11. Launch of PSUV and the Constitutional Referendum¶
Core Argument¶
In 2006, the Venezuelan oligarchy intensified economic sabotage, particularly in food distribution through Grupo Polar, a strategy previously tested in Chile and Nicaragua. The UNT’s Second Congress in May 2006 was paralysed by infighting over leadership elections rather than addressing workers’ problems or the upcoming presidential election, ending in chaos and splintering. The FSBT, a pro-government faction, was strengthened when Chávez appointed its leader José Ramón Rivero as Labour Minister in 2007; Rivero used his position to favour the FSBT in disputes, sometimes siding with bosses, and in April 2008 announced a new union federation, calling for disaffiliation from the UNT.
Food shortages of staples like milk, chicken, and black beans worsened before the December 2006 election, driven by hoarding, black market sales, and diversion to unregulated products. The government imposed price controls but avoided nationalising food production and distribution under democratic control. Mercal, the state distribution network, was riddled with corruption. Chávez won the December 2006 election with 62.8% of the vote and called for a new party, the PSUV, to be built from below, though this differed from Lenin’s method.
In 2007, Chávez proposed constitutional amendments for a transition to ‘Socialism for the Twenty-First Century’, subject to a December referendum. He called for Socialist Workers’ Councils (SWCs), which workers established enthusiastically but faced hostility from bureaucrats and the FSBT. The PCV proposed a law protecting SWCs, but the National Assembly took no decision. The opposition, including the Catholic Church and private media, campaigned hysterically against the reforms. The referendum on 2 December 2007 was defeated 50.65% to 49.35%, Chávez’s first electoral loss, largely because many Chavistas abstained. Despite this, Chavista rallies were five to eight times larger than opposition ones, and the working class overwhelmingly supported the Revolution.
The Bolivarian Revolution’s progress remained piecemeal and ad-hoc, lacking a revolutionary party as its subjective factor. Chávez’s radical announcements stayed within the bounds of the bourgeois state, and activism substituted for analysis. Factory occupations like Inveval, led by Marxists, faced sabotage from the state bureaucracy and PDVSA; efforts to co-ordinate struggles via Freteco were undermined by the bureaucracy, which isolated and asphyxiated the movement. Food shortages in 2007-2008, caused by deliberate oligarchic sabotage, contributed to the referendum defeat; the crucial factor was the government’s failure to act. Laws against hoarding were not implemented. In January 2008, Chávez seized 13,000 tons of food; the National Guard confirmed Polar’s involvement in smuggling. Food smuggling was political, while fuel smuggling was more profitable. PDVAL was launched to distribute food, but production remained in a mixed economy controlled by bureaucrats. Concessions to the oligarchy in 2008 intensified scarcity. In 2009, Chávez expropriated Cargill and Polar rice plants, but the movement lacked a structure to turn calls for action into reality. Inflation and shortages hit the poorest hardest; land reform was inadequate. The bourgeois state could not implement revolutionary policies; private ownership of food production contradicted popular needs. Concessions strengthened the oligarchy and demoralised the masses.