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The ILP in transition

Core Argument

In 1943, the Independent Labour Party (ILP) convened its Jubilee conference, an event that laid bare the party’s accelerating evolution under the pressures of early working-class radicalisation. While membership and finances had improved, the leadership—once centrist and sectarian—was now capitulating to the Labour bureaucracy. The previous year’s conference had seen a left wing crystallise around the correct Marxist position: demanding that Labour end the coalition and struggle for power on a socialist programme. The leadership evaded this challenge. In the intervening months, the Fourth Internationalists’ analysis was confirmed: Labour workers were moving towards class independence, ignoring the ILP’s “Socialist Britain Now” campaign. Thrown off balance, the leadership now spoke of Labour’s “revolutionary potentialities” and the possibility of converting it to socialism, while refusing to expose the Labour leadership’s real nature. Maxton argued that Labour leaders were “decent” and that rank-and-file workers were equally to blame. The leadership rejected a resolution to contest by-elections against Labour, revealing its policy as the left flank of Labour reformism. The ILP, it seemed, would likely re-affiliate to the Labour Party when mass pressure forced an end to the coalition—a progressive step for a non-revolutionary party, accelerating differentiation within it.

The conference was marked by confusion, trivial debates, and the leadership’s evasion of principled issues. The left wing, though inexperienced, grew in confidence and support. The leadership’s confusion was starkly displayed in discussions on fascism and the Beveridge plan, where it took an out-and-out reformist stand. This mirrored the ILP’s historical trajectory: it had rejected the Leninist 21 points in 1920, moving from a centrist to a reformist position, and had refused to fight Labour Party leaders as betrayers of the working class. Now, the leadership repeated this history, but with different, unexpected results. The Jubilee conference showed an accelerated evolution, with leaders believing that victory ensured growth and a safe haven in the Labour Party. In reality, coming events would test all programmes, and revolutionary workers in the ILP would grasp centrism’s true nature.

The leadership also evaded principled discussion on internationalism. The London Bureau, its claimed international affiliate, had collapsed: the American Lovestoneite group dissolved itself, the Norwegian group returned to the Second International, the German SAP backed the “democracies” in war, Doriot’s French group ended in fascism, and the Swedish section fused with the Communist Party. The Spanish POUM, the best centrist party, failed the revolutionary test through vacillation, contributing to its own destruction. The ILP would likely grow in numbers, but this would intensify differentiation and clashes. Its all-inclusive method would destroy the Party as it had destroyed the Bureau. A growing left wing of working-class elements must pursue theoretical education and hardening. With systematic work, it could win the best workers to genuine Marxism. The ILP’s debacle was inevitable, and its best elements would break with centrism for the Fourth International.