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20. Presidential Elections and Economic Crises

Core Argument

By the end of 2017, Venezuela's economic crisis compelled the government to renegotiate foreign debt, while Maduro launched a corruption offensive against PDVSA that saw officials arrested and US$4.8 billion reported lost. The Central Bank printed money for Christmas bonuses before December municipal elections, doubling the money supply from October. The text argues these moves undermined revolutionary gains and prepared the oligarchy's return. Despite immense hardships, the masses retained a class instinct to reject the right-wing opposition's overthrow attempts—a sentiment the bureaucracy cynically exploited to remain in power.

Since Maduro's presidency, three themes emerge: transforming PSUV into a control instrument, reviving foreign investment in extractive industries, and increased authoritarian measures. PSUV became a top-down structure controlling dissent, using food parcel distribution and the Fatherland Card to ensure political loyalty. Maduro opened the Arco Minero to foreign investment—a policy Chávez had rejected on environmental and indigenous rights grounds. The May 2018 presidential election saw Maduro re-elected with 6,248,864 votes on 46.07% turnout. The working class and campesinos voted overwhelmingly for Maduro, though some traditional Chavistas abstained, perceiving the government would not tackle the crisis. Imperialists increased sanctions and called for a coup. Hyperinflation pulverised wages: chicken prices rose 1,500% by mid-2018 while the minimum wage rose only 220%. Social explosion was prevented only by subsidised food parcels (CLAPs), regular bonuses funded by printing money, and migration.

The Venezuelan working class had repeatedly mobilised in defence of the revolution—defeating the 2002 US-backed coup, breaking the bosses' lockout through workers' control, occupying factories, and joining the PSUV in millions—but the revolution ended in a cul-de-sac. The missing factor was a clear revolutionary leadership capable of expropriating the oligarchy and smashing the capitalist state. Self-styled Trotskyists in the UNT squandered opportunities, acting opportunistically and sectarianly. Chávez, though sincere and moving towards socialism, was not a Marxist and failed to act against reformists and bureaucrats who sabotaged his proposals; his speeches remained largely rhetorical, and he never broke the bourgeois state. The key task for Venezuelan revolutionaries today is to build a revolutionary leadership with a clear socialist programme, drawing on the growing critical mood among Chavismo's revolutionary elements who recognise that the obstacles include not only the oligarchy and imperialism but also the reformists and bureaucrats who led the movement to a dead end.