10. Revolution Under Siege (1985)¶
Core Argument¶
The chapter dissects the internal decay of the Sandinista Front (FSLN) during the mid-to-late 1980s, arguing that its Stalinist, stagist political perspective and lack of internal democracy fatally undermined the Nicaraguan revolution. The core narrative traces how the FSLN leadership, particularly Daniel Ortega, consolidated personal power while clinging to a failed alliance with the national bourgeoisie, thereby sacrificing the working class and betraying the revolution’s socialist potential.
The chapter’s key claim is that the FSLN’s refusal to break with capitalist property relations—preserving a “mixed economy” and offering incentives to the bourgeoisie “more even than the workers”—was a strategic catastrophe rooted in a stagist theory that insisted on completing a stage of “national liberation” before attempting social liberation. Tomás Borge’s admission that the regime had “sacrificed the working class in favour of the economy” is presented as damning evidence. The chapter contrasts this with the necessary step of moving toward a planned economy to reverse economic decline, a step the leadership resisted. The Contra War is cited as the external pressure that forced conscription and a state of emergency, but the chapter emphasises that the FSLN used this emergency to ban strikes and equate labour indiscipline with capitalist sabotage, revealing its hostility to working-class militancy.
A central polemic is directed against the FSLN’s internal structure, which the chapter condemns as a military-style, top-down apparatus inherited from its guerrilla origins. The absence of a party congress until 1991, the appointment of leaders from pre-selected lists, and the suppression of democratic discussion are contrasted with Lenin’s Bolshevik model of maximum internal debate combined with disciplined action. The chapter argues that without such mechanisms, the party inevitably became dictatorial, with Ortega emerging as a “Napoleon” figure in the mould of Stalin or Mao. The demotion of rivals like Henry Ruiz and the undermining of Jaime Wheelock are presented as evidence of Ortega’s personal consolidation of power, supported by his brother Humberto and Leticia Herrera.
The chapter also launches a fierce polemic against the FSLN’s record on women’s rights. It cites a study showing that botched illegal abortions were the single greatest cause of death and injury to women between 1985 and 1988, exceeding female casualties from the Contra War. The leadership’s refusal to legalise abortion, citing the opposition of the Catholic Church, is condemned as a betrayal of revolutionary principles. The chapter highlights the hypocrisy of a self-proclaimed socialist government tolerating a law that required a woman’s nearest male relative to petition for a therapeutic abortion, while thousands died from back-street procedures.
The Atlantic Coast autonomy process is noted as a partial reversal of earlier FSLN policy, with Tomás Borge’s 1985 report recognising indigenous rights to language, culture, and self-organisation. However, this is presented as a grudging concession rather than a principled initiative. The chapter concludes by underscoring the FSLN’s commitment to a Scandinavian model rather than socialism, a position Ortega explicitly stated in a 1986 Time interview, confirming the leadership’s abandonment of any revolutionary trajectory.