16. The Military Struggle under Negrin-Prieto¶
Core Argument¶
Chapter 16: The Military Struggle under Negrin-Prieto¶
The Negrin-Prieto government, rather than correcting the catastrophic military errors of its predecessor, intensified them. Its conduct of the war was marked by political discrimination, strategic betrayal, and a deepening hostility towards the revolutionary aspirations of the working class and the national minorities. On the national question, the regime moved decisively to the right, suppressing Catalan autonomy and refusing it to Galicia, thereby extinguishing the very national energies that could have galvanised the anti-fascist struggle. In the military sphere, Prieto maintained a policy of discriminatory aircraft allocation and pursued a passive naval strategy. Morale was further shattered by a cut in militiamen’s pay from ten to seven pesetas daily, while officers continued to receive substantially more.
The consequences of this approach were most starkly revealed on the Aragon front. The 29th Division, composed of former POUM militiamen, was deliberately exposed during an offensive, with artillery and air support withheld. After the attack, the division was surrounded, disarmed, and its leaders arrested. The Ascaso Division, a CNT formation, was similarly undermined. Troops went unpaid for months and faced starvation. The northern front, however, provided the most damning evidence of bourgeois treachery. Bilbao’s vaunted ‘iron ring’ fortifications were surrendered without a siege. The Basque bourgeoisie, preferring the preservation of property to a destructive fight, handed the city over intact. Basque regular army and police disarmed Asturian and Santander militiamen, released fascist hostages, and facilitated the capitulation. The Basque general staff later fled to France on a British warship, taking remaining fascist hostages with them. Santander fell shortly after, with fifteen thousand militiamen executed after being surrounded.
The text argues that this was no accident. British banks had extended credits to Franco secured against Bilbao’s products, and the gap in the ‘iron ring’ was deliberate. The government instituted no investigation into the treachery, despite Prieto’s own El Socialista admitting its presence at Málaga, Bilbao, and Santander. The Stalinists’ September statement blamed the Basque bourgeoisie for retaining privileges, but the text notes the Communist Party had previously led the struggle against interference with the big bourgeoisie, denouncing ‘socialisation’ as impermissible. In Asturias, militiamen fought bitterly, destroying villages before retreating. Gijon fell when the government evacuated its functionaries, leaving the armed masses. Civil and Assault Guards went over to Franco; the city and its factories fell intact. The text concludes that the Negrin-Stalin government was, unequivocally, ‘the government of defeat’.