Introduction¶
Core Argument¶
In the introduction to the new Spanish edition of Felix Morrow’s Revolution and Counter-revolution in Spain, Alan Woods argues that the Spanish Revolution of the 1930s was defeated not by the military strength of Franco, but by the betrayals of the workers’ own leaderships. The Spanish bourgeoisie, like its Russian counterpart, was too weak and fearful of the working class to confront fascism. The Popular Front—a policy of class collaboration with liberal bourgeois parties—was a Menshevik, not Leninist, conception and proved disastrous. Workers spontaneously seized factories and land from below, but lacked a revolutionary party akin to the Bolsheviks. The anarchist and POUM leaders refused to take power when it was within their grasp, instead entering bourgeois governments. Stalin’s foreign policy, driven by fear of revolution and a desire for alliances with Britain and France, actively suppressed the Spanish Revolution. The Stalinist-led PCE rebuilt the capitalist state, crushed workers’ committees and collectives, and murdered POUM leaders. The liquidation of the revolution led directly to military defeat and Franco’s victory.
The PCE’s policy of “first win the war, then carry out the revolution” culminated in catastrophe. Between 26 March and 1 April 1939, Colonel Casado and the right-wing socialist Besteiro staged a coup, purged Communists, and sought peace with Franco. Franco demanded unconditional surrender; hundreds of thousands of Republicans were arrested, interned, or murdered. Madrid fell on 27 March 1939 without resistance. Up to one million died in the Civil War.
After Franco’s death in 1975, a revolutionary upsurge emerged, but the PCE again prioritised a pact with the bourgeoisie. Following the Atocha murders in 1977, the PCE suppressed working-class militancy. Carrillo struck a deal with Suárez, renouncing anti-capitalist struggle and even the abolition of the monarchy. This “Democratic Transition” was a fraud: the old repressive apparatus, Church privileges, and monarchy remained intact; no fascist crimes were punished. The PCE’s opportunism caused its decline.
Today, amid economic crisis and revived class struggle, a new generation seeks answers. Podemos’s rise reflects frustration with old leaderships. A thorough, honest analysis of past mistakes is necessary. The Spanish Revolution’s lessons remain essential for future victory.