7. Tsarist Russia and the War¶
Core Argument¶
In this chapter, Trotsky dissects the entry of Tsarist Russia into the First World War, arguing that the Empire’s apparent military might was a hollow façade masking profound structural weakness. Russia entered the conflict as a junior, semi-colonial partner of the Entente, its war aims limited to seizing the Turkish Straits and Constantinople, dominating the Balkans, and absorbing Galicia and Armenia. These ambitions were regional, not global, reflecting Russia’s relative weakness. Britain and France made empty promises of these spoils, but the price was immediate: French imperialism, to which Russia was heavily indebted, demanded a diversionary offensive in the East to relieve pressure on Paris. Russia had no choice but to comply, paying in blood for its place in the “rich man’s club of imperialism.”
The chapter’s core argument is that every army reflects the society from which it springs, and the Russian army mirrored the contradictions of a semi-feudal, semi-colonial state dependent on foreign capital. On paper, Russia had 1.5 million men and 3 million reservists, but this numerical strength was negated by industrial and technological backwardness. The army lacked rifles, ammunition, heavy artillery, machine guns, medical staff, and railway lines. The chapter provides damning statistics: a third of soldiers had no rifle; Russia produced 42,000 rifles per month against a need for 100,000; it had 60 heavy artillery batteries to Germany’s 381; two machine guns per battalion to Germany’s thirty-six. The officer corps was riddled with inept aristocrats promoted through favouritism, while the court clique, particularly the Tsarina, poisoned military leadership with intrigue.
The narrative thrust is driven by the catastrophic Battle of Tannenberg in August 1914, presented as the decisive exposure of Russian incapacity. Two Russian armies under generals Rennenkampf and Samsonov, who refused to communicate, were outmanoeuvred by Ludendorff. Battle plans were sent uncoded by radio. The result was the annihilation of the Russian Second Army: 100,000 men lost in a single day, 92,000 taken prisoner, against German losses of 13,800. The chapter contrasts this with the Russian successes against Austria-Hungary, arguing these reflected Austrian feebleness, not Russian strength. The arrival of German reinforcements reversed these gains, leading to the fall of Warsaw in August 1915 and a retreat that became a disorderly rout.
The chapter draws heavily on the theoretical framework of Lenin’s imperialism, noting that despite never exporting capital, Russia was included among the five main imperialist powers due to its aggressive, expansionist character. It also situates the war within the revolutionary trajectory of 1905 and 1917. The war exacerbated every social contradiction, turning soldiers and even junior officers against the regime. The chapter notes that former tsarist officers like Tukhachevsky and Brusilov later served the Red Army, while the latter was honoured by the Bolsheviks. The polemical target is the myth of Russian military strength and the patriotic unity of August 1914. Trotsky quotes the War Minister Polivanov’s reliance on “impenetrable spaces, impassable mud, and Saint Nicholas” as a damning indictment of the regime’s incompetence. The chapter concludes by tracing the war’s impact on the home front: food shortages, inflation, forty-hour queues for working-class women, and a rising strike wave from mid-1915. The stage was being set for revolution.