The Soviet-Polish War¶
Core Argument¶
Here the chapter presents a collection of documents from 1920, chiefly writings by Leon Trotsky, which together form a polemical and strategic dissection of the Soviet-Polish War. The core argument is that the war was not a Soviet act of aggression but a predatory invasion by bourgeois-landlord Poland, orchestrated and sustained by the Entente, particularly Britain and France, to destroy the Soviet Republic. The chapter’s narrative thrust is to expose British duplicity: its simultaneous offer of mediation and its material arming of Poland and Wrangel.
Trotsky’s first piece, from Izvestia, directly refutes a speech by British Conservative leader Bonar Law. Law had cited a purported letter from Trotsky to French soldiers, threatening to crush Poland after finishing with Denikin, as justification for British aid. Trotsky clarifies the letter was to the French communist Loriot, written during Denikin’s advance on Moscow, and stated only that after Denikin’s defeat, reserves could be switched to the western front. He dismisses as “trebly absurd” the idea this was a proclamation of offensive intent, noting the letter was published and that such a statement would contradict Soviet policy. The real division, Trotsky argues, is not between nations but between the honest working majority seeking peace and a predatory minority backing intervention.
A subsequent letter to the Politburo (13 July 1920) outlines a tactical response to Curzon’s “ultimatum”. Trotsky proposes accepting British mediation on Poland’s frontiers, while flatly rejecting British interference in the Crimea, which he insists is not an independent state. He suggests a reciprocal demand regarding Ireland to expose British hypocrisy. The chapter then reproduces an official appeal from the Council of People’s Commissars, rejecting Curzon’s mediation outright. It argues Britain could have prevented the war by refusing Poland supplies, but instead “caused the Polish War”. The League of Nations is denounced as a cover for British imperialism, having failed to restrain Poland or Japan. Curzon’s proposal to spare Wrangel’s Crimean “sanctuary” is presented as a transparent ruse to save a hireling from defeat, following an earlier broken promise of amnesty. The appeal concludes by affirming readiness to trade with “capitalist cannibals” but denying them the right to pose as peacemakers.
A report to the Moscow Soviet (17 August) notes the “working-class re-awakening” in Britain, citing the London Congress of 2,000 delegates and the formation of Councils of Action, which forced the British government to read Soviet replies. Trotsky attributes the favourable diplomatic position to the Red Army’s proximity to Warsaw. Finally, ‘Personal Notes’ summarise the villainy: France’s lies about a Soviet offensive, Britain’s arming of Poland and Wrangel, and Curzon’s diplomatic manoeuvres to constrain the Red Army while Wrangel struck. The chapter is a sustained polemic against Lloyd George, Curzon, Bonar Law, and the League of Nations, arguing that British “mediation” was a weapon of war, not peace.