Report on the Fourth World Congress¶
Core Argument¶
The Fourth World Congress of the Communist International confirmed a sober strategic assessment of the post-war revolutionary conjuncture. Three distinct spheres—Europe, America, and the colonial countries—must be analysed separately through Marxist criteria: productive-technological conditions, social-class strength, and subjective-political readiness. In Europe, productive forces had ceased developing under capitalism by 1913, making socialism an absolute economic necessity. The Russian Revolution proved the working class socially powerful enough to win power, even in peasant-majority countries. The missing element was a sufficiently organised and conscious revolutionary party. Since 1917, revolutionary waves had repeatedly failed due to this lack: Germany in 1918, Hungary in 1919, France’s failed general strike in May 1920, Italy’s factory occupations in September 1920, and Germany’s March 1921 events. In each case, either the party shrank from power or the working class lacked confidence in it.
Trotsky argued that the Fourth Congress did not signal an immediate revolutionary assault, but deepened the Third Congress’s work. He drew an analogy with Russia’s 1908-09 low point: after defeats, the industrial crisis of 1921 weakened the proletariat. However, the analogy ended because pre-war capitalism was full-blooded, whereas European capitalism was now a disintegrating, tubercular organism. The bourgeoisie could no longer bribe a labour aristocracy, so reformism declined. Two key differences from 1905-17 were the existence of Soviet Russia and a centralised Communist International. In America, capitalism still developed, but the Communist Party was weak; revolution would likely win in Europe first, then spur American developments. The colonies were not ready for proletarian revolution in isolation; their fate depended on the metropolitan proletariat’s struggle. Trotsky rejected the idea Europe must wait for America.
The Congress forced the French Communist Party to confront internal divisions. Centrists, learning from the Italian Maximalists’ expulsion, accepted Draconian demands: a complete break with bourgeois institutions and nine-tenths of electoral candidates to be workers and peasants. The united front tactic was sharpened: communists, still a minority, must win workers’ confidence through joint struggle on immediate demands. When the French party proposed joint action for political amnesty, the Dissidents refused, proving their bankruptcy. The slogan of a workers’ government was confirmed as central. In Saxony, the Comintern rejected coalition with Social Democrats because, without imminent revolution, communists would be an impotent appendage. Mussolini’s victory provided a crucial lesson: under democracy, the bourgeoisie will turn to fascist counter-revolution.
The Soviet Republic’s existence was the decisive fact; its fall would postpone world revolution for decades. The American bourgeoisie threatened a grain blockade against revolutionary Europe, but Soviet Russia could supply grain. Each economic success in Soviet agriculture was therefore a revolutionary act, more effective than propaganda. The monopoly of foreign trade was an inalienable conquest, preventing the American bourgeoisie from buying up Russia. The party itself was the final trump; it must educate its youth and raise its qualifications. Lenin’s illness provoked a vicious campaign from enemies who hoped for a split, but the party remained united. The Soviet frontier was the trench beyond which counter-revolution could not pass, to be held until the European revolution arrived.