7. The Irresistible Rise of Adolfo Suárez 1976-77: “A normal Man”¶
Core Argument¶
Adolfo Suárez’s ascent to power was not the triumph of a visionary democrat but the elevation of a political chameleon whose very lack of principle constituted a form of political realism. A product of the Francoist bureaucracy, Suárez had risen by being obedient, silent, and conformist, avoiding both enemies and commitments. His appointment as prime minister in July 1976 transformed a political nobody into a figure of significance; the office itself conferred greatness upon him. The liberal press reacted with dismay—Ricardo de la Cierva wrote “What a mistake!” in El País—while the right and extreme right were exultant.
Suárez’s rise was made possible by the paralysis of the Arias government. By mid-1976, the Cortes had rejected even modest penal code reform, the economy was in crisis with massive capital flight, and King Juan Carlos had already signalled to Washington that Arias was an “unmitigated disaster”. The Vitoria massacre threatened a general strike, and Spain’s banking elite saw that Arias’s vacillation risked revolution. At a decisive meeting on 4 May 1976 at Ignacio Coca’s villa, nineteen leading bankers, including the presidents of the Bank of Bilbao, Banco de Santander, and Banco Popular, agreed to fund Suárez’s political project. Emilio Botín summarised their demand: “Money and organisation.” Suárez received 500 million pesetas to create a party serving the Spanish right.
Torcuato Fernández-Miranda, the king’s éminence grise, identified Suárez as the ideal successor: pliable, ambitious, and utterly loyal. The king rejected Fraga Iribarne as too tainted by the Vitoria massacre and Areilza as too independent and intellectual. He needed a careerist who would obey without question. Suárez’s success derived not from strategic vision but from bureaucratic skill, calculated ambiguity, and the poor quality of his rivals.
Suárez then produced the Law of Political Reform, calling for a two-chamber Cortes elected by universal suffrage, an amnesty, and general elections before 30 July 1977. The existing Francoist Cortes approved it by 425 votes to 59. Suárez dispensed with his mentor Fernández-Miranda, who resigned on 3 May 1977, and purged the army top, dismissing General Fernando de Santiago despite opposition from the king. From September 1976, Suárez was in regular secret contact with PCE leader Santiago Carrillo, preventing Carrillo from criticising PSOE leader Felipe González from the left. Suárez deliberately assisted the PSOE to gain an advantage over the Communists, holding his first interview with González on 10 August and allowing the PSOE to hold its first congress inside Spain since the Civil War in December 1976, one week before the Referendum for Political Reform. González sold out the PCE to gain a head start. The December Referendum was a manufactured fraud, promoting “freedom without anger” to deny the Spanish people justice after forty years of repression. While Suárez manoeuvred at the top, the regime continued beating, torturing and murdering; on May Day the Guardia Civil attacked peaceful demonstrators. The Political Reform Act passed on 18 November 1976, abolishing the National Movement, legalising parties and unions, and establishing a two-tier chamber. The referendum on 15 December saw 94% approval on 77% turnout. The result strengthened Suárez, who then opened formal talks with the opposition ‘Committee of Nine’. González accepted the monarchy in exchange for the PSOE’s legalisation.