A dash for the borders¶
Core Argument¶
A Dash for the Borders
This chapter argues that the Second World War’s closing phase is defined not by a unified Allied war effort against fascism, but by a naked imperialist scramble for Eastern Europe. The core contention is that both Anglo-American imperialism and the Stalinist bureaucracy are manoeuvring to secure spheres of influence, each fearing the other’s domination more than they desire the defeat of Germany. The Red Army’s advance toward the Balkans is presented as a revolutionary threat the ruling classes of all countries recognise: regardless of Stalin’s intentions, the arrival of Soviet troops would ignite uprisings among Balkan peoples. Consequently, the Western Allies are racing to occupy the region first, while the reactionary regimes of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria wait to betray their German patrons and strike deals with Anglo-American capital, emulating the treachery of Darlan and Badoglio.
The chapter draws on the wartime journal War and the Working Class, cited via the Daily Worker of September 1943, to expose a specific instance of Allied bad faith. When the Red Army was hard-pressed and the Germans threatened Baku, the Soviet government requested military assistance. The British response was not to station troops alongside Soviet forces on the active front, but to propose occupying the oil-rich Trans-Caucasus region of Baku and Tiflis—an area where no front existed and no battles could be fought. The text interprets this as a predatory design to seize Soviet oil fields in the event of a Red Army collapse, not a genuine attempt at military cooperation.
The chapter also dissects the Stalinist bureaucracy’s contradictory position. Stalin does not desire revolution in Europe, but he cannot accept an Anglo-American-dominated Eastern Europe, which would become an “iron ring” around the USSR. His regime’s new prominence for the Orthodox Church is analysed as a cynical foreign-policy tool: it reassures American imperialists of Stalin’s reactionary turn, exerts influence over reactionary Slav elements, and signals to Eastern European ruling classes that Stalin seeks accommodation, not insurrection. Yet the Russian press simultaneously reveals a deep fear of future Western imperialist encirclement.
The Polish government-in-exile’s sudden claim to territories seized from Russia in 1920 is presented as evidence of prior collusion with Anglo-American imperialism. Churchill’s prolonged Washington conference is highlighted as the site where the “key question” of relations with Russia dominated discussions. The chapter polemicises sharply against the notion that the Soviet Union can be saved for socialism by military victories alone. It dismisses any lasting agreement between Stalin and the Western powers as impossible—the Hitler-Stalin pact lasted less than two years, and the Anglo-Soviet pact is already “trembling in the balance.” The final argument is unequivocal: only the victory of socialist revolution in Europe can secure the Soviet Union and guarantee peace.