FMA’s and on PFD’s: In blue during the arm phase In green with a star during the capture phase In green without star when in track phase Track phase, for both LOC and G/S, can only take place below 1500 ft RA, but must be achieved before 800 ft RA. End 600-Series

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.6.3 CAT II Capability 500-Series

As soon as APP mode is armed, the approach capability (as seen by the AFCS computer), will be displayed on the first line of the ADU (CAT 1 or CAT 2). CAT 2 message means that CAT II conditions are met; it replaces the CAT 1 message on ADU as and when all the following requirements are satisfied: • CM1 and CM2 AHAS valid. • CM1 and CM2 EFIS valid. • CM1 or CM2 DADC valid. • Radio Altitude 1 or Radio Altitude 2 valid. • Pilot and Copilot displaying an ILS source. • Radio altitude greater than 800 feet AGL. • Comparison monitor annunciator is non-active. The CAT2 message remains displayed for the duration of the approach if all the above stated conditions remain satisfied. If any of those requirements for the CAT2 message are lost, a CAT2 INVALID message flashes on the ADU. In addition a triple click aural warning is generated. End 500-Series 600-Series As soon as APP mode is armed, the approach capability (as seen by the AFCS computer), will be displayed on the FMA’s (CAT 1 or CAT 2). CAT 2 message means that CAT II conditions are met; it replaces the CAT 1 message on FMA’s as and when all the following requirements are satisfied: • CM1 and CM2 AHAS valid. • CM1 and CM2 EFIS valid. • CM1 or CM2 DADC valid.

Deviation	Calls
IAS – 0 kts/+10 kts	“Speed”
Bank Angle > 10°	“Bank Angle”
Pitch Attitude ± 4°	“Pitch”
	Excessive Deviation Threshold
---	---
Localiser	1/3 DOT
Glideslope	3/4 DOT
All Weather Operations (Prohibited)
• Radio Altitude 1 or Radio Altitude 2 valid.
• Pilot and Copilot displaying an ILS source.
• Radio altitude greater than 800 feet AGL.
• Comparison monitor annunciator is non-active.
The CAT2 message remains displayed for the duration of the approach if all the above stated conditions remain satisfied. If any of those
requirements for the CAT2 message are lost, a CAT2 INVALID message flashes on the FMA’s. In addition a triple click aural warning is generated.
End 600-Series 500-Series
enabled when CAT II conditions are met.
The excess ILS deviation monitor is active during dual coupled CAT II AGL, localiser deviation is monitored between 500 ft and 0 ft AGL.

Deviation	Calls
IAS – 0 kts/+10 kts	“Speed”
Bank Angle > 10°	“Bank Angle”
Pitch Attitude ± 4°	“Pitch”
	Excessive Deviation Threshold
---	---
Localiser	1/3 DOT
Glideslope	3/4 DOT
All Weather Operations (Prohibited)
If excessive is detected the associated scale and pointer turn AMBER and flash EXCESS DEV is displayed on the ADU. If Installed the Guidance
warning light located in the primary field of view of the pilot is also triggered.
End 500-Series 600-Series
The excess ILS deviation monitor is active during dual coupled CAT II AGL, localiser deviation is monitored between 500 ft and 0 ft AGL.
Excessive deviation on the GS or the LOC. The message on the FMA is associated with the GS or the LOC deviation scale flashing amber to
indicate a flight path excusion. Red message, reverse video flashing for 7 seconds, then steady amber.
End 600-Series
14.6.5 Dual Coupling 500-Series
During ILS approach, DUAL coupling automatically occurs after LOC and GS track phase has begun, only if both NAV receivers are tuned to ILS. In
dual CPL both arrows are illuminated and both NAV receivers are coupled to the AFCS computer which utilises average data for guidance
computation.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) Dual coupling requires that all of the following conditions are met. • The EHSls are displaying different ILS navigation sources tuned to the same frequency. • Both the localiser and glideslope are in track mode. • Radio altitude is below 1200 feet AGL. • Both navigation receivers are operative. End 500-Series 600-Series During ILS approach, DUAL coupling automatically occurs after LOC and GS track phase has begun, only if both NAV receivers are tuned to ILS. In dual CPL both arrows are illuminated and both NAV receivers are coupled to the AFCS computer which utilises average data for guidance computation. Dual coupling requires that all of the following conditions are met. • The PFD’s are displaying different ILS navigation sources tuned to the same frequency. • Both the localiser and glideslope are in track mode. • Radio altitude is below 1200 feet AGL. • Both navigation receivers are operative.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) End 600-Series

14.6.6 Minimum Equipment Required 500-Series

The equipment which must be serviceable at the beginning of the approach is established during the certification process and included in the AFM. This list should be used to amend the airline Minimum Equipment List (MEL). The dispatch conditions for relevant equipment should clearly indicate that CAT II operations are not authorised. This list should also be included in the airline operating manual and/or QRH to be used by the crew mainly in case of in flight failure. Before commencing a low visibility approach the crew has to check that all relevant equipment is operative. Below is the minimum equipment required on 500 series to meet CAT II approach criteria refer to AFM PRO.SPO CAT II Approach. End 500-Series 600-Series The equipment which must be serviceable at the beginning of the approach is established during the certification process and included in the AFM. This list should be used to amend the airline Minimum Equipment List (MEL). The dispatch conditions for relevant equipment should clearly indicate that CAT II operations are not authorised. This list should also be included in the airline operating manual and/or QRH to be used by the crew mainly in case of in flight failure. Before commencing a low visibility approach the crew has to check that all relevant equipment is operative.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) Below is the minimum equipment required on 600 series to meet CAT II approach criteria refer to AFM PRO.SPO CAT II Approach. End 600-Series

14.6.7 CAT II Minimum Equipment 500-Series

Approach with AP Autopilot 1 FD bars 1 (PF side) AP quick disconnect 1 (PF side) AP OFF warning (light and aural) 1 ADU 1 ILS receiver 2 AHRS 2 Standby Horizon 1 CRT 3 (2 PF side) SGU 2 Radio altimeter 1 (with 2 displays) DH indicator 2 GA pb 1 (PF side) Windshield wipers 1 (PF side) Yaw damper 1 Airspeed indicators 2: • F/O side must be operativea • If CAPT is PF, CAPT side must be operative Altimeters 3 Hydraulic system Blue + Green Electrical system DC: BUS1/BUS2/EMER/STBY/ESS AC: BUS1/BUS2/STBY ACW: BUS1/BUS2 MFC modules 3 a. The standby airspeed instrument can be easily monitored only from the CAPT position (Captain position). End 500-Series

	Approach with AP
Autopilot	1
COURSE rotary switch	2
AP quick disconnect	1 (PF side)
AP OFF warning (light and aural)	1
ILS receiver	2
AHRS	2
IESI	1
PFD	2
Radio altimeter	1 (with 2 displays)
DH indicator	2
GA pb	1 (PF side)
Windshield wipers	1 (PF side)
Yaw damper	1
ADC	2
Hydraulic system	Blue + Green
Electrical system	DC: BUS1/BUS2/EMER/STBY/ESS AC: BUS1/BUS2/STBY ACW: BUS1/BUS2
MFC modules	3
All Weather Operations (Prohibited)
600-Series PFD 2
ADC 2 AC: BUS1/BUS2/STBY
ACW: BUS1/BUS2 End 600-Series
14.7 Failures and Associated Actions During Approach 500-Series
Any failure that is not completely treated before 1000 ft RAD ALT, or that occurs below 1000 ft RAD ALT, must always lead to a missed approach.
1. Engine Failure Provided lateral trimming is properly achieved before 1000 ft RAD
ALT, single engine approach may be performed with autopilot engaged, but must be restricted to CAT I.

Warnings	Actions at the Time of Failure Detection		Complementary Actions
	> 1000 RAD ALT	< 1000 RAD ALT
Flap failure, jammed between 0 and 25 positions	Revert to Cat I minima	Not applicable
Flap failure, jammed above 25 position	Continue increase V (flaps 35) by APP 10kt		Multiply landing distance flaps 35 by 1.13
Engine failure	Revert to Cat I minima	Discontinue the approach
Hydraulic failure (without fluid loss)	Transfer No capability loss
All Weather Operations (Prohibited)
2. AFCS Failure and Trajectory Deviation
In case of CAT II INVALID, excess deviations and AFCS failure, go around must be performed with STBY HORIZON: initial missed
approach attitude: 10°.
End 500-Series 600-Series
Any failure that is not completely treated before 1000 ft RAD ALT, or that occurs below 1000 ft RAD ALT, must always lead to a missed approach.
1. Engine Failure Provided lateral trimming is properly achieved before 1000 ft RAD
ALT, single engine approach may be performed with autopilot engaged, but must be restricted to CAT I.
2. AFCS Failure and Trajectory Deviation
In case of CAT II INVALID, EXCESS DEVIATION or AFCS failure, Go Around must be performed. If no discrepancy is detected on PFD
(CHECK ATT messages) PFD can be used with IESI monitoring to set the initial missed approach attitude.
End 600-Series
14.7.1 A-C Systems 500-Series
Actions Flap failure, jammed
Revert to Cat I between 0 and 25
minima positions
Continue increase Multiply landing Flap failure, jammed
V (flaps 35) by distance flaps 35 by above 25 position APP
10kt 1.13 Revert to Cat I
minima Discontinue the Hydraulic failure Transfer No capability approach
(without fluid loss) loss

Warnings	Actions at the Time of Failure Detection		Complementary Actions
	> 1000 RAD ALT	< 1000 RAD ALT
First MFC module failure	Apply associated procedure continue the approach	Discontinue the approach
Second MFC module failure	Apply associated procedure Revert to CAT 1 minima	Discontinue the approach
Warnings	Actions at the Time of Failure Detection		Complementary Actions
---	---	---	---
	> 1000 RAD ALT	< 1000 RAD ALT
Flap failure, jammed between 0 and 25 positions	Revert to Cat I minima	Not applicable
Flap failure, jammed above 15 position	Continue increase V (flaps 30) by APP 10kt		Multiply landing distance flaps 30 by 1.13
Engine failure	Revert to Cat I minima	Discontinue the approach
Hydraulic failure (without fluid loss)	Transfer No capability loss
First MFC module failure	Apply associated procedure continue the approach	Discontinue the approach
Second MFC module failure	Apply associated procedure Revert to CAT 1 minima	Discontinue the approach
All Weather Operations (Prohibited)
Actions Apply associated
First MFC module Discontinue the procedure continue
failure approach the approach
Apply associated Second MFC module Discontinue the
procedure Revert to failure approach
CAT 1 minima End 500-Series
600-Series Actions
Flap failure, jammed Revert to Cat I
between 0 and 25 minima
positions Continue increase Multiply landing
Flap failure, jammed V (flaps 30) by distance flaps 30 by above 15 position APP
10kt 1.13 Revert to Cat I
minima Discontinue the Hydraulic failure Transfer No capability approach
(without fluid loss) loss Apply associated
First MFC module Discontinue the procedure continue
failure approach the approach
Apply associated Second MFC module Discontinue the
procedure Revert to failure approach
CAT 1 minima End 600-Series

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.7.2 Flight Instruments 500-Series

Actions at the Time of Failure Detection Complementary Warnings Actions

1000 RAD ALT < 1000 RAD ALT Revert to CAT I Standby horizon flag minima Radio altimeter Revert to CAT I warning on PM EFIS minima Switch to valid AHRS ATT/PIT/ROLL Reengage AP Revert First action before warning on any EFIS to CAT I minima switching AHRS is to refer to standby HDG warning on any Switch to valid AHRS horizon to determine EFIS Revert to CAT I the wrong AHRS minima LOC/GS/ILS warning Revert to CAT I on any EFIS minima Loss of one CRT on CAPT side or loss of Switch affected CRT Discontinue the EHSI CRT on F/O OFF approach side Switch affected CRT OFF Continue for an Loss of EADI CRT on AP approach Revert F/O side to CAT I minima for a FD approach Switch to valid SGU. Loss of both CRT on Revert to CAT I one side minima Loss of F/O airspeed Revert to CAT I indicator and CAPT minima side if PF Loss of F/O altimeter Revert to CAT I and CAPT side if PF minima End 500-Series

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) 600-Series Actions at the Time of Failure Detection Complementary Warnings Actions

1000 RAD ALT < 1000 RAD ALT Revert to CAT I IESI minima Radio altimeter Revert to CAT I warning on PM EFIS minima AP single source Mismatch flag limited to 1000 ft “CHECK ATT” on or PFD Revert to CAT I First action before minima without AP switching AHRS is to refer to standby AP single source horizon to determine Mismatch flag limited to 1000 ft the wrong AHRS “CHECK HOG” on or PFD Revert to CAT I Discontinue the minima without AP approach LOC/GS/ILS warning Revert to CAT I on any DU minima Switch affected DU Loss of one DU OFF Loss of both DU on Revert to CAT I one side minima AP single source CHECK IAS flag or, limited to 1000 ft CHECK ALT flag or, or IAS FAIL flag or, Revert to CAT I ALT FAIL flag minima without AP End 600-Series

Warnings	Actions at the Time of Failure Detection		Complementary Actions
	ZRA: 1000 RAD ALT	500 FT
AP disengage	Try to recover If impossible revert to Cat I FD approach	Discontinue the approach
LOC or G/S excess deviation	Not applicable	Discontinue the approach
Loss of ADU	Perform a Cat I minima manual approach	Discontinue the approach
Loss of Cat II capability (Triple click)	Try to recover If impossible revert to Cat I minima	Discontinue the approach
Warnings	Actions at the Time of Failure Detection		Complementary Actions
---	---	---	---
	ZRA: 1000 RAD ALT	500 FT
AP disengage	Try to recover If impossible revert to Cat I FD approach	Discontinue the approach
LOC or G/S excess deviation	Not applicable	Discontinue the approach
Loss of Cat II capability (Triple click)	Try to recover If impossible revert to Cat I minima	Discontinue the approach
All Weather Operations (Prohibited)
14.7.3 AFCS and ADU 500-Series
Actions Try to recover If
Discontinue the approach
Cat I FD approach LOC or G/S excess Discontinue the
deviation approach Perform a Cat I
Discontinue the approach approach
Loss of Cat II Try to recover If Discontinue the
capability (Triple impossible revert to approach
click) Cat I minima End 500-Series
600-Series Actions
Try to recover If Discontinue the
approach Cat I FD approach
LOC or G/S excess Discontinue the deviation approach
Loss of Cat II Try to recover If Discontinue the
capability (Triple impossible revert to approach
click) Cat I minima End 600-Series
14.8 Maintenance and Engineering Procedures
14.8.1 Aircraft Equipment Status
The aircraft equipment status (Cat II or Not Cat II) will be controlled and recorded in the Technical Log. In order for a Cat II approach to be
conducted, the aircraft must be serviceable to Cat II status.
Where Cat II approaches have been abandoned or not been possible due to technical reasons, a suitable entry must be made in the aircraft
technical log and the aircraft status downgraded as required.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.8.2 System Downgrading

The Commander or a Certifying Engineer holding full approval in any trade category in the aircraft type may downgrade the aircraft to Category I. Downgrading is achieved by raising an Acceptable Deferred Defect (ADD). The Category Status of the aircraft will be controlled by the Technical Log ADD system. A separate ADD is to be raised for the component or system to differentiate the defect from the Category Status of the aircraft. Loganair Technical Control Centre will inform Operations of any changes in the Category Status of the aircraft.

14.8.3 System Upgrading Upgrading can only be considered after the following criteria have been

satisfied: 1. Positive identification and rectification of the defect that caused the downgrade have been carried out in accordance with the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM). 2. Line Replaceable Units (LRU) removed for a defect must have passed a full bench test prior to installation. 3. Relevant LRU interface verification test must be satisfied as applicable and as detailed in the AMM. 4. The associated BITE checks must be satisfied. 5. A satisfactory operational test of Integrated Computers. 6. Whenever there is any doubt about the integrity of the system, a flight crew qualified to carry out CAT II approaches should be requested to carry out an UPGRADE ASSESSMENT approach. The request must be documented in the Technical Log. In this case an upgrade can only be considered when the operating crew has reported no adverse comment on the system performance, in the Technical Log.

Note: made by a CAT II approved flight crew and no engineer is available to clear the ADD, the Commander may, at his discretion, operate the aircraft to CAT II minima. Under these circumstances the Tech Log statement should be made on completion of the first sector where an engineer is available to clear the ADD.

14.8.4 Upgrade Assessment Approach

1. An Upgrade Assessment Approach must be carried out in CAT I meteorological conditions or better.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) 2. An Upgrade Assessment Approach may be made using a CAT II ILS with or without CAT II protection. 3. An Upgrade Assessment Approach may be made using a CAT 1 ILS. 4. When CAT II protection is not in place or when using a CAT I ILS the autopilot minimum use height of 160 ft must be observed. In this case system performance below 160 ft must be assessed while flying the remainder of the approach manually. 5. System performance should be assessed as PASS or FAIL as described in Section14.14 unless it is believed that signal interference was responsible for out of limits performance. If signal interference was believed to be responsible for out of limits performance the system should be reported as Not Assessed.

14.8.5 Robbery or Interchange of Units Robbery or interchange of critical units is not recommended, as this will

require both aircraft to be downgraded to CAT I and necessitate a subsequent upgrade to CAT II.

Note: released. The removed LRU must be sent for repair, as a very minimum, a bench check.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.9 Low Visibility Operations

FLT 3.11.9

14.9.1 Decision Height and Visual Reference

14.9.2 Decision Height Most pilots will have carried out several approaches to CAT I minima in

weather conditions close to the relevant limits, and will be familiar with the visual segment available at a DA of the order of 200 ft. The required specified visual reference includes 6 lights (approach and/or runway), which is a sufficiently large segment to constitute a relatively ‘normal’ view of the environment providing enough visual cues to allow the pilot to make an instantaneous decision as to whether the approach may be safely continued. There is also normally sufficient time and distance available before flare initiation to allow some correction of alignment and tracking errors. Little specific training is therefore required for instrument to visual transition for CAT I approaches, except to emphasise the need for accurate flying on the ILS to minimise corrections after visual transition and the need for close monitoring by the PM. Crews must also be aware of the possibility of the illusion of pitch up when entering shallow fog, etc. However, when considering CAT II conditions, the picture is very different. The significantly reduced visual segment in minimum RVR associated with a DH of the order of 100 ft provides visual cues and environmental information which may only barely exceed the minimum required to assess the aircraft’s situation. Crews will be shown diagrams and simulator visual sequences in weather conditions close to and at CAT II minima. There is also very little time available to correct any alignment or tracking errors prior to flare initiation. The DH for a particular approach is determined by the accuracy, integrity and reliability of the ground and airborne equipment, and the maintenance of an OFZ to ensure adequate obstacle clearance in the missed approach case. The absolute minimum RVR assigned to a particular DH is chosen to provide a high probability that the required visual reference will be available at the DH. The visual reference required by a pilot at and below DH depends on the task that he has to carry out, and the visual segment available to him depends on the obscuring medium and its structure, the general rule in fog being that it becomes more dense with an increase in height. Research in the UK shows that, in deep, stable fog, there is a 90% probability that the

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) SVR from eye height greater than 25 ft above the ground will be less than the reported RVR. There is no similar data for blowing snow or heavy rain, but pilot reports suggest an SVR/RVR relationship similar to that for fog. Research using flight simulators and flight trials has shown that visual contact needs to be established about 3 seconds above DH to allow assessment of the external references and the evaluation of the flight path relative to those references. The duration of this decision process reduces to about 1 second when a fail-operational automatic landing system is being used. (The Embraer ATR 42/72 does not have such an automatic landing system).

14.9.3 Visual Reference

To establish lateral position and cross-track velocity, not less than one axial light segment of the approach lights or runway centreline or runway edge lights should be visible. To make accurate adjustments to the flight path in the vertical plane including the flare, using purely external cues, a point on the ground which has a low or zero rate of apparent movement relative to the aircraft (i.e. the aiming point) should be visible. Therefore, the requirement is that the pilot who is landing the aircraft arrives at DH having spent the previous 3 seconds assessing the visual cues available and the aircraft’s position. The CAT I concept of DH is modified to the concept of the Decision Zone which extends from 40 ft (3 seconds) above and in which the decision is made according the quality of the approach and the way the visual references develop as DH is approached. The crew enter the decision zone prepared for a go-around but as far as possible without any preconception as to the outcome. The pilot who is not carrying out the landing is not involved in the decision process and must not seek visual cues, but must closely monitor the A/C performance. The conditions required at DH to continue the approach and landing are: 1. The visual reference should be adequate to monitor the continued approach to minimum AP engagement height then complete and manually flare and land, The visual reference is a segment of at least 3 (three) consecutive lights, being the centreline of the approach lights or touchdown zone lights or runway centre line lights or runway edge lights or a combination of these which can be maintained. This visual reference must include a lateral element of the ground pattern i.e. an approach lighting crossbar or the landing threshold or a barrette of the touchdown zone lighting. 2. The flight-path should be acceptable. If these conditions are not satisfied it is mandatory to initiate a go-around.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) If the decision to land has been made at DH and the visual references subsequently become insufficient, or the flight path deviates unacceptably below DH, a go-around must be carried out. The minimum visual segments required for CAT II approaches and landing are: 1. A visual segment of not less than 120 metres is required for a pilot to be able to maintain roll attitude manually at and below DH. 2. For a manual landing using only external visual cues, a visual segment of at least 225 metres will be required at the flare initiation height in order to provide the pilot with sight of the aiming point. Since SVR should increase with decreasing height, these requirements should normally be compatible.

14.9.4 Visual Acquisition

In CAT II conditions there are adequate visual cues to establish position and aircraft altitude in relation to the approach lights. However, PM must monitor instruments to determine immediately any tendency to deviate from the final approach path and airspeed. It is particularly important that PF appreciates the visual illusions created by shallow fog patches and continues to fly a correct approach path after AP disconnect. PM will be monitoring this phase continuously. The geometry of the ATR average approach attitude is such that at 100 ft RA, a visual segment of 174 m is obtained when the forward visibility from the cockpit to ground is 300 m (See below). Pitch attitude at DH is approximately 2.3° nose up.

14.9.5 Visual Segment at DH and Minimum Visual References

The minimum visual references allowing at the decision height to continue the approach and landing must be clearly defined in the Operations Manual and be in accordance with the applicable operational regulation.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) Visual segment approaching CAT II Visual segment at 80 ft Minima In CAT II conditions, the visual cues must be sufficient to enable the pilots to judge the aircraft’s orientation to the run-way and to perform a manual landing. For roll guidance, most pilots need to see a lateral element of the ground pattern (e.g an approach lighting cross bar, the landing threshold, or a barrette of the TDZ). To make an accurate adjustment to the flight path in the vertical plane, such as a flare, most pilots need to see a point on the ground which has a low or a zero rate of apparent movement relative to the aircraft. On the basis of those findings, the European regulation states that a pilot may not continue an approach below DH unless visual references In accordance with the table hereunder are obtained and maintained. Use of landing lights at night In low visibility conditions can be detrimental to the acquisition of visual references. Reflected lights from water droplets or snow may actually reduce visibility. Landing lights would therefore not normally be used in CAT II weather conditions.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) Visual References CAT II 3 consecutive lights of: • The centre line of the approach lights or; • The touchdown zone lights or; • The runway centreline lights or; • The runway edge lights or; • A combination of the above. A lateral element of the ground pattern: • Approach lighting crossbars or; • Threshold or; • Barrettes of the TDZ. If the RVR is at the minimum value of the approach category (300 m for CAT II) the visual segment at the decision height should be as shown on the drawings below: Visual references at 100 ft with 300 m RVR

14.10 Low Visibility Take-off Approach & Landing Operations

AMC1 SPA.LVO.100 Low Visibility Operations defines specific ranges of weather minima for Take-Off with LVTO approval.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.10.1 LVTO – Aeroplanes RVR vs. Facilities Facilities RVR (m) 1, 2

Day: runway edge lights and runway centre line 300 markings Night: runway edge lights and runway end lights or runway centre line lights and runway end lights Runway edge lights and runway centre line lights 200 Runway edge lights and runway centre line lights TDZ, MID, rollout 1503 High intensity runway centre line lights spaced 15 m or TDZ, MID, rollout 1253 less and high intensity edge lights spaced 60 m or less are in operation Runway protection and facilities equivalent to CAT III TDZ, MID, rollout 75 landing operations are available and the aircraft is equipped either with an approved lateral guidance system or an approved HUD/HUDLS for take-off. Note 1: The reported RVR value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot assessment. Note 2: Multi-engined aeroplanes that in the event of an engine failure at any point during take-off can either stop or continue the take-off to a height of 1500 ft above the aerodrome while clearing obstacles by the required margins. Note 3: The required RVR value to be achieved for all relevant RVRs TDZ: touchdown zone, equivalent to the initial part of the take-off run MID: midpoint AMC5 CAT.OP.MPA.110 defines specific ranges of weather minima for precision approaches for CAT I & CAT II in the following tables:

14.10.2 Altimeter Bug Take-Off • All bugs set to the acceleration altitude.

DH or MDH			Class of Lighting Facility
			FALS	IALS	BALS	NALS
			See (a)(4), (5), (8) above for RVR <750/800 m
ft			RVR/CMV (m)
200	–	210	550	750	1000	1200
211	–	220	550	800	1000	1200
221	–	230	550	800	1000	1200
231	–	240	550	800	1000	1200
241	–	250	550	800	1000	1300
251	–	260	600	800	1100	1300
261	–	280	600	900	1100	1300
281	–	300	650	900	1200	1400
301	–	320	700	1000	1200	1400
321	–	340	800	1100	1300	1500
341	–	360	900	1200	1400	1600
361	–	380	1000	1300	1500	1700
381	–	400	1100	1400	1600	1800
401	–	420	1200	1500	1700	1900
421	–	440	1300	1600	1800	2000
441	–	460	1400	1700	1900	2100
461	–	480	1500	1800	2000	2200
481		500	1500	1800	2100	2300
501	–	520	1600	1900	2100	2400
521	–	540	1700	2000	2200	2400
541	–	560	1800	2100	2300	2500
561	–	580	1900	2200	2400	2600
581	–	600	2000	2300	2500	2700
601	–	620	2100	2400	2600	2800
621	–	640	2200	2500	2700	2900
641	–	660	2300	2600	2800	3000
All Weather Operations (Prohibited)
14.10.3 CAT I RVR/CMV vs DH/MDH

DH or MDH			Class of Lighting Facility
			FALS	IALS	BALS	NALS
			See (a)(4), (5), (8) above for RVR <750/800 m
ft			RVR/CMV (m)
661	–	680	2400	2700	2900	3100
681	–	700	2500	2800	3000	3200
701	–	720	2600	2900	3100	3300
721	–	740	2700	3000	3200	3400
741	–	760	2700	3000	3300	3500
761	–	800	2900	3200	3400	3600
801	–	850	3100	3400	3600	3800
851	–	900	3300	3600	3800	4000
901	–	950	3600	3900	4100	4300
951	–	1000	3800	4100	4300	4500
1001	–	1100	4100	4400	4600	4900
1101	–	1200	4600	4900	5000	5000
1201 and above			5000	5000	5000	5000
DH (ft)	Auto-coupled or Approved HUDLS to Below DH 1
---	---	---
	Aircraft Categories A, B, C RVR (m)	Aircraft Category D RVR (m)
100–120	300	300/350 2
121–140	400	400
141–199	450	450
All Weather Operations (Prohibited)
14.10.4 CAT II Operation Minima RVR vs. DH RVR (m) (m)
Note 1: This means continued use of the automatic flight control system or the HUDLS down to a height of 80% of the DH. The AFCS may
be engaged to a minimum height of 80 feet.
Note 2: An RVR of 300 m may be used for a category D aircraft conducting an auto-land.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.11 Low Visibility Operating Procedures

The Commander shall satisfy themselves that: 1. The status of the visual/non-visual facilities is sufficient prior to commencing an LVTO or CAT II approach. 2. Appropriate LVPs are in force according to information received from ATC before commencing an LVTO or CAT II approach. 3. The flight crew are properly qualified prior to commencing an LVTO. 4. Company aircraft will not commence an LVTO in less than 125 m RVR at all of the relevant RVR reporting points. 5. Commanders are not authorised to determine CAT II minima. 6. Low visibility take-offs (visibilty less than 400 m) must be performed by CM1.

14.12 Effect on Landing Minima of Failed Ground Equipment

AMC7 SPA.LVO.100

14.12.1 General

These instructions are intended for use both pre-flight and in-flight. It is however not expected that the pilot-in-command/commander would consult such instructions after passing 1000 ft above the aerodrome. If failures of ground aids are announced at such a late stage, the approach could be continued at the pilot-in-command/commander’s discretion. If failures are announced before such a late stage in the approach, their effect on the approach should be considered as described in the table below, and the approach may have to be abandoned. The following conditions should be applicable to the tables below: 1. Multiple failures of runway/FATO lights other than indicated in Table 7 are not acceptable; 2. Deficiencies of approach and runway/FATO lights are treated separately; 3. For CAT II and CAT III operations, a combination of deficiencies in runway/FATO lights and RVR assessment equipment are not permitted; and 4. Failures other than ILS and MLS affect RVR only and not DH.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) Failed or Effect on Landing Minima Downgraded CAT IIIB (no Equipment CAT IIIB CAT IIIA CAT II DH) ILS/MLS stand-by Not allowed RVR 200 m No effect transmitter Outer marker No effect if replaced by height check at 1000 ft Middle marker No effect At least one RVR assessment RVR value to On runways equipped with two or more RVR systems be available on assessment units, one may be inoperative the aerodrome Not allowed for operations with Approach lights No effect Not allowed DH >50 ft Approach lights No effect Not allowed except the last 210 m Approach lights No effect except the last 420 m Standby power for No effect approach lights Day: no effect Day: no effect Edge lights, threshold lights and runway end No effect Night: RVR Night: not lights 550m allowed Day: RVR Day: RVR Day: RVR 200m 300m 350m Centre line lights Not allowed Night: RVR Night: not Night: RVR 550m (400 m allowed 400m with HUDLS or auto-land) Centre line lights spacing increased to RVR 150 m No effect 30 m Day: RVR Day: RVR 300 m 200m Touchdown zone No effect lights Night: RVR Night: RVR 550 m, 350 m with 300m HUDLS or auto-land Taxiway light system No effect

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) 14.13 Limitations 14.13.1 Autopilot and Yaw Damper Select a FD mode before AP engagement. Minimum height for AP engagement after takeoff...........................100 ft NAV mode for VOR approach with either AP or FD is authorized only if: • A collocated DME is available • DME HOLD is not selected. Minimum height for use of either AP or FD: CAT II Miniumum height for use of Autopilot in approach mode..................80 ft 14.13.2 CAT I ILS Approach and Landing The aircraft is permitted to make a CAT I ILS approach with, or without, the flight director followed by a manual landing, or an automatic coupled approach followed by a manual landing or a manual or go-around. The minimum decision height for a CAT I ILS coupled approach is 200 ft. The autopilot must be disengaged at a height above the runway threshold 14.13.3 CAT II ILS Coupled Approach and Landing The ILS installation must be approved for CAT II operation. The aircraft is permitted to make a CAT II ILS coupled approach followed by a manual landing or a manual go-around. The radio altimeter must be tested before every CAT II ILS coupled approach. | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | • Except during takeoff or approach | 1000 ft | | • VS or IAS mode during approach | 160 ft | | • V-FP mode during LNAV/VNAV approach | 160 ft | | • L-GS mode during LPV approach | 160 ft | | • CAT I APP mode | 160 ft |

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) Radio altimeter indications must be available on both EADI’s/PFDs before, and during, every CAT II ILS coupled approach. The autopilot must be engaged during a CAT II ILS coupled approach. The flaps must be set to 30/35° for a CAT II ILS coupled approach. The landing flap selection must be made at a height greater than 1000 ft AGL indicated on the radio altimeter. 500-Series The CAT II system requires the white CAT II advisory be displayed on the ADU and the RA display to be operational. End 500-Series 600-Series The CAT II system requires both of the green CAT II annunciators on the FMA and the RA display to be operational. End 600-Series The autopilot must be disengaged after an engine failure during a CAT II ILS coupled approach, and the aircraft manually re-trimmed in all axes. The minimum decision height for a CAT II ILS coupled approach is 100 ft.

Note: this case, the actual decision height will not be less than 100 ft. The autopilot must be disengaged at a height above the runway threshold of not lower than 80 ft.

14.13.4 Approved Configurations • Approach

AP and FD are approved with use of approach mode for CAT II precision approaches. The CAT II capability must be displayed on the ADU. • Go-Around FD is approved with use of GA mode.

CAT II Wind Limitations (AFM PRO.SPO CAT 2 APPROACH)
	ATR 42	ATR 72
Headwind	15 kts	29 kts
Crosswind	15 kts	15 kts
Tailwind	10 kts	10 kts
Aircraft	Category
---	---
ATR 42/72	B
All Weather Operations (Prohibited)
14.13.5 Wind Speed Limitations
14.13.6 Turbulence Limitations Turbulence not greater than light to moderate.
14.13.7 Precipitation Limitations Precipitation not greater than moderate.
14.13.8 Braking Action Medium or better.
14.13.9 Minima Company or approved chart minima, whichever is more restrictive.
14.13.10 Aeroplane Categories for Aerodrome Operating Minima
The criteria taken into consideration for the classification of aeroplanes by categories is the indicated airspeed at threshold (VAT).
Note: Loganair use CAT C minima for circling approaches until established on final approach thereafter CAT B minima applies.
14.14 Monitoring of CAT II Approaches
EASA-SPA.LVO 105 AMC 3
A system of monitoring is to be used to detect any undesirable trends. This will highlight any trends toward the unsuitability of particular runways or
aircraft for Cat II operations. When carrying out a Cat II approach, crews will record the following information using the AWOPS Performance
Report – Evaluation of CAT II Approach on DocuNet.
This information must be recorded and retained for 12 months.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) CAT II Pass/Fail Criteria In order to achieve acceptable CAT II performance the autopilot must position the aeroplane at DH with the following limits: 1. Lateral The main gear shall remain within the extended runway edges, and the flight deck line within the lateral confines of the red approach barrettes (27 m/90 ft), with the aeroplane tracking in, parallel to or towards the centre-line. The maximum allowed deviation is 1/3 LOC dot. 2. Vertical Within 3/4 dot on the glide slope at 100 ft RA. Green CAT II Green must remain green until touchdown.

Note: protection in place. An aircraft that meets the above criteria using an unprotected CAT II signal or a CAT I signal for an Upgrade Assessment Approach can be assessed as acceptable for upgrade.

CAUTION: CAT II approaches may only be carried out using ILS systems that are approved for CAT II operations as terrain below the final approach may be unsuitable for CAT II RA minima.

14.15 Engineering, Maintenance & Technical Integrity Instructions for the maintenance of Cat II and LVTO equipment have been

established by Loganair Engineering. Loganair Engineering will monitor aircraft technical integrity. When a Cat II approach has been abandoned or not commenced due to technical reasons, an entry must be made in the aircraft tech log and the aircraft status downgraded as required. Downgrading of the aircraft from Cat II can be authorised by either the flight crew or a licensed engineer holding the appropriate approval and endorsement. However, the upgrade of an aircraft to Cat II status may only be carried out by a licensed engineer, holding the appropriate approval and endorsement.

14.16 Performance

14.16.1 Performance Envelope in Approach • LLZ Capture: ≥6 nm

• LLZ Capture angle: ≤90°

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) • GS Capture ≥1500 ft • Capture Speed: Max ≤180 kt at 1500 ft • Approach Speed Vapp = VmHB + Wind Correction Wind Correction = 1/3 the headwind or gust in full whichever is greater. Max correction 15 kts

14.16.2 Approach Climb Limits

At scheduled Company airports (<2,000 ft AMSL) the approach climb limit for CAT II approach with Anti-ice On is always above the MLW of 18,300kg (ATR42) or 22,350kg (ATR72).

14.16.3 Discontinued Approach

In view of the low decision height associated with CAT II operations, the approach mass of the aircraft, taking into account the take-off weight and the fuel expected to be consumed in flight, allows for a missed approach climb gradient with an engine failed, at the speed and configuration used for go-around to be at least 2.5% or the published gradient, whichever is the greater.

14.16.4 Landing Field Lengths

The landing distance required is the factored gross distance from a height of 50 ft to rest. At airfields where CAT II facilities exist, Flap 30/35° Landing Performance is promulgated in the Route Performance Manual. Associated Conditions: Engines All operating Anti-Icing As required Flaps 30/35° Landing gear Extended Airspeed Appropriate CAT II landing approach speed Runway Hard paved runway

14.16.5 Contaminated Runways CAT II Approaches are not permitted on Contaminated or Slippery

runways.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.17 Training and Recency Training and Recency Requirements

Initial and recurrent training requirements for Low Visibility Operations are laid down in OM D Section2.5.9. (SPO.LVO.120) The Company will ensure that, in conjunction with the normal recurrent training and operator proficiency checks, a pilot’s knowledge and ability to perform the tasks associated with the particular category of operation for which he is authorised, is checked. The required number of approaches to be undertaken in a flight simulator within the validity period of the operator proficiency check is to be a minimum of two, one of which may be substituted by an approach and landing in the aeroplane using Category 2 procedures. One missed approach must be flown during the conduct of the operator proficiency check. As the Company is authorised to conduct take-offs when the RVR is less than 150 m, at least one LVTO must be flown with RVR of 125 m during the conduct of the operator proficiency check. One landing must be completed at the lowest approved RVR.

14.18 Crew Qualifications

For crew qualifications, please refer to Loganair OM A Section8.4.2, Low Visibility Operations.

14.19 Planning Considerations

14.19.1 Freezing Rain and Drizzle Neither a take-off, nor an approach and landing, is to be carried out in

actual freezing rain or freezing drizzle conditions: 1. Before departure if the actual or forecast weather at the destination is freezing rain or freezing drizzle, then two alternates must available above landing minima and with no actual or forecast freezing rain or freezing drizzle. 2. If upon arrival at a destination the actual weather is freezing rain or freezing drizzle, then no approach can be made to that airport until the condition has cleared. 3. A take-off is not permitted during reported or observed freezing rain or freezing drizzle.

Approach Type	Minimum DH	Minimum Runway Visual Range
		TDZ	MID	STP
CAT 2	100 ft	300 m	125 m	75 m (If required)
CAT 1	200 ft	550 m	125 m	75 m (If required)
All Weather Operations (Prohibited)
14.19.2 Departure Airfield Minimum RVR and lighting requirements for take-off:
Crew RVR Requirement Airfield and Lighting Requirements
In all 3 zones High intensity CL at 15 m intervals.
Edge lighting at 60 m intervals.
90 m visual segment.
150 m–199 m None Runway edge and CL lights.
In all 3 zones 200 m–249 m None Runway edge and CL lights.
250 m–499 m None Runway edge lighting and/or CL markings.
Runway end lights required at night.
Greater than None No lighting required. (Daylight Only)
500m
Note 1: The reported RVR for the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot assessment. When there is no reported RVR,
the take-off can only be commenced if the commander can determine that the RVR along the runway is equal to or better
than the required minimum.
Note 2: There must be a suitable airfield within 60 minutes still air flying time on 1 engine, ISA conditions at FL 100, with TAFS at Cat I
conditions or better if the take-off RVR precludes a landing at the point of departure.
• ATR 42 : 218 nm • ATR 72 : 199 nm
14.19.3 Destination Airfield Weather conditions must be at or above the appropriate landing minima
Type TDZ MID STP

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.19.4 Alternate Airfield

The alternate weather must be, or forecast to be, at or above the relevant minima for the ETA at the destination and possible diversion.

14.19.5 Crew Qualifications

The commander must verify that both pilots are qualified and meet recency requirements for the intended operation.

14.19.6 AIS

The destination airfield must be Cat II approved and all relevant radio aids must be serviceable.

14.19.7 Fuel Planning

In addition to normal requirements, consideration should be given to carrying extra fuel to cover delays. While LVPs are in force separation is increased causing possible delays. Additionally delays can be expected when weather conditions improve due to a backlog of traffic. An extra 30 minutes of holding time equates to approximately 300kgs of fuel. Particular attention should also be paid to minimum fuel requirements for designated alternate airfields, bearing in mind that wide-spread low visibility conditions may lead to limited options for alternate airfields.

14.19.8 Pre-Flight Check the autopilot status page in the aircraft technical log. Crew briefing

for low visibility take-offs must include Cat II procedures, holding points and other relevant information.

14.19.9 Taxiing Allow extra time for ground operations to achieve ATC slots when LVPs

are in force. Make use of taxiway charts and keep taxi speed as low as necessary for safe progress. Both pilots should devote their full attention to taxiing. Specific taxi routes for LVP’s as stipulated in the Navigation charts must be adhered to unless superseded by ATC instructions. Allow extra margins during taxiing.If unsure, ask for assistance from radar or a follow-me car. Single Engine Taxi is not permitted when LVP are in force.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.20 Procedures

EASA-SPA.LVO 125 AMC 1

14.20.1 Task Sharing

Both pilots must be CAT II Qualified. For the approach the First Officer (CM2) will be the pilot flying (PF) and as such will call for configuration changes, checklists, etc. as for a normal approach. CM1 will permanently monitor flight and engine instruments and aircraft systems. The captains (CM1) primary task is decision making with particular emphasis on acquisition of visual references at decision height. If by decision height, CM1 obtains and is able to maintain adequate visual references, takes control and continues the approach, disconnecting the autopilot and YD at 80 ft RA and manually lands the aircraft. Both CM1 and CM2 cross check any selections made on the AFCS/FGCP and announce the selection made from the EADI/FMA. To avoid any confusion during a CATII approach, Pilots shall complete the approach as briefed to CATII minima regardless of becoming visual at an earlier stage. Use of Checklists Checklists are to be used at all times on a challenge and response basis where shown. CM1 will call for the relevant checklist which is then read by CM2 as a challenge and response. When taxiing when LVOPS are in force, checklists and checklist items should only be accomplished when the aircraft is stationary.

14.20.2 Altimeter Bugs Landing

500-Series 1 Bug set to DA/CDA for the relevant approach. 1 Bug set to DA/CDA plus 100 ft. 1 Bug set to DA/CDA plus 500 ft End 500-Series 600-Series CAT I Minima set via the ICP as the active selection. End 600-Series

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.20.3 Radio Altimeter

The decision height is referenced to the Radio Altimeter. 500-Series Set CAT I/II DH using the inner knob of the EFIS control panel. End 500-Series 600-Series • CAT I Minima set via the ICP (background selection) • CAT II Minima set via the ICP as the active selection End 600-Series

14.20.4 Low Visibility Take-Off

When visibility is less than 400m CM1 will perform the take-off. The minimum RVR for take-off is 125 m in all 3 zones. On completion of the before take-off checklist, the RVR can be cross-checked with the runway lights. The requirement for take-off is a 90 m visual segment from the flight deck. This is equal to seeing 7 centreline lights spaced at 15 m intervals. Check the runway centreline with the ILS localiser. The runway centreline lights should be used as directional guidance. Advancing the power with brakes on will assist streaming effect with the increasing speed and will assist in directional control.

14.20.5 Rejected Take-off Normal SOPs must be applied. CM2 will make additional speed calls

during the deceleration indicating runway length remaining. Centreline lights alternate red and white at 900 m remaining and are all red at 300 m from runway end. As a rule of thumb: Speed < 90 kts with 900 m remaining and < 30 kts with 300 m remaining.

14.20.6 After Take-off

If required, it may be necessary to advise ATC once airborne.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.20.7 Descent and Approach Monitor the destination and alternate weather, and monitor the fuel status

and holding time available. Prior to commencing the descent, the CAT II checklist in the Normal Procedures section of the QRH must be completed. Cabin crew shall be reminded to ensure that all PED are switched off prior to giving the “Cabin secure” call. The standard approach brief is to be conducted by CM2 when Cat II procedures are to be used, in addition the briefing must include the following: • All standard Cat II calls • Stabilisation Criteria • Approach ban point • A review of crew actions in the event of a go-around at and below decision height • The Cat I reversion procedure • Expected runway exit points and low visibility taxi routes and procedures • Radio Altimeter Setting • Seat Position The visual segment of runway or approach visible from the cockpit is very dependent on the pilot having the correct eye position in the cockpit. The optimum position is attained by adjusting the seat position to align the red and white guidance balls on the screen centre-post.

14.20.8 Initial Approach Once the descent checks are completed CM2 must be the PF.

Check LVP’s in force with ATC or ATIS and if required, inform ATC of your Cat II capability.

14.20.9 Final Cleared Altitude

The aircraft should be configured for the approach with both ILS receivers tuned to the ILS for the runway in use and the runway HDG set on both course selectors. FD bars must be active.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.20.10 Final Approach

When cleared to establish on the localiser, arm the APPmode. The approach capability will be displayed on the ADU/FMA. (Cat 1 or Cat 2) CM2 will request configuration changes. As the aircraft speed approaches Vapp it must be configured for landing. The aircraft must be stabilised with all checks complete by 1000 ft AAL. Either pilot should call any abnormalities should they occur.

Note: reported RVR is less than the applicable minima. If, after passing 1000 ft AAL, the reported RVR falls below the applicable minimum, the approach may be continued to DH. The approach may be continued below DH and the landing may be completed provided that the visual reference adequate is established at DH or and is maintained. If not, a go-around must be executed. The touchdown zone RVR shall always be controlling.

14.20.11 Landing

A lateral element of the ground lighting system (approach crossbar or landing threshold bar) and at least three consecutive lights of the following must be seen and maintained to positively align the aircraft: • Centre-line of the approach light, or • Touch-down zone lights, or • Runway centre-line lights, or • Runway edge lights, or • Any combination of the above If adequate visual references are obtained at minimums, continues the approach, disengages the AP at 80 ft RA and manually lands. Touchdown must occur in the designated Touch Down Zone (TDZ) Missed Approach If adequate visual references are not obtained at minimums, CM1 announces “Go Around”. CM2 immediately initiate a normal missed approach. A missed approach must be initiated for any of the following: • Inadequate visual references at DH

All Weather Operations (Prohibited) • No response from CM1 at DH • A safe landing is uncertain • A failure not fully dealt with above 800 ft RA • ILS deviation more than ± 3/4 dot GS or 1/3 dot LOC • Aircraft too far out of trim at DH • A sudden change of rate of descent or altitude below 500 ft RA • Either pilot becomes incapacitated, unless continuation is the only safe option

14.20.12 CAT II Approach Calls

Refer to Section2.5.3.16, CAT II Approach.

14.20.13 Loss of Visual Reference After Decision to Land Should CM1 lose visual references after the decision to land was made

they shall execute a go around. After Touch Down It is essential that CM2 keep his eyes inside the cockpit, monitoring the approach and landing on instruments until the landing run is complete. CM1 will seek the Cat II runway exit point and when clear CM2 will inform ATC that they have vacated the runway.

14.21 Failures and Associated Actions Either pilot is to call on recognition of failures or deviation from a safe flight

path. Failures during approach should lead to a missed approach unless: Visual references have been achieved, or The relevant checklists and procedure have been fully applied above 800ft RA.

14.21.1 Engine Failure Except in an emergency situation, Single Engine CAT II approaches are

not permitted and the flight should be diverted to an airfield with CAT I conditions or better.

All Weather Operations (Prohibited)

14.21.2 Pilot Incapacitation Pilot incapacitation is detectable in the usual way, by one pilot not

responding to a command or request in the appropriate manner. If a pilot becomes incapacitated the other pilot should discontinue the CAT 2 approach, unless they consider that continuing the approach and landing is the safest option available.

14.21.3 System Failures Please refer to Section14.7.

Note 1: If a failure, downgrading the aircraft’s CAT II capability occurs, the approach cannot be continued below the approach ban point unless the revised RVR applicable to the downgraded aircraft status exists. Note 2: Any CAT II equipment failure requires positive crew actions. Corrective actions must include the use of company and/or aircraft manufacturers checklists as promulgated in the company SOPs. While not always required, in the event of an equipment failure during a Cat II approach a go around is recommended.

FMS Procedures 15 FMS Procedures

Section 15: FMS / GNSS Operating Procedures

FMS is primary nav system. 500-Series: Honeywell HT-1000. 600-Series: Thales FMS.

Task sharing: PF programs FMS. PM cross-checks entries and monitors performance.

Flight plan cross-check: FMS waypoints vs CIFP and OFP. Confirm route, altitudes, performance.

Thales FMS (600-Series): Departure initialisation (power-up, database, flight plan, performance). Cruise (fuel, ETA, altitude constraints). Arrival (STAR, approach, missed approach).

Honeywell GNSS (500-Series): Departure initialisation via MCDU. Waypoint entry, route building.

Section 16: RNP & RNAV Procedures

RNP & RNAV Principles

• RNP: Performance-based navigation with on-board monitoring and alerting.
• Multi-sensor FMS (GPS/IRU/radio nav). Accuracy: 95% containment.
• RAIM/FDE check required before RNP operations. RAIM must be available for RNP APCH.
• Loss of RNP capability → revert to conventional navigation.

PBN Operational Procedures

• Nav specs: RNAV 5, RNAV 2, RNAV 1, RNP 4, RNP 2, RNP 1, RNP APCH.
• 95% accuracy: RNP 0.3 (approach), RNP 1 (departure/arrival), RNAV 2 (en-route).
• Pre-flight: database currency, RAIM check, NOTAMs, aircraft certification, crew qual.

RNP Departures

• RNP SID requires RNP 1. Engine failure → revert to conventional or runway heading.
• Loss of RNP: advise ATC, revert to conventional guidance.
• LNAV engaged before departure. Autopilot recommended.

En-Route (RNAV 2, RNAV 5)

• RAIM prediction, position cross-check at waypoints.

Arrivals (RNAV 1, RNP 1)

• STAR with RNP 1. Speed/altitude constraints via FMS.

RNP APCH

• LNAV: To MDA. Standard callouts.
• LNAV/VNAV & 3D Overlay: Baro-VNAV or SBAS vertical guidance. Temperature limits apply.
• LPV: ILS-like SBAS approach. Vectored or procedural. Loss of LPV → revert to LNAV or GA.
• MAGVAR: Database must apply correct MAGVAR.

2D Overlay Approaches

• NDB/VOR with GPS overlay. Lateral only. MDA.

Missed Approach

• RNP 1 applies. FMS sequencing. ATC coordination.

Section 18: Supplementary Procedures — Speed Cards

18.1 ATR 42-500 600-Series

Not Applicable End 600-Series

NP = 82%		12 T
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 5 112	105 112
	VFTO	112 / F.0	112 / F.15
	ICING Bug		128 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 35°	VREF	94	94
	VGA	110**/ F.25	110**/ F.25
	VFGA	112 / F.0	112 / F.15
NP = 82%		13 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 5 112	105 112
	VFTO	113 / F.0	112 / F.15
	ICING Bug		134 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 35°	VREF	94	96
	VGA	110**/ F.25	110**/ F.25
	VFGA	113/ F.0	112 / F.15
NP = 82%		14 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 5 112	105 112
	VFTO	117 / F.0	112 / F.15
	ICING Bug		139 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 35°	VREF	94	100
	VGA	110**/ F.25	110**/ F.25
	VFGA	117/ F.0	117 / F.15
NP = 82%		16 T
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 5 112	109 113
	VFTO	125 / F.0	117 / F.15
	ICING Bug		148 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 35°	VREF	97	108
	VGA	110**/ F.25	110**/ F.25
	VFGA	125/ F.0	125 / F.15
NP = 82%		15T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 5 112	105 112
	VFTO	121 / F.0	112 / F.15
	ICING Bug		144 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 35°	VREF	94	103
	VGA	110**/ F.25	110**/ F.25
	VFGA	121/ F.0	121 / F.15
NP = 82%		17 T
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 5 112	112 116
	VFTO	129 / F.0	121 / F.15
	ICING Bug		153/ F.0
APPROACH FLAP 35°	VREF	100	112
	VGA	110**/ F.25	113**/ F.25
	VFGA	129/ F.0	129 / F.15
NP = 82%		18 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 8 113	115 120
	VFTO	133 / F.0	124 / F.15
	ICING Bug		158/ F.0
APPROACH FLAP 35°	VREF	103	116
	VGA	111**/ F.25	116/ F.25
	VFGA	133/ F.0	132 / F.15
NP = 82%		18.6 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 1 0 115	118 122
	VFTO	135 / F.0	127 / F.15
	ICING Bug		160/ F.0
APPROACH FLAP 35°	VREF	104	117
	VGA	113**/ F.25	118/ F.25
	VFGA	135/ F.0	135 / F.15
500-Series ATR 42-500 SPEED CARD
NON-LIMITING RUNWAYS ONLY - FOR LIMITING RUNWAYS SEE RPM FOR V1,VR &V2 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 5 105 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 5 105
FLAP 15° V2 112 112 FLAP 15° V2 112 112 APPROACH APPROACH
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 5 105 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 5 105 FLAP 15° V2 112 112 FLAP 15° V2 112 112
APPROACH APPROACH TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 5 109 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 5 112
FLAP 15° V2 112 113 FLAP 15° V2 112 116 APPROACH APPROACH
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 8 115 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 1 0 118 FLAP 15° V2 113 120 FLAP 15° V2 115 122
APPROACH APPROACH
** VGA must be not less than 1.1 VMCA. 1.1 VMCA values based on ISA condions at MLM and are conservave.
Issue 4 (JAN 2023)

End 500-Series

18.2 ATR 72-500 600-Series

Not Applicable End 600-Series

		13 T
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	104 110
	VFTO	110 / F.0	110 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	127 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	95	95
	VGA	107*/ F.15	107**/ F.15
	VFGA	110 / F.0	110 / F.15
		14 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	104 110
	VFTO	110 / F.0	110 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	132/ F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	95	95
	VGA	107*/ F.15	107**/ F.15
	VFGA	110/ F.0	110 / F.15
		15 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	104 110
	VFTO	114 / F.0	110 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	136 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	95	97
	VGA	107*/ F.15	107**/ F.15
	VFGA	114/ F.0	110 / F.15
		16 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	104 110
	VFTO	118 / F.0	110 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	141 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	95	100
	VGA	107*/ F.15	107**/ F.15
	VFGA	118/ F.0	111 / F.15
		17 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	104 110
	VFTO	122 / F.0	111 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	146 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	96	104
	VGA	107*/ F.15	109/ F.15
	VFGA	122/ F.0	114 / F.15
		18 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	108 111
	VFTO	125 / F.0	115 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	150 F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	99	107
	VGA	110/ F.15	112/ F.15
	VFGA	126/ F.0	118 / F.15
		19 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	111 115
	VFTO	129 / F.0	118 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	154/ F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	101	110
	VGA	114/ F.15	115/ F.15
	VFGA	129/ F.0	121 / F.15
		20 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 6 110	114 118
	VFTO	132 / F.0	121 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	158/ F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	104	113
	VGA	117/ F.15	119/ F.15
	VFGA	133/ F.0	125/ F.15
500-Series ATR 72-500 SPEED CARD
NON-LIMITING RUNWAYS ONLY - FOR LIMITING RUNWAYS SEE RPM FOR V1,VR &V2 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 104 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 104
FLAP 15° V2 110 110 FLAP 15° V2 110 110 APPROACH APPROACH
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 104 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 104 FLAP 15° V2 110 110 FLAP 15° V2 110 110
APPROACH APPROACH FLAP 30° FLAP 30°
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 104 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 108
FLAP 15° V2 110 110 FLAP 15° V2 110 111 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 111 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 6 114
FLAP 15° V2 110 115 FLAP 15° V2 110 118 FLAP 30° FLAP 30°
Issue 4 (JAN 2023)

		21 T
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 8 111	117 121
	VFTO	136 / F.0	125 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	162 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	107	116
	VGA	120/ F.15	122/ F.15
	VFGA	136/ F.0	128 / F.15
		21.5 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 9 113	118 123
	VFTO	138 / F.0	126 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	164 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	109	118
	VGA	121/ F.15	123/ F.15
	VFGA	138 / F.0	130 / F.15
		22 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 1 1 114	120 124
	VFTO	139 / F.0	128 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	165 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	110	120
	VGA	124/ F.15	125/ F.15
	VFGA	139/ F.0	131 / F.15
		22.5 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 1 2 115	121 126
	VFTO	141 / F.0	129 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	167 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	112	121
	VGA	124 / F.15	126 / F.15
	VFGA	141/ F.0	133 / F.15
		22.8 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 1 3 116	122 127
	VFTO	142 / F.0	130 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	168 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	113	122
	VGA	126 / F.15	127 / F.15
	VFGA	142 / F.0	134 / F.15
ATR 72–500 SPEED CARD NON-LIMITING RUNWAYS ONLY - FOR LIMITING RUNWAYS SEE RPM FOR V1,VR &V2
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 8 117 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 9 118 FLAP 15° V2 111 121 FLAP 15° V2 113 123
APPROACH APPROACH TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 1 1 120 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 1 2 121
FLAP 15° V2 114 124 FLAP 15° V2 115 126 APPROACH APPROACH
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 1 3 122 FLAP 15° V2 116 127
APPROACH
* VGA must be not less than 1.1 VMCA. 1.1 VMCA values based on ISA condions at MLM and are conservave.
End 500-Series

18.3 ATR 72-600 500-Series

Not Applicable End 500-Series

		13 T
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	104 110
	VFTO	110 / F.0	110 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	127 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	95	95
	VGA	107*/ F.15	107**/ F.15
	VFGA	110 / F.0	110 / F.15
		14 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	104 110
	VFTO	110 / F.0	110 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	132/ F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	95	95
	VGA	107*/ F.15	107**/ F.15
	VFGA	110/ F.0	110 / F.15
		15 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	104 110
	VFTO	114 / F.0	110 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	136 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	95	97
	VGA	107*/ F.15	107**/ F.15
	VFGA	114/ F.0	110 / F.15
		16 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	104 110
	VFTO	118 / F.0	110 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	141 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	95	100
	VGA	107*/ F.15	107**/ F.15
	VFGA	118/ F.0	111 / F.15
		17 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	104 110
	VFTO	122 / F.0	111 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	146 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	96	104
	VGA	107*/ F.15	109/ F.15
	VFGA	122/ F.0	114 / F.15
		18 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	108 111
	VFTO	125 / F.0	115 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	150 F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	99	107
	VGA	110/ F.15	112/ F.15
	VFGA	126/ F.0	118 / F.15
		19 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	111 115
	VFTO	129 / F.0	118 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	154/ F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	101	110
	VGA	114/ F.15	115/ F.15
	VFGA	129/ F.0	121 / F.15
		20 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 6 110	114 118
	VFTO	132 / F.0	121 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	158/ F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	104	113
	VGA	117/ F.15	119/ F.15
	VFGA	133/ F.0	125/ F.15
600-Series ATR 72-600 SPEED CARD
NON-LIMITING RUNWAYS ONLY - FOR LIMITING RUNWAYS SEE RPM FOR V1,VR &V2 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 104 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 104
FLAP 15° V2 110 110 FLAP 15° V2 110 110 APPROACH APPROACH
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 104 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 104 FLAP 15° V2 110 110 FLAP 15° V2 110 110
APPROACH APPROACH FLAP 30° FLAP 30°
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 104 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 108
FLAP 15° V2 110 110 FLAP 15° V2 110 111 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 111 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 6 114
FLAP 15° V2 110 115 FLAP 15° V2 110 118 FLAP 30° FLAP 30°
Issue 4 (JAN 2023)

		21 T
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 8 111	117 121
	VFTO	136 / F.0	125 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	162 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	107	116
	VGA	120/ F.15	122/ F.15
	VFGA	136/ F.0	128 / F.15
		21.5 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 9 113	118 123
	VFTO	138 / F.0	126 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	164 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	109	118
	VGA	121/ F.15	123/ F.15
	VFGA	138 / F.0	130 / F.15
		22 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 1 1 114	120 124
	VFTO	139 / F.0	128 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	165 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	110	120
	VGA	124/ F.15	125/ F.15
	VFGA	139/ F.0	131 / F.15
		22.5 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 1 2 115	121 126
	VFTO	141 / F.0	129 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	167 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	112	121
	VGA	124 / F.15	126 / F.15
	VFGA	141/ F.0	133 / F.15
		22.8 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 1 3 116	122 127
	VFTO	142 / F.0	130 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	168 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	113	122
	VGA	126 / F.15	127 / F.15
	VFGA	142 / F.0	134 / F.15
ATR 72–600 SPEED CARD NON-LIMITING RUNWAYS ONLY - FOR LIMITING RUNWAYS SEE RPM FOR V1,VR &V2
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 8 117 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 9 118 FLAP 15° V2 111 121 FLAP 15° V2 113 123
APPROACH APPROACH TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 1 1 120 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 1 2 121
FLAP 15° V2 114 124 FLAP 15° V2 115 126 APPROACH APPROACH
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 1 3 122 FLAP 15° V2 116 127
APPROACH
* VGA must be not less than 1.1 VMCA. 1.1 VMCA values based on ISA condions at MLM and are conservave.
End 600-Series

18.4 ATR 72-500F 600-Series

Not Applicable End 600-Series

		13 T
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	104 110
	VFTO	110 / F.0	110 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	127 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	95	95
	VGA	107*/ F.15	107**/ F.15
	VFGA	110 / F.0	110 / F.15
		14 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	104 110
	VFTO	110 / F.0	110 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	132/ F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	95	95
	VGA	107*/ F.15	107**/ F.15
	VFGA	110/ F.0	110 / F.15
		15 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	104 110
	VFTO	114 / F.0	110 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	136 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	95	97
	VGA	107*/ F.15	107**/ F.15
	VFGA	114/ F.0	110 / F.15
		16 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	104 110
	VFTO	118 / F.0	110 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	141 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	95	100
	VGA	107*/ F.15	107**/ F.15
	VFGA	118/ F.0	111 / F.15
		17 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	104 110
	VFTO	122 / F.0	111 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	146 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	96	104
	VGA	107*/ F.15	109/ F.15
	VFGA	122/ F.0	114 / F.15
		18 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	108 111
	VFTO	125 / F.0	115 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	150 F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	99	107
	VGA	110/ F.15	112/ F.15
	VFGA	126/ F.0	118 / F.15
		19 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 4 110	111 115
	VFTO	129 / F.0	118 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	154/ F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	101	110
	VGA	114/ F.15	115/ F.15
	VFGA	129/ F.0	121 / F.15
		20 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 6 110	114 118
	VFTO	132 / F.0	121 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	158/ F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	104	113
	VGA	117/ F.15	119/ F.15
	VFGA	133/ F.0	125/ F.15
500-Series ATR 72-500F SPEED CARD
NON-LIMITING RUNWAYS ONLY - FOR LIMITING RUNWAYS SEE RPM FOR V1,VR &V2 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 104 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 104
FLAP 15° V2 110 110 FLAP 15° V2 110 110 APPROACH APPROACH
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 104 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 104 FLAP 15° V2 110 110 FLAP 15° V2 110 110
APPROACH APPROACH TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 104
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 108 FLAP 15° V2 110 110 FLAP 15° V2 110 111
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 4 111 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 6 114 FLAP 15° V2 110 115 FLAP 15° V2 110 118
FLAP 30° FLAP 30° Issue 4 (JAN 2023)

		21 T
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 8 111	117 121
	VFTO	136 / F.0	125 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	162 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	107	116
	VGA	120/ F.15	122/ F.15
	VFGA	136/ F.0	128 / F.15
		21.5 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 9 113	118 123
	VFTO	138 / F.0	126 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	164 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	109	118
	VGA	121/ F.15	123/ F.15
	VFGA	138 / F.0	130 / F.15
		22 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 1 1 114	120 124
	VFTO	139 / F.0	128 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	165 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	110	120
	VGA	124/ F.15	125/ F.15
	VFGA	139/ F.0	131 / F.15
		22.5 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 1 2 115	121 126
	VFTO	141 / F.0	129 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	167 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	112	121
	VGA	124 / F.15	126 / F.15
	VFGA	141/ F.0	133 / F.15
		22.8 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 1 3 116	122 127
	VFTO	142 / F.0	130 / F.15
	ICING Bug	→	168 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 30°	VREF	113	122
	VGA	126 / F.15	127 / F.15
	VFGA	142 / F.0	134 / F.15
ATR 72–500F SPEED CARD NON-LIMITING RUNWAYS ONLY - FOR LIMITING RUNWAYS SEE RPM FOR V1,VR &V2
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 8 117 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 9 118 FLAP 15° V2 111 121 FLAP 15° V2 113 123
APPROACH APPROACH TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 1 1 120 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 1 2 121
FLAP 15° V2 114 124 FLAP 15° V2 115 126 APPROACH APPROACH
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 1 3 122 FLAP 15° V2 116 127
APPROACH
** VGA must be not less than 1.1 VMCA. 1.1 VMCA values based on ISA condions BOOST OFF at MLM and are conservave.
End 500-Series

18.5 ATR 42-600 500-Series

Not Applicable End 500-Series

NP = 82%		12 T
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 5 112	105 112
	VFTO	112 / F.0	112 / F.15
	ICING Bug		128 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 35°	VREF	94	94
	VGA	110**/ F.25	110**/ F.25
	VFGA	112 / F.0	112 / F.15
NP = 82%		14 T
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 5 112	105 112
	VFTO	117 / F.0	112 / F.15
	ICING Bug		139 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 35°	VREF	94	100
	VGA	110**/ F.25	110**/ F.25
	VFGA	117/ F.0	117 / F.15
NP = 82%		16 T
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 5 112	109 113
	VFTO	125 / F.0	117 / F.15
	ICING Bug		148 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 35°	VREF	97	108
	VGA	110**/ F.25	110**/ F.25
	VFGA	125/ F.0	125 / F.15
NP = 82%		13 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 5 112	105 112
	VFTO	113 / F.0	112 / F.15
	ICING Bug		134 / F.0
	VREF	94	96
	VGA	110**/ F.25	110**/ F.25
NP = 82%		15T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 5 112	105 112
	VFTO	121 / F.0	112 / F.15
	ICING Bug		144 / F.0
APPROACH FLAP 35°	VREF	94	103
	VGA	110**/ F.25	110**/ F.25
	VFGA	121/ F.0	121 / F.15
NP = 82%		17 T
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 5 112	112 116
	VFTO	129 / F.0	121 / F.15
	ICING Bug		153/ F.0
APPROACH FLAP 35°	VREF	100	112
	VGA	110**/ F.25	113**/ F.25
	VFGA	129/ F.0	129 / F.15
NP = 82%		18 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 0 8 113	115 120
	VFTO	133 / F.0	124 / F.15
	ICING Bug		158/ F.0
APPROACH FLAP 35°	VREF	103	116
	VGA	111**/ F.25	116/ F.25
	VFGA	133/ F.0	132 / F.15
NP = 82%		18.6 T
---	---	---	---
		NORMAL	ICING
TAKE-OFF FLAP 15°	V1 = VR V2	1 1 0 115	118 122
	VFTO	135 / F.0	127 / F.15
	ICING Bug		160/ F.0
APPROACH FLAP 35°	VREF	104	117
	VGA	113**/ F.25	118/ F.25
	VFGA	135/ F.0	135 / F.15
600-Series ATR 42-600 SPEED CARD
NON-LIMITING RUNWAYS ONLY - FOR LIMITING RUNWAYS SEE RPM FOR V1,VR &V2 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 5 105 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 5 105
FLAP 15° V2 112 112 FLAP 15° V2 112 112 APPROACH APPROACH
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 5 105 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 5 105 FLAP 15° V2 112 112 FLAP 15° V2 112 112
APPROACH APPROACH TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 5 109 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 5 112
FLAP 15° V2 112 113 FLAP 15° V2 112 116 APPROACH APPROACH
TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 0 8 115 TAKE-OFF V1 = VR 1 1 0 118 FLAP 15° V2 113 120 FLAP 15° V2 115 122
APPROACH APPROACH
** VGA must be not less than 1.1 VMCA. 1.1 VMCA values based on ISA condions at MLM and are conservave.
Issue 2 (JAN 2023)
End 600-Series

CAT II Aide 19 CAT II Aide

Section 19: CAT II Approach Aids

19.1 ATR 42-500: CAT II Approach – Aide 600-Series

Not Applicable End 600-Series

CAT II Aide 500-Series LOC “LOC star” “LOC star,Cat II” 1000ft “Stabilised” “Go-around” (if ‘stable’ parameters not met) 00 “, Dul Coupling, No” "Checked" 500 “Five hundred” “Checked” 100 Above “One hundred above” “Checked” D “Decide” (1) “Land” “Go Around” “Eighty” “Disengaging Autopilot, Yaw damper OFF” (1) If Capt does not respond to “Decide”, FO must initiate a GA unless visual.

CAT II Aide Multiply QRH

-

-

End 500-Series

CAT II Aide

19.2 ATR 72-500: CAT II Approach – Aide 600-Series

Not Applicable End 600-Series

CAT II Aide 500-Series

AC: BUS 1+2+STBY MFC Modules..................................... 3 ACW: BUS 1+2 LOC “LOC star” “LOC star,Cat II” 1000ft “Stabilised” “Go-around” (if ‘stable’ parameters not met) 00 “, Dul Coupling, No” "Checked" 500 “Five hundred” “Checked” 100 Above “One hundred above” “Checked” D “Decide” (1) “Land” “Go Around” “Eighty” “Disengaging Autopilot, Yaw damper OFF” (1) If Capt does not respond to “Decide”, FO must initiate a GA unless visual. | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | Green ‘CAT II’ placard | Fitted Radio Altimeter ........ 1 (with 2 displays) | | Autopilot & Flight Director | 1 DH indicator ....................................... 2 | | COURSE rotary selectors | 2 GA pushbutton .................... 1 (PF side) | | AP Quick Disc. button | 1 (Capt. Side) Windshield wipers ........... 1 (Capt. side) | | AP OFF warning (light &aural) | 1 Yaw Damper ...................................... 1 | | ILS receivers | 2 ASI ......... 2 (FO side must be operative) | | AHRS | 2 Altimeters. ........................................... 3 | | STBY Horizon | 1 Hydraulic systems ........... Blue & Green | | CRT | 3 (2 PF side) Electrical system… | | SGU | 2 DC: BUS 1+2+EMER+STBY+ESS |

CAT II Aide The following failures or malfunctions, if resolved or made safe by 00ft , may permit the action indicated in the table. Any other failure or malfunction (or any listed below that are not resolved or made safe by 00ft ), shall result in - Reversion to Cat I minima (if available and safe to do so)to continue the approach, or Continuing the approach visually if possible, or Executing a missed approach (o round) if necessary. Monitor Discontinue approach or Continue visually Continue, increase Multiply QRH Not Applicable VAPP/F.30 by 10kt - , o - Discontinue Co a n s ti s n o u c e ia , t a e p d p ly app o ro r ach - procedure. Continue visually Attempt to recover, or revert to Cat I - FD approach. Attempt to recover, - or revert to Cat I. A Category II ILS approach procedure (Actual or Practice) must be recorded using Form FO 131 LVO OPS Performance Report -Evaluation of CAT II End 500-Series

CAT II Aide

19.3 ATR 72-500F: CAT II Approach – Aide 600-Series

Not Applicable End 600-Series

CAT II Aide 500-Series LOC “LOC star” “LOC star,Cat II” 1000ft “Stabilised”“Go-around” (if ‘stable’ parameters not met) 00 “, DulCoupling, No” "Checked" 500 “Five hundred” “Checked” 100 Above “One hundred above” “Checked” D “Decide” (1) “Land”“Go Around” “Eighty” “Disengaging Autopilot, Yaw damper OFF” “Decide”,

CAT II Aide End 500-Series

CAT II Aide

19.4 ATR 42-600: CAT II Approach – Aide 500-Series

Not Applicable End 500-Series

CAT II Aide 600-Series Seat Position correct Crew Qualified & Current NOTAMS checked Suitable Alternate available NavBlue Cat II & Cat I minima Rad Alt DH & Baro MDA set Max HWC:15kt / Max TWC: 10kt / Max XWC: 15kt PED's Flight Safe Mode - ACW: BUS 1+2 LOC “LOC star” “LOC star,Cat II” 1000ft “Stabilised” “Go-around” (if ‘stable’ parameters not met) 00 “, Dul Coupling, No” "Checked" 500 “Five hundred” “Checked” 100 Above “One hundred above” “Checked” D “Decide” (1) “Land” “Go Around” “Eighty” “Disengaging Autopilot, Yaw damper OFF” “Decide”, | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | Green ‘CAT II’ placard | Fitted Radio Altimeter ........ 1 (with 2 displays) | | Autopilot & Flight Director | 1 DH indicator ........................................ 2 | | COURSE rotary selectors | 2 GA pushbutton .................... 1 (PF side) | | AP Quick Disc. button | 1 (Capt. Side) Windshield wipers ........... 1 (Capt. side) | | AP OFF warning (aural) | 1 Yaw Damper ....................................... 1 | | ILS receivers | 2 ADCs .................................................. 2 | | AHRS | 2 Hydraulic systems........... Blue & Green | | IESI | 1 Electrical system… | | PFDs | 2 DC: BUS 1+2+EMER+STBY+ESS | | MFC Modules | 3 AC: BUS 1+2+STBY |

CAT II Aide The following failures or malfunctions, if resolved or made safe by 00ft , may permit the action indicated in the table. Any other failure or malfunction (or any listed below that are not resolved or made safe by 00ft ), shall result in - Reversion to Cat I minima (if available and safe to do so) to continue the approach, or Continuing the approach visually if possible, or Executing a missed approach (go around) if necessary. Monitor Discontinue approach or Continue visually Continue, increase Not Applicable VAPP/F.3 by 10kt Continue, switch off affected DU , no Discontinue Continue, apply approach associated or procedure. Continue visually Attempt to recover, or revert to Cat I FD approach. Attempt to recover, or revert to Cat I. A Category II ILS approach procedure (Actual or Practice) must be recorded using Form FO 131 LVO OPS Performance Report -Evaluation of CAT II End 600-Series

CAT II Aide

19.5 ATR 72-600: CAT II Approach – Aide 500-Series

Not Applicable End 500-Series

CAT II Aide 600-Series

ACW: BUS 1+2 LOC “LOC star” “LOC star,Cat II” 1000ft “Stabilised” “Go-around” (if ‘stable’ parameters not met) 00 “, Dul Coupling, No” "Checked" 500 “Five hundred” “Checked” 100 Above “One hundred above” “Checked” D “Decide” (1) “Land” “Go Around” “Eighty” “Disengaging Autopilot, Yaw damper OFF” | Action | Value | | --- | --- | | Green ‘CAT II’ placard | Fitted Radio Altimeter ........ 1 (with 2 displays) | | Autopilot & Flight Director | 1 DH indicator ....................................... 2 | | COURSE rotary selectors | 2 GA pushbutton .................... 1 (PF side) | | AP Quick Disc. button | 1 (Capt. Side) Windshield wipers ........... 1 (Capt. side) | | AP OFF warning (aural) | 1 Yaw Damper ...................................... 1 | | ILS receivers | 2 ADCs ................................................. 2 | | AHRS | 2 Hydraulic systems ........... Blue & Green | | IESI | 1 Electrical system… | | PFDs | 2 DC: BUS 1+2+EMER+STBY+ESS | | MFC Modules | 3 AC: BUS 1+2+STBY |

CAT II Aide The following failures or malfunctions, if resolved or made safe by 00ft , may permit the action indicated in the table. Any other failure or malfunction (or any listed below that are not resolved or made safe by 00ft ), shall result in - Reversion to Cat I minima (if available and safe to do so)to continue the approach, or Continuing the approach visually if possible, or Executing a missed approach (go around) if necessary. Monitor Discontinue approach or Continue visually Continue, increase Not Applicable VAPP/F.30 by 10kt Continue, switch off affected DU , no Discontinue Continue, apply approach associated or procedure. Continue visually Attempt to recover, or revert to Cat I FD approach. Attempt to recover, or revert to Cat I. After every Cat II Approach A Category IIILS approach procedure (Actual or Practice) must be recorded using End 600-Series

CAT II Aide

De-Icing Aide Memoir 20 De-Icing Aide De-Icing Aid Contamination Check The contamination check is a check of the aircraft to establish the need for de-icing. Usually, this is completed by the flight crew during the walk-around. The objective is to determine if the aircraft contamination fallswithin permitted contamination in FCOM8.1.2.1. If this is not the case a de-icing procedure MUST be carried out. De-Icing Procedure ATR De-Icing Configuration Establish what Anti/De-Icing is required i.e. (one-step or two- If propellers require de-icing this must be done step procedure) de-icing or and/or anti-icing. Advise de-icing BEFOREenginestart (including HOTEL mode) crew which parts/surfaces require treatment. On-Stand de-icing withGPU:De-Icing with engines at FUEL SO. Once all doors closed and the aircraft is configured for de-icing, On-Stand without GPU:Use of HOTELmode is advise ground crew ready for de-icing. permitted to supply the electrical systems but MUST be agreedwith the de-icing crew. When procedure is complete you will be passed de-icing Remote De-Icing:Engine1be shut downand details/code. This includes: engine2 runinHOTEL mode. Type of fluid/brand used, fluid concentration, local start time Before the procedure begins, ensurethe following: of de-ice treatment (for HOT) and date. It may also contain a statement toconfirm post de-ice treatment checks complete. All doors closed. Flaps fully retracted. Gust lock ENGAGED. Record information on tech log sector strip andquantity used OVBD VALVE switch set to FULL CLOSED. on scratchpad. ENGINE BLEEDS OFF.

CAUTION: Refer to FAA holdover times on EFB to determine the expected Ifaircraft has been treated with Type II/IV holdover time available. fluid Continually re-assess validity of calculated holdover time with regard to the weather and other external conditions, including aircraft surfaces for accumulations. A change in Method 2 must be briefed: CM1is PF fortake- conditions, expired holdover time or failure of the fluid may off. Higher than normalcontrol forces may be require retreatment. experienced during rotation, PF may askPM for assistance by calling “PULL” at VR. PM then pulls the controlcolumnuntil5° pitch attitude is Perform pre-take-offcheck immediately before departure. reachedthen PM releasesthe controls. Holdover Times The published holdover times are only an estimate and the initial time (opening of the HOT window) should be used for departure planning. The actual time of protection depends on the actual weather conditions experienced and may be reduced by a number of factors, such as an increase in precipitation intensity, high winds, jet blast etc. Therefore, holdover times shouldonly be used in conjunction with the pre-take-off check. If contamination is found or uncertainty exists asto the applicability of the holdover time, take-off is not permitted – residual fluid must be removed and a new treatment performed. Just prior to take-off CM1 is to assess whether the holdover time is still appropriate; review the environmental conditions, inspect the aircraft tothe extent possible to ensure critical surfaces are clear of frozen contamination, especially those that have been anti/de-iced. This visual check is performed from the flight deck

De-Icing Aide Memoir De-Icing Aid

Royal Mail Operations Inverness 21 Royal Mail Operations Inverness