A Letter to Comrade Treint¶
Core Argument¶
In this letter of July 1922, Trotsky addresses the internal struggles then convulsing the young French Communist Party (PCF) in the wake of its decisive split from the Socialist Party at the Tours Congress. His core argument is that the factional conflict within the party, however unpleasant, is not a sign of weakness but a necessary and healthy process of revolutionary consolidation. The victory at Tours, he warns, came too easily; history now demands that this overall victory be realised through a series of partial victories, which necessarily entails a struggle inside the party itself. Trotsky rejects any sentimental longing for a painless purification through mass action alone, insisting instead on a dialectical relationship between internal unity and external activity: the party requires a minimum of unity of consciousness and will before it can initiate serious mass actions, and the energy expended in achieving this internal cohesion will be recouped at the first serious test.
The letter identifies the principal dangers facing the PCF as a cluster of interrelated deviations: centrism, pacifism, journalistic individualism, and anarcho-syndicalism. Trotsky is particularly emphatic on the last point. He argues that impunity for anarcho-syndicalist proclivities under the banner of communism is the greatest danger, and that pseudo-communists who counteract communist influence in the trade unions must be automatically expelled. He clarifies his position on the Monmousseau group, associated with the newspaper La Vie Ouvrière, correcting what he regards as a false impression created by comrade Frossard. Trotsky insists he does not propose declaring war on this group, which contains precious elements of the French labour movement. The issue is one of party discipline: communists must vote according to the decisions of their own party, not according to the discipline of Monmousseau’s faction. If the party decides to adhere unconditionally to the Red International of Labour Unions (RILU or Profintern), any communist voting against that decision must be expelled. If the relationship of forces precludes such a decision, then a bloc with Monmousseau’s group is possible, but even then communists must act on their party’s instructions.
Trotsky then offers a strategic appraisal of the party’s internal groupings, distinguishing four categories requiring different treatment. Reformist, pacifist, and nationalist elements—the intellectual right—must be mercilessly burned out with white-hot irons. The syndicalist workers following Monatte and Monmousseau, whose error is mistrust of the party’s revolutionary spirit, require patient ideological struggle to win them over. The federalist and extreme leftist elements, whose confusions flow from youth and inexperience, need a calm and pedagogical approach. Finally, the tendency he calls “paysanism” (peasantry-ism), associated with Renaud Jean, must be criticised firmly but without driving valuable revolutionaries into the right-wing camp. Trotsky concludes with tactical advice to the left wing: it should not constitute itself as an organised faction or contemplate a split, but should vigorously draw closer to revolutionary elements of the centre, defending a united front against anti-communist groupings. The letter is a sustained polemic against any conception of party-building that evades the necessary pain of ideological and organisational struggle, and against any tolerance of indiscipline masked as revolutionary pluralism.