6. The Attempted Coup of April 2002¶
Core Argument¶
Chapter 6: The Attempted Coup of April 2002¶
The attempted coup of April 2002 laid bare the fundamental contradiction at the heart of the Bolivarian process: a revolutionary mass movement confronting a counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie that retained control of capital, media, and the state apparatus. The plot was meticulously pre-planned. Carlos Ortega of the pro-capitalist CTV called a nationwide work stoppage, while Fedecámaras urged employers to grant paid leave for anti-government protests and demanded a recall referendum. On 10 April, Brigadier General Néstor González publicly withdrew recognition of Chávez, who cancelled a foreign trip. The following day, an opposition demonstration was deliberately re-routed to clash with a pro-government rally. Gunfire killed seven Chavistas, seven oppositionists, and five bystanders. Private media falsely claimed Chavistas had fired on unarmed demonstrators. Chávez ordered private television stations off air; they switched to cable. By 9 pm, the High Command demanded his resignation; he surrendered. General Rincón falsely announced Chávez had resigned. Pedro Carmona declared himself interim president, dissolved the constitution and National Assembly, annulled the Land Law, and pledged to increase oil production above OPEC quotas. Police suppressed pro-Chávez demonstrations. CIA documents from 6 April showed detailed knowledge of the planned coup. The violence on 11 April was later proven to have been orchestrated by opposition leaders using Metropolitan Police personnel.
The coup collapsed on 13 April due to a spontaneous mass uprising from the barrios, led by women, who surrounded Miraflores. Pro-Chávez military units declared for him. This mass action was unprecedented in Latin America: it defeated a military coup. Yet Chávez failed to capitalise. Appearing on the Miraflores balcony holding a crucifix and the constitution, not a sword, he declared no thirst for revenge, released arrested plotters, and told the crowd to go home. This allowed the opposition to regroup. The Chavista rank-and-file understood the threat better than Chávez. Bolivarian Circles expanded rapidly to 200,000 groups with 2 million members by end of 2003, organising food, medical and education provision separately from the MVR. However, dispersed and lacking class consciousness, they posed no existential threat to the oligarchy. The coup proved revolution was possible but failed due to the absence of a party to develop revolutionary consciousness and strategy. The TSJ dismissed charges against senior coup officers by 11-8, ruling a ‘power vacuum’ not a coup, and later rescinded Articles 89 and 90 of the constitution, ending land seizures. The legal establishment sided with the bourgeoisie. The regime should have built rank-and-file Bolivarian committees in the military.