Lessons of the Dockers’ Strike¶
Core Argument¶
Lessons of the Dockers’ Strike
This chapter argues that the dockers’ strike marked a qualitative leap in working-class consciousness, not merely in militancy but in political and organisational understanding. For the first time since the formative, militant period of the transport unions, the dockers built their own strike organisations — and these were opposed to the official union structure. In the early labour movement, strike organisation and official union organisation were synonymous because the unions were still fighting for recognition. Now, the official leaders are tied to the capitalists and the state machine, so rank-and-file organisation is the only means to maintain, unite, and direct militancy against capitalist reaction.
The key claim is that the dockers demonstrated an unprecedented grasp of the role of the union bureaucrats and how to combat them. The chapter cites Donovan’s attempts to persuade the dockers back to work: the strike committees in London and Liverpool ensured every branch member attended official meetings, swamping and voting down Donovan and his officials. This, the author asserts, is “the beginning of the end for the trade-union bureaucrats.” Crucially, the strike committees rejected calls for splits from the unions, explaining that such splits would play into the hands of the Donovans and Deakins. Instead, they advocated a struggle within the unions to oust the existing leadership. This strategic line is presented as a major contribution to the labour movement, already influencing building workers who demanded “Coppock must go.”
However, the chapter is sharply critical of the strike committees’ failure to reach beyond their own ranks. The greatest factor against the dockers was the hostility or neutrality of other sections of the working class and the public. The committees voluntarily limited their struggle: they did not circularise union, Labour Party, or Co-op branches; they did not publish leaflets explaining their case; they did not send speakers to other workers’ demonstrations, such as the building workers’ Hyde Park rally. Most damningly, they failed to issue an appeal to soldiers who, reports indicated, had “no heart to scab upon their fellow workers.” This failure is characterised as an “unfortunate mistake” that could have altered the entire situation.
The chapter draws on the historical context of the Labour government deploying troops to break the strike, arguing this was a deliberate act to save the capitalists from certain defeat. The Labour government understood that concessions to the dockers would start a “snowball running down a hill.” The strike, despite the committees’ protests, was in fact political — in its organisation, demands, and confrontation with the Labour government. The chapter claims that the strike committees, in some cases consciously, put forward the programme of the Revolutionary Communist Party, and that “the ideas of revolutionary communism took flesh and blood form.” This is why the capitalist press attacked the RCP.
The polemic is directed against three targets: the trade-union bureaucrats (Donovan, Deakins, Coppock), the Labour government as strikebreakers for capital, and the strike committees themselves for their failure to agitate beyond their own ranks. The chapter concludes that the strike has already won a victory — the unity and rank-and-file organisation forged in struggle — and calls for a permanent national rank-and-file movement to prepare for future battles.