The Anglo-Russian Committee and Comintern Policy¶
Core Argument¶
Chapter Digest: The Anglo-Russian Committee and Comintern Policy
This chapter subjects the Anglo-Russian Committee to a devastating Marxist critique, arguing that its preservation after the 1926 General Strike betrayal transformed it from a legitimate united front tactic into a conservative millstone around the neck of the international revolutionary movement. The plenum’s central contention is that the Committee had become the decisive test of the entire Comintern line in Britain, and that failure to adopt a principled stance would condemn the British Communist Party to repeat its gravest errors.
The analysis identifies the most dangerous reformists not as open reactionaries like Thomas or MacDonald, but as left lackeys such as Purcell and Hicks, whose pseudo-radicalism more effectively propped up British imperialism. The united front tactic, correctly understood, permits only temporary agreements with left reformists against the right—never a lasting political bloc. Yet the Committee had become precisely such a bloc, shielding the General Council’s treachery while pacifying the masses. The Berlin declaration of April 1927, presented as unanimous agreement on opposing war, actually reduced pressure on the “left” traitors and aided Chamberlain’s assault on Soviet institutions, directly contradicting Lenin’s instructions for the Hague Congress, which insisted on refuting pacifist illusions rather than endorsing them.
The chapter’s most penetrating polemic targets Bukharin’s post-hoc justification of the Committee as a diplomatic exception requiring the abandonment of revolutionary methods for state reasons. This theory, invented after the event, contradicted his earlier insistence that the alliance did not hinder principled criticism. In practice, each successive conference demanded ever more cautious criticism, culminating in outright capitulation. The Opposition’s prediction that maintaining the Committee would strengthen the General Council’s political position had been dismissed as ultra-leftism, yet events proved it correct.
The international situation demanded the opposite policy: breaking with the General Council after its betrayal would have forced the “left” to expose themselves, deepened splits among reformists, and strengthened the USSR’s position. Instead, the leadership sacrificed revolutionary policy to conceal its own errors. The chapter draws a devastating parallel with the bloc with Chiang Kai-shek, which obstructed the Chinese revolution. If soviets in China were deemed harmful but the General Council useful, the principle of “non-interference” was accepted, and similar conclusions would follow regarding Amsterdam. The argument that Chamberlain also wanted the Committee’s breakup is dismissed as Menshevik.
War danger can only be averted if the bourgeoisie fears imperialist war being transformed into civil war—this demands a more irreconcilable revolutionary policy, not compromise. The bloc with the Purcells, who betrayed the General Strike, was a hindrance in peace and is a millstone in wartime. The plenum demands immediate breakup of the political bloc, an open programme of struggle from the AUCCTU, and a broad campaign against reformists. Not another day should be lost.