11. The recall referendum in Venezuela: A crushing blow to the counter-revolution¶
Core Argument¶
This chapter analyses the outcome of the 15 August 2004 recall referendum in Venezuela, arguing that the result — 58.95% voting against the recall of President Hugo Chávez — constituted a decisive defeat for the counter-revolution and a vindication of the Bolivarian process. The text opens with the official tally and immediately notes the opposition’s refusal to accept the result, a pattern of behaviour it traces back through the 2002 coup and the PDVSA lockout. The unprecedented 90% voter turnout, with queues of up to ten hours, is presented as evidence of a politically conscious mass movement, starkly contrasted with the apathy of elections in Britain and the United States.
The chapter makes several key claims. First, it insists that the very mechanism of the recall referendum was a product of the Chávez government’s own 1999 Constitution, which the opposition had rejected and would have abolished had they won. Second, it argues that the opposition’s persistent characterisation of Chávez as a “dictator” is belied by eight electoral victories in six years. Third, it contends that the international observer missions — particularly the Carter Centre and the Organisation of American States — were not neutral but instruments of US foreign policy, funded by Washington and predisposed to delegitimise the Chávez government. The text names Súmate, the pro-opposition civil association, as a conduit for US funds and notes its co-director Maria Corina Machado’s involvement in the 2002 coup.
The chapter draws heavily on the immediate reporting of the referendum night, including correspondence from Caracas describing the euphoria in poor districts and the anger in wealthy areas. It references the role of former US President Jimmy Carter with sustained polemical force, accusing him of “Christian hypocrisy” and arguing that his Centre’s lead observer, Jennifer McCoy, had previously equated the Chávez government with the authoritarian regime of Alberto Fujimori. The text argues that Carter and the OAS were forced to accept the result only because the class balance of forces made a coup impossible at that moment; their acceptance was tactical, not principled.
The polemic is directed squarely at the Venezuelan opposition, US imperialism, and the “siren voices” within the Bolivarian movement who believe elections can reconcile class enemies. The chapter concludes with a sharp warning: the referendum has solved nothing. The oligarchy retains control of key sections of the economy and will regroup. The only way to build on the victory, it argues, is to expropriate the counter-revolutionaries and take the road of socialist democracy — a call for the revolution to be carried through to its conclusion rather than halted by moderation and negotiation.