4. Revolution: The FSLN comes to Power¶
Core Argument¶
The Somoza dictatorship, by concentrating all class antagonisms into a single autocratic target, created the objective conditions for a ‘national revolution’ uniting the bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeoisie, peasantry and proletariat. The central question, however, was which class would seize leadership of this anti-dictatorial movement. The murder of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro in January 1978 triggered a general strike that shut down 80% of businesses, yet the big capitalists of the Banamérica and BANIC groups refused to participate. The Broad Opposition Front (FAO) quickly capitulated under pressure from the US embassy, confirming the Trotskyist thesis that the national bourgeoisie in semi-colonial countries will not complete the democratic and anti-imperialist struggle. In Monimbó, a spontaneous uprising held off the National Guard for a week; the Tercerista Tendency recruited survivors into the FSLN. The August 1978 seizure of the National Palace secured prisoner releases, and the September offensive saw FSLN forces occupy cities before retreating under fierce repression that killed over 5,000 people. The FSLN acted according to its own timetable, not the mass movement’s level of activity, revealing a serious failure to appreciate how masses mobilise.
At the end of 1978, Cuban mediation reunified the three FSLN tendencies; Castro made aid conditional on unity but advised a class-collaborationist, bourgeois democratic perspective. On 17 June 1979, the FSLN agreed to the Puntarenas Pact, establishing a five-person Junta of National Reconstruction that promised a mixed economy, political pluralism, non-aligned foreign policy, and later elections. The Junta dropped plans for a Constituent Assembly in favour of a non-elected Council of State where bourgeois elements would have a clear majority. It agreed to incorporate ‘patriotic’ National Guard elements into a new army and guaranteed private property except Somoza’s. The New York Times reported that a seventeen-person advisory group, overwhelmingly bourgeois, guided economic policy; only four ministries went to FSLN members. The FAO proposed excluding the FSLN from government and disarming it; Ortega walked out. The revolutionary upsurge then overwhelmed any agreement. Somoza fled on 17 July, leaving a US$1.6 billion debt and US$80 million in damage. The urban masses, not the FSLN’s few hundred guerrillas, liberated the cities. Humberto Ortega admitted the masses led, not followed. The Junta arrived on 20 July to find the Council’s original composition obsolete; the FSLN expanded it to forty-seven seats, giving itself and allied organisations a majority. Opponents demanded the original Puntarenas terms be respected.