3. 1789 – 1848 – 1905¶
Core Argument¶
Here the chapter establishes its central theoretical argument: history does not repeat itself, and the Russian Revolution of 1905 cannot be understood as a repetition of 1789 or 1848. The core claim is that revolutions succeed only under two opposing sets of conditions: either a united nation rises against feudal despotism, as in 1789, or the class struggle within the nation becomes so acute that the proletariat is thrust forward to take power. The worst outcome is a middle course, which is precisely what developed in 1848.
The chapter contrasts the French bourgeoisie of 1789, which was enlightened, active, and unaware of its own contradictions, with the German bourgeoisie of 1848, which was meanly wise, corrupted by the experience of the French Revolution, and frightened by its failures. The French bourgeoisie led the nation, rallied the masses, and gave them slogans; the German bourgeoisie dissociated itself from the revolution from the start, placed its back against the old order, and dreamed only of the return of the fleeing monarch. The key evidence for this is drawn from the experience of Vienna in 1848, where the proletariat exhibited wonderful heroism but lacked organisation, experience, and independent leadership. The students, the only active democratic group, exercised a benevolent revolutionary dictatorship over the workers, summoning them to battle one moment and forbidding them to put forward independent demands the next. When the monarchy fled and the troops withdrew, no political force was found to take the helm. The liberal bourgeoisie deliberately refused power; the workers were too weak to seize it. The result was a republic that nobody noticed, which departed for a long time from the stage.
The chapter draws on Lassalle’s letter to Marx of 24 October 1849, which concluded from the defeats in Hungary and Germany that no revolution could succeed in Europe unless it was from the very first proclaimed to be purely socialistic. The chapter does not endorse this conclusion uncritically but affirms that by the mid-nineteenth century, only the independent tactics of the proletariat could have secured victory.
The polemical thrust is directed against two targets. First, against liberal wiseacres who use Jacobinism as a term of reproach. The chapter defends Jacobinism against the calumny of anaemic, phlegmatic liberalism, arguing that the proletariat has taken the honour of the revolutionary past of the bourgeoisie under its protection, preserving the traditions of great passions, heroism, and initiative. Second, against the Russian liberals of 1905, who, unlike their 1848 counterparts, do not even demand a militia. The chapter cites the liberal philosopher Dzhivelegov, who argues that society must be prepared to defend its constitution but adds that it is not necessary for everyone to bear arms. The chapter concludes that the fear of the armed proletariat is greater in the hearts of Russian democrats than the fear of the soldiery of the autocracy. The task of arming the revolution falls entirely upon the proletariat, and the fate of the Russian Revolution is bound up with this question. The Russian workers of 1906, the chapter argues, in no way resemble the workers of Vienna of 1848, and the best evidence of this is the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies, organs created by the masses themselves for the purpose of co-ordinating their revolutionary struggle.