Class struggle on the industrial field¶
Core Argument¶
Here the author argues that the immediate post-war economic boom, while granting the Labour government a temporary respite, will paradoxically fuel an explosion of industrial militancy. Workers, emboldened by full employment and the promise of reform, will launch direct struggles for improved hours and conditions, bypassing the parliamentary arena. The chapter’s core narrative thrust is that this industrial combat—not political debate within the Labour Party—will be the primary terrain of class struggle in the coming period, and that the slump will eventually strip away any concessions won, transforming the character of the fight.
Key claims are supported by a catalogue of recent strikes: the dock strike, the London building trades movement, the engineers, and the tinplate strike in South Wales. The author notes that these major struggles “passed by without affecting the internal life of the Labour parties,” demonstrating that industrial militancy does not automatically translate into political realignment. The “epidemic of little strikes” among previously quiescent strata—dairy workers, tinplate workers—is presented as evidence that the struggle is broadening. Crucially, many of these strikes revolve around workers’ control of hiring and firing, which the author interprets as an “instinctive preparation” for a future demand for workers’ control of production itself.
The chapter draws on a Marxist theoretical framework that treats the economic base (the industrial field) as the determinant of political superstructure (the Labour Party). It situates itself in the immediate post-war conjuncture of the Attlee government, predicting that the Labour government will side with employers against militant workers, thereby generating “deep hostility from the Left” and preventing a new mass orientation toward the party. The author argues that the trade union apparatus will become “further integrated into the state apparatus” via Joint Production committees and class-collaborationist bodies, but that this will provoke a crystallising opposition movement.
The polemic is directed against two targets. First, against reformist illusions that nationalisation (e.g., of the mines) will deliver genuine benefits; the author warns that the miners will soon realise “the fraud of the reformist nationalisation measures.” Second, against the failed strategy of the Militant Workers Federation, which “failed to strike roots” during and after the war. The chapter instead points to the unofficial co-ordinating bodies thrown up by the dock strike and building trades movement as the correct organisational form. The party’s task is to integrate itself with these bodies, link them regionally and nationally, and recruit from the industrial militants—including Labour and Communist Party members—who will form the core of the Revolutionary Communist Party’s growth.