3. The International Context¶
Core Argument¶
The 1973 world recession struck Spain with singular ferocity, doubling its trade deficit to 340 billion pesetas—the largest globally—and exposing the deep structural weaknesses of Spanish capitalism. A parasitic ruling class, favouring speculation over productive investment, had rendered the economy chronically uncompetitive. By February 1976, a ten per cent devaluation of the peseta still left exports covering only forty-five per cent of imports. New capital investment collapsed from 12.5 per cent growth in 1973 to a four per cent contraction in 1975; by 1976, the state itself accounted for a third of gross national investment. Inflation surged from twelve to twenty per cent, while the cost of basic necessities rose by forty per cent, and bread prices alone increased by thirty-five to forty per cent in early 1976. Capital flight was massive.
These conditions ignited explosive class struggle. In Pamplona, traditionally a reactionary stronghold, forty thousand workers struck in solidarity with 200 sacked engineering workers at Motor Ibérica. A general strike on 14 June 1973 involved 25,000 strikers, with assemblies, barricades, and clashes with police using anti-riot weapons. The strike spread across Navarre and inspired solidarity actions in Irún, Beasain, Barcelona, and Zaragoza. Crucially, the middle class actively supported the workers, the Church distanced itself from the regime, and the Carlists—formerly Franco’s crack troops—moved into opposition. Between 1970 and 1972, the Carlist Party under Carlos Hugo had swung sharply left, declaring itself a federal, democratic class party aiming for a socialist monarchy based on Yugoslav workers’ self-management. A layer of Navarrese priests broke from the church to join Maoism, founding the ORT and the SU trade union.
The regime’s authority was visibly crumbling. By 1974, strikes in Asturias, Barcelona, Ferrol, and Madrid involved workers refusing to submit demands through the state-controlled Sindicato Vertical, directly challenging the state itself. The regime alternated between concessions and ferocious repression: it authorised police to use weapons, closed the journal Cambio 16, shot strikers dead, and arrested and tortured militants. Yet repression yielded diminishing returns. In 1974, 5,000 workers were fired and 25,000 suspended for political reasons; the Tribunal of Public Order held around 2,000 trials affecting 5,000 people. Strikes were increasingly motivated by solidarity rather than wage demands. By 1975, half of all labour contracts were imposed without consent, up from 6.5 per cent in 1972; official figures recorded 3,156 labour conflicts involving 650,000 workers. Even the Catholic Church distanced itself, with worker priests supporting strikers. Former fascist ministers resigned, and the upper classes sought non-Falangist party cards. A petition by 500 civil servants demanding democratic rights showed the rot had spread to the regime’s heart.
The Portuguese Revolution of 25 April 1974, where the MFA overthrew the Caetano dictatorship and workers occupied workplaces and nationalised over half the economy, had a tremendous impact in Spain. Spanish ruling circles panicked, fearing the army might break as in Portugal. Prime Minister Arias Navarro secretly sought US support for an invasion of Portugal, but the Americans were unenthusiastic. The Democratic Military Union (UMD) emerged among Spanish officers demanding democratic rights, but was crushed by summer 1975. Meanwhile, King Hassan II of Morocco seized the Spanish Sahara for its phosphate deposits. Franco’s death agony prompted the Green March of 350,000 Moroccans into the Western Sahara. Spain’s leaderless cabinet, fearing a colonial war with Morocco and mindful of the Portuguese dictatorship’s fate in Africa, surrendered the Sahara without a fight. The regime’s weakness meant it could not contemplate aggression against revolutionary Portugal, as Spanish troops would have been immediately affected by the revolution.
On 3 April 1973, police shot dead building worker Manuel Fernandez during a strike at a FECSA thermoelectric plant in Sant Adrià del Besòs, linked to the Siemens combine and controlled by the sons of Franco supporter Juan March. Workers had refused to work after FECSA refused to negotiate with elected unofficial representatives.