Revolution in Egypt – Power is on the streets¶
Core Argument¶
In this chapter, Alan Woods argues that the Egyptian uprising of January 2011 is a genuine revolution, not a mere revolt, and that power has effectively fallen into the streets, awaiting organisation and leadership. Drawing a direct parallel to the French Revolution, Woods recounts the Duke of Rochefoucauld-Liancourt’s reply to Louis XVI — “Non Sire, c’est une révolution!” — to insist that the scale and character of the Egyptian events have already transcended the limits of a protest or riot. The evidence marshalled is immediate and visceral: the collapse of the police, the burning of stations and vehicles, the freeing of political prisoners, the formation of neighbourhood committees in Suez and Alexandria to maintain order and direct traffic, and the refusal of the population to observe curfews. Woods notes that the death toll had reached 53 by 28 January, with bodies of martyrs carried through the streets in Suez.
The chapter is sharply polemical on several fronts. Woods excoriates Hosni Mubarak’s televised speech as the ravings of a man “akin to madness”, detached from reality and surrounded by servile courtiers. The appointment of Rachid Mohamad Rashid — a millionaire associated with neoliberal reforms — as prime minister and Omar Suleiman, the intelligence chief, as vice-president is presented as a deliberate provocation, not a concession. Woods also dismantles the western media’s framing of the Muslim Brotherhood as the driving force behind the protests. He insists the Brotherhood was caught unawares, initially reluctant, and that the movement is led by secular youth, students, and unemployed workers from the slums, not bearded fundamentalists demanding Sharia law. He cites the Islamist cleric al-Qaradawi urging protesters not to attack state institutions and the testimony of activist Hossam el-Hamalawy on the Brotherhood’s internal divisions and decline.
The international dimension is treated with biting sarcasm. Woods contrasts Obama’s belated calls for democracy and jobs with the $2 billion annual US subsidy to Mubarak’s regime, much of it spent on arms, including tear gas canisters marked “Made in the USA”. He argues that Washington’s real concern is the loss of a key regional ally who propped up the fraudulent “peace process” and supported the “war on terror”. The chapter concludes with a strategic assessment of the army’s position. Woods notes the fraternisation between soldiers and protesters and the crucial distinction between the poorly paid, brutal Central Security Force and the more respected army command under General Tantawi. He argues that the regime’s days are numbered, but warns that without a revolutionary party of the type represented by Lenin’s Bolsheviks, the revolution risks deadlock or a military-brokered transition. The fall of Mubarak, however, will open the floodgates for working-class struggle, turning the fight for democracy into a fight for socialism.