2. The Bourgeois ‘Allies’ in the Peoples Front¶
Core Argument¶
This chapter argues that the fatal error of the Spanish workers’ parties in the People’s Front was the assumption that their bourgeois allies—Azaña’s Republican Left, Martínez Barrio’s Republican Union, Companys’ Catalan Left, and the Basque Nationalists—were equally committed to defeating fascism. The author contends that no vital interest of the liberal bourgeoisie was menaced by Franco. Unlike the working class, whose trade unions and very existence were at stake, the liberal bourgeoisie faced only minor inconveniences under fascism: professional politicians might need new careers, liberal newspapers might close, but the basic strata of the liberal bourgeoisie would retain the advantages of low wages and curtailed social services. Evidence from Germany and Italy is cited to show that while trade union officials were extirpated, the liberal bourgeoisie found room to be assimilated. The core claim is class-based: fascism is primarily the enemy of the working class, so bourgeois elements in the Popular Front cannot be relied upon to prosecute the struggle seriously.
The chapter then moves from deductive analysis to concrete historical record. It recalls that the Comintern itself called Azaña a fascist from 1931 to 1934, and quotes the Comintern’s own admission that Azaña was ‘an enemy of the working class’ whose victory would bring only ‘a certain amount of relief from the repression, for a time at least’. The author draws on the record of Azaña’s 1931-33 government: it promised land to peasants and gave none, refused unemployment relief, left the reactionary officer caste intact, enforced laws against civilian criticism of the army, left church wealth untouched, and kept Morocco in the hands of Moorish mercenaries. The same pattern repeated in the February-July 1936 Popular Front government: strikes declared illegal, workers’ demonstrations broken up, labour press censored, and hundreds of strikers arrested. Most damningly, Azaña restored General Mola—who had fled with the monarchy—to his command, left Franco, Goded, and Queipo de Llano in place, and in March 1936 issued a government statement giving the army a clean bill of health despite documented evidence of the fascist plot. The reactionary leaders praised Azaña accordingly.
The other bourgeois parties fare no better. Companys’ Catalan Esquerra had reduced the CNT to semi-legal status before October 1934 and chose to knuckle under to Gil Robles rather than arm the workers. Martínez Barrio’s Republican Union was merely reconstituted from Lerroux’s Radicals, who had crushed an anarchist rising in December 1933. The Basque Nationalists had supported Gil Robles in crushing the Asturian Commune of October 1934 and only hesitated to join Franco because of their ties to Anglo-French imperialism.
The chapter culminates in the exposure of Azaña’s treachery in the first days of the revolt. On July 17-18, 1936, the government suppressed news of the rising, issued dishonest notes claiming ‘absolute tranquillity’, and refused to arm the workers despite their clamour. Azaña replaced Premier Casares Quiroga with the right-wing Barrio and spent the night hunting for bourgeois leaders outside the Popular Front to form a cabinet, while making frantic attempts to contact the military leaders for a compromise. Franco’s forces refused any face-saving deal, demanding open military dictatorship. For two decisive days, the government paralysed resistance while garrisons rebelled. The author’s polemic is directed squarely against the Stalinist and reformist leaders who suppressed these facts and maintained the People’s Front policy, arguing that the liberal bourgeoisie’s deeper commitment to capitalism over democracy meant they would always bow before fascism. The chapter ends by noting that the workers did not wait for the government’s signal to resist.