5. March 1976: The Floodgates Open¶
Core Argument¶
Franco’s death in November 1975 did not bring stability but unleashed a revolutionary upsurge of extraordinary scale. Between 1976 and 1978, 13.2 million working days were lost, involving 5.7 million workers — 60% of the working population. Despite a deepening economic crisis, wages rose under strike pressure. Economic demands for sliding wage scales, shorter hours, and safety rapidly fused with political ones: an end to dictatorship, democratic rights, amnesty, and the dissolution of the Francoist trade union apparatus. Repression backfired, radicalising workers further. In January 1976, Madrid came close to a general strike. Twenty-five thousand metalworkers struck in December; by January, Metro, postal, rail, telecom, construction, and bank workers had joined. Official estimates counted 100,000 strikers and 21 million hours lost. Metro workers issued public apologies and solidarity appeals; 70,000 pesetas were raised from other striking factories. Denied meeting spaces, workers occupied churches. The government militarised the Metro and postal services, but strikers held firm: out of 2,500 Metro workers, only five voted to return. Massive demonstrations mixed wage and political slogans; some suburbs were effectively taken over by demonstrators. The regime was weak, divided between the intransigent ‘Bunker’ and reformists, and lacked any social base. The old fear of repression was broken.
A one-day general strike saw street fighting where police were bombarded with objects, including a sewing machine and a refrigerator thrown from workers’ flats. Millions then swept through Andalusia in demonstrations formally demanding regional autonomy but actually driven by unemployment, misery, and hunger. Student revolts erupted in February, closing Valladolid University. Ana Muñoz describes the Complutense University of Madrid as a hotbed of revolutionary activity, with daily demonstrations and constant police repression. Police used informers, infiltrated meetings, and trapped students against metal fences for beatings; students removed the fences the next morning. Intellectuals and artists joined the opposition. The journal Cambio 16 was closed and its editor fined. Singers set anti-fascist poetry to music; actors interrupted performances to join strikes. Middle-class opposition grew; one comrade, Emilio, dressed in black until Franco died, then wore red and played the Internationale through villages.
Prime Minister Arias Navarro, nicknamed ‘the Butcher of Malaga’, promised “firmness and severity” while maintaining “organic democracy.” His cabinet comprised loyal Francoists. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Vice President and Interior Minister, is depicted as a pugnacious, ambitious, and egotistical figure lacking principles, whose political line zigzagged but ultimately dragged him to the right. Despite a reputation as a ‘liberal’, he brutally repressed protesters, famously declaring “La calle es mía.” The dictatorship had feet of clay, lacking a labour bureaucracy to control workers. The government’s ‘reform’ — a plan for “Spanish-style democracy” and “reform in continuity” — was a blatant attempt to preserve Francoism, legalising some parties but excluding the Communist Party. This was doomed to fail amidst mounting class struggle. The regime combined concessions with ferocious repression, including systematic torture detailed in sworn statements. The ruling class closed ranks around King Juan Carlos, a colourless mediocrity pushed forward to fill the power vacuum, acting as a willing tool to avoid being overcome by the revolutionary wave. Fearing that social radicalisation threatened the monarchy, Juan Carlos resolved to sideline Arias and broker a pact between Adolfo Suárez and opposition leaders, aiming to save the regime through cosmetic concessions. Despite having spent his adult life currying favour with Franco, he now presented himself as a democrat. The author argues that opposition leaders were predisposed to accept this, likening it to the tale of the emperor’s new clothes. Meanwhile, Spanish capitalism, weakened by protectionism, sought entry into the European Economic Community. West Germany’s SPD, fearing an uncontrolled transition like Portugal’s, supported Fraga’s pseudo-reforms, believing democratic parties and unions had to operate legally to prevent communist domination of the opposition, and used financial leverage to control socialist leaders.