8. The Founding of the National Workers’ Union, Co-operatives and the Recall Referendum¶
Core Argument¶
Chapter 8: The Founding of the National Workers’ Union, Co-operatives and the Recall Referendum¶
In the wake of the bosses’ lock-out, the Venezuelan class struggle entered a new phase. Many smaller factories were bankrupted, while larger companies withheld wages or used bankruptcy as a tool of economic sabotage, transferring capital abroad. Workers responded by organising democratic unions, striking, and occupying factories abandoned by their owners. The Chavista government replaced the pro-oligarch CTV with the National Workers’ Union (UNT), but the process was deeply flawed: leadership was settled by horse-trading and government functionaries, not rank-and-file involvement. The UNT’s founding congress in August 2003 passed a radical programme, yet its leadership subsequently ignored class-struggle policies, avoiding factory occupations and workers’ control.
From July 2005, the government began expropriating closed businesses—often those already occupied by workers—but compensated owners at market value. It also promoted co-operatives, offering tax exemptions and interest-free loans, sparking a boom: by 2008 over 250,000 were registered, though only a third were viable, and many reproduced capitalist relations. Meanwhile, the opposition pursued a recall referendum against Chávez. Despite fraudulent signatures and economic sabotage, Chávez won with 59.25 per cent on a 90 per cent turnout. Trotskyist groups began publicly criticising bureaucratic behaviour, proposing transitional demands including nationalisation under workers’ control and a workers’ militia. Chávez’s economic policies were radicalised after the recall victory, extending to re-nationalisation and expropriation of occupied enterprises, though state subsidies from PDVSA became essential.
Land reform followed a similarly cautious trajectory. The Decreto Zamorano required land to be uncultivated—not merely underused—for expropriation, with compensation at market rates. Peasants received the least productive land. Chávez threatened army enforcement, but Vice-President Rangel reassured landowners with proper titles had “nothing to fear”. In February 2005, the FNCEZ peasant conference criticised the slow, bureaucratic process, noting over 100 peasant leaders had been killed with no justice. It demanded armed peasant militias, observing little had been done despite Chávez’s calls. A new Land Law in April 2005 reversed a 2002 Supreme Court decision and introduced cartas agrarias allowing development before ownership was resolved. Within six months, INTI identified 5.2 million hectares for redistribution; by end of 2011, only half was ‘rescued’. More significant was regularisation of land tenancies: 5.9 million hectares between 2003 and 2011. The aim shifted from cattle, coffee and cacao to food self-sufficiency. The chapter argues that mobilisation and arming of peasants, plus integration into a national food production plan with credit and infrastructure, were necessary for reform to succeed against the oligarchs.