The moment of truth¶
Core Argument¶
Here, Alan Woods analyses the Egyptian Revolution at its zenith in early 2011, arguing that the Mubarak regime has become an inverted pyramid — all strength at the top, none at the base — and is therefore inherently unstable. The core narrative thrust is that the regime has lost the initiative through fatal hesitation. Woods contrasts the regime’s display of military might (tanks, fighter jets) with the demonstrators’ psychological adaptation and growing defiance. The army, he claims, is not a monolithic entity; prolonged contact with the revolutionary masses makes it harder to deploy against them. The key claim is that Mubarak is “willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike,” a recipe for the collapse of authority. Evidence is drawn from the scale of the protests — four million across Egypt, with figures for Cairo, Suez, Mahalla, Mansoura, and Alexandria — and the paralysis of economic life: Nissan halting production, shops stripped bare, bakeries running out of bread.
Woods draws on historical context by invoking Machiavelli’s dictum on fear versus love, and the precedent of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 1952 colonel’s coup. He situates the revolt within a regional wave, noting the sacking of Jordan’s government after protests inspired by Tunisia and Egypt. The chapter is heavily polemical. It attacks the notion of an “orderly transition” promoted by Obama, Cameron, and the EU, arguing that the American aim is to preserve the system minus Mubarak, not to empower the masses. Woods ridicules Mohamed ElBaradei as a manufactured leader (“Me? I’m their leader”) and dismisses the Muslim Brotherhood’s belated involvement, insisting the protests are secular, democratic, and rooted in demands for jobs, food, and rights — a bridge to socialism. He also polemicises against a Stratfor report alleging plainclothes police instigated violence to justify a crackdown, and against Chinese censorship of Egypt news, driven by fear of domestic contagion. The chapter concludes that the “moment of truth” has arrived: either the old order re-imposes itself (increasingly unlikely) or the masses impose a new one, with the army’s internal contradictions decisive.