Correspondence June - September 1943¶
Core Argument¶
Here the correspondence of mid-1943 reveals the British Trotskyist movement at a critical juncture, where the imperative for organisational unity is repeatedly asserted but continually frustrated by factional manoeuvring and unresolved political differences. The letters, primarily between Ted Grant of the Workers' International League (WIL) and M. Loris of the International Secretariat (IS), alongside communications with the Revolutionary Socialist League (RSL) and the Trotskyist Opposition (TO), chart the tortuous path toward a single British section of the Fourth International.
The core narrative thrust is the WIL’s attempt to force a serious, politically-grounded unification process against what it perceives as irresponsible and vacillating behaviour from other groups. Grant’s letter to the TO is notably blunt, refusing to engage in “discussion for the sake of discussion.” He demands that the TO clarify its organisational status—whether it remains a faction of the RSL or a separate entity—and insists that any talks must be based on a written statement of political agreements and disagreements, not abstract slogans like “democratic centralism.” Grant argues that the TO’s campaign around this principle is “worthless” unless linked to the concrete “political and tactical tasks of the British fourth internationalists.” The letter is a polemic against a pattern of endless, unproductive debate that had characterised the previous eighteen months, placing the responsibility for deterioration squarely on the TO leadership.
A key claim, advanced by Grant and supported by Loris, is that the dissolution of the Comintern and the general development of the war situation made a solution to the “British problem” increasingly urgent. Loris, writing from the IS, reinforces this, stating that the evolution of the groups is “quite clear” and that a settlement must be reached before “coming events catch us unprepared.” However, Loris gently corrects Grant’s approach to the TO, arguing that negotiations for unification cannot be separated from the internal factional struggle inside the RSL. He defends Lawrence’s policy of bringing issues into the open for educational effect, a tactic that had reportedly already spurred a new opposition against the RSL leader, DDH.
The correspondence also touches on the fraught question of international discipline and personal letters. Grant had complained about unauthorised correspondence from American comrades (Stuart, Cooper) to British members. Loris dismisses this as a procedural issue, stating such letters carry only the authority of their signatories and that the IS will issue official positions only when it deems necessary. This exchange highlights the tension between the WIL’s desire for a structured, centrally-directed unification and the more fluid, factional politics tolerated by the international leadership.
The chapter concludes with the WIL preparing for its October convention, forwarding a resolution on unification to Loris and seeking his views. A final, sardonic letter from the WIL Political Bureau to Gerry Healy grants him permission to approach the RSL leadership with his unity proposal, but frames it as an exercise to “expose” the Bureau’s alleged obstructionism. The tone is one of weary tactical permission, not genuine hope, underscoring the deep mistrust that pervaded the movement even as the objective need for unity grew more pressing.