Speech on Comrade Radek’s [1] Report on ‘Tactics of the Comintern’¶
Core Argument¶
In his speech on Radek’s report concerning the tactics of the Comintern, Trotsky opens by dismissing Thälmann’s procedural objections, insisting that discipline requires acceptance of the speakers’ list. He corrects Thälmann’s misrepresentation of Lenin, clarifying that the theses under discussion were a compromise forged through lengthy negotiations with the German delegation, which included concessions to the leftist tendency. Trotsky insists that the German party’s internal struggles are an international matter, as analogous situations confront the French and Italian parties. He delineates two opposing tendencies: that of Lenin, Zinoviev, Radek and himself, and the tendency expressed in proposed amendments to the theses. These amendments demand that the Congress recognise the March Action as a step forward, an attempt to realise the party’s leading role, and a means of clarifying mistakes. Trotsky ridicules the notion that an action’s merit lies in revealing its own errors, dismissing this as self-justification rather than analysis. He highlights contradictions in accounts of the March Action: Heckert portrayed acute crisis and mass ferment, while Thalheimer described passivity and a need to break through stagnation. Trotsky warns that the amendments are dangerous because they seek a misty resolution open to later reinterpretation, perpetuating a non-Marxist “philosophy of the offensive” that treats passivity as requiring a forced breakthrough. He insists the Congress must clearly tell German workers that the attempt to assume the leading role was unsuccessful, and that this offensive philosophy, if repeated, could ruin the party.
Trotsky fully agrees with Zinoviev that no major concessions are needed to the so-called Left. The struggle against these Lefts does not place the Comintern to their right; as the Communist and Marxist International, it is the most revolutionary party, capable of utilising every situation and assuring victory. This requires cold-blooded strategy, weighing enemy and own forces, not plunging into struggle merely to “activise the party”. He criticises juxtaposing the sword with statistics, warning this is dangerous for Italian comrades who must work with statistics. The Italian party must regain working-class confidence after Serrati’s betrayal; workers want to see the party in action before committing to decisive battle. Three tendencies exist at the Congress: the German delegation, shaped by the March Action and its philosophy of the offensive; the Italian comrades, newly broken from centrists and eager for action; and the third tendency, expressed in the theses, which rejects artificial mass actions and insists on cold-blooded analysis of each country’s situation before attacking where possible and necessary. In France, the party is moulting; its central organ lacks sharp revolutionary thought and will. Impatient comrades risk provoking disastrous premature action. The task is to underscore dangers early, even exaggerate them, to prevent adventures. Breaking with opportunists is not enough; one must orient correctly within a complex world of classes, police, and economic conditions. The goal is to overwhelm capitalist society practically, combining statistics with revolutionary violence.